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THESIS

SOVIET INTEREST IN SCANDINAVIA:
AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD THE NORDIC STATES

by

James C. Easterly


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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Soviet Interest in Scandinavia: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Nordic States.		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis, June 1977
7. AUTHOR(s) James C. Easterly		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE June 1977
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 226 (2225p.)
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this Report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Given the trend toward increased interdependence and regional integration in the European state system since World War II, plus the stark reality of strategic geography, this thesis postulates that Soviet foreign policy toward any of the Scandinavian states is best comprehended from a regional perspective. Soviet interactions with the Scandinavian states through the media of the Communist Party, interstate diplomacy, trade and armed force are taken as the collective expression of Soviet interests in the region, the roots of		

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Soviet Interest in Scandinavia:
An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy
Toward the Nordic States

by

James C. Easterly
Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., University of Tennessee, 1966

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1977

Author

James C. Easterly

Approved by:

Prof. Bond Huff

Thesis Advisor

Jim Valer

Second Reader

[Signature]

Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

A. Schrad

Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

Given the trend toward increased interdependence and regional integration in the European state system since World War II, plus the stark reality of strategic geography, this thesis postulates that Soviet foreign policy toward any of the Scandinavian states is best comprehended from a regional perspective. Soviet interactions with the Scandinavian states through the media of the Communist Party, interstate diplomacy, trade and armed force are taken as the collective expression of Soviet interests in the region, the roots of Soviet foreign policy. The plan and prognosis for Soviet foreign policy, faithfully attributed by today's Soviet leaders to the wisdom and vision of Party founders, Marx and Lenin, are examined in this thesis in the light of Scandinavia's political history to gauge Scandinavia's ideological potential for Soviet cultivation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE-----	10
I. INTRODUCTION -----	23
II. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN SCANDINAVIA -----	30
III. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES -----	87
IV. TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES -----	120
V. MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SCANDINAVIAN AREA-----	148
VI. CONCLUSION-----	175
APPENDIX A: TREATY CHRONOLOGY-----	180
APPENDIX B: FINNO-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE----	203
APPENDIX C: SURVEY OF DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS-----	207
APPENDIX D: INDICATORS OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC STRENGTH -----	209
BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	213
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	225

TABLES

1.	Scandinavian Political Parties: Finland -----	79
2.	Scandinavian Political Parties: Iceland-----	81
3.	Scandinavian Political Parties: Denmark-----	82
4.	Scandinavian Political Parties: Norway -----	84
5.	Scandinavian Political Parties: Sweden -----	85
6.	Treaty Statistics: Finland -----	113a
7.	Treaty Statistics: Iceland -----	114
8.	Treaty Statistics: Norway -----	115
9.	Treaty Statistics: Sweden -----	116
10.	Treaty Statistics: Denmark -----	117
11.	Treaty Statistics: Communist Group -----	118
12.	Treaty Statistics: Soviet Union -----	119
13.	NATO Trade with Communist Countries (1972-1975) -----	131
14.	NATO Trade with Communist Countries: Imports by NATO Country (1974-1975) -----	132
15.	NATO Trade with Communist Countries: Exports by NATO Country (1974-1975) -----	133
16.	Denmark's Imports from Communist Countries (1972-1975) -----	134
17.	Denmark's Exports to Communist Countries (1972-1975) -----	135
18.	Iceland's Imports from Communist Countries (1972-1975)-----	136

TABLES (continued)

19.	Iceland's Exports to Communist Countries (1972-1975) -----	136
20.	Norway's Imports from Communist Countries (1972-1975)-----	137
21.	Norway's Exports to Communist Countries (1972-1975)-----	138
22.	European Non-NATO Trade with Communist Countries (1973-1974) -----	139
23.	Finland's Imports from Communist Countries (1973-1974)-----	141
24.	Finland's Exports to Communist Countries (1973-1974)-----	142
25.	Sweden's Imports from Communist Countries (1973-1974)-----	144
26.	Sweden's Exports to Communist Countries (1973-1974)-----	146

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author is indebted to Dr. Nils Orvik, Director, Centre for International Relations, Queens University, Kingston, Canada; Mr. Eric Willenz, Chief, USSR and East Europe Section, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State; Ms. Luci Kornei, Special Assistant for European Economic Relations, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State; and Dr. Kurt London, Adjunct Professor, Naval Postgraduate School and editor of The Soviet Impact on World Affairs (Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974) for their advice and contributions of references for this study.

The author, alone, however, must accept responsibility for the methodology, conclusions and implications of the thesis.

TERMINOLOGY

Scandinavia, as used herein, encompasses the five-state area of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The term "Scandinavia" is also used interchangeably with Norden and the Nordic countries (states).

PREFACE

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

There is a strong argument from a continuum of events that the foreign policy of the USSR today is largely unchanged from that of Ivan I (1325-1341). Karl Marx observed:

One merely needs to replace one series of names and dates by others and it becomes clear that the policies of Ivan III (1462-1505) and those of Russia today are not merely similar but identical. Ivan, in turn, only perfected the traditional Muscovite policy which he inherited from Ivan I, Katila. Ivan Katila, the slave of the Mongols, achieved his greatness by deflecting the power of his greatest enemies, the Tatars, against his lesser enemies, the Russian princes. But he could guide this power only by falsehood and pretense¹

The editors of a collection of essays by Marx and Engels on Russian attitudes toward Europe summarize:

The major objective of Russian foreign policy as Marx and Engels saw it is domination of the world, or at least domination of Europe

.

We may be impressed by the Engels' prophetic vision, who in 1855 foresaw the preliminary boundaries of Russian expansionism in its march toward domination of the world. But even more impressive is the fact that the very objective of Russian foreign policy, which Engels considered the chief threat to the freedom of Europe, had now been realized by a power which pretends to follow in the footsteps of his and Marx's teachings. Let no one pretend that the case which Engels had in mind and the actual policies of Stalinism are fundamentally different.²

¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Russian Menace to Europe, ed. by Paul W. Blackstock (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), p. 12.

² Ibid., pp. 9-10.

.....
In summary, the aims and methods of Czarist foreign policy as described by Marx and Engels have striking parallels in the objectives and methods of Soviet foreign policy of the last few years.³

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

If anything would handicap the prestige of one of the most powerful states in the world and retard its freedom of action in formulating foreign policy, being effectively landlocked with access to the ocean only through the courtesy of international conventions and the permission of lesser state "gate keepers" would undoubtedly do so. This basic geographical constraint has inevitably figured prominently in the Soviet Union's strategic objectives.⁴ It is no surprise, therefore, that the Soviet Navy makes frequent "visits" to the waters of its Scandinavian neighbors, as reported by TASS, 12 November 1974:

Oslo: Norwegian high officials received a squadron of Soviet warships during a celebration of the 30th anniversary of the liberation of the northern parts of Norway by the Soviet army ... strengthening the neighborly relations and mutual understanding between the Soviet and Norwegian peoples.⁵

³ Ibid., p. 15

⁴ For a detailed treatment of the subject, see The Significance of International Straits to Soviet Naval Operations, James Paul Deaton, Naval Postgraduate School (MA Naval Intelligence, March 1975).

⁵ TASS, 12 November 1974, FBIS, Soviet Union, III (13 November 1974), E6.

As reported by the Norwegian press, the growing Soviet presence in Norway's coastal waters is disturbing.⁶ Denmark, too, has registered alarm over Soviet violations of its sovereignty in territorial waters and airspace.⁷

Generally, Soviet strategic naval activity has focused on either the Danish straits area, including the Kattegat and Skagerrak waters, or the northern extremities of Norway and Finland abutting the Kola Peninsula -- a Soviet barracks for air, ground and naval forces. Soviet war games have employed scenarios that resemble the German invasion of Scandinavia in 1940, where landing ships exited the Straits and followed the Norwegian coast northward.⁸ In view of the force concentration in Kola, a Finnish military writer has speculated that the Soviet military regards Norway potentially as one huge aircraft carrier from which to support naval operations ranging far out into the Atlantic.⁹

⁶"Defense Minister Cautions Against Economy Motivated Spending Cuts," Aftenposten, 13 January 1976, FBIS, VII (19 January 1976), p. 2; and "Nation Now More Vulnerable to Soviet Attack," Aftenposten, 4 February 1976, FBIS VII (February 11, 1976), p. 1.

⁷"Discussion with Polish Foreign Minister of Eastern Military Activity Close to Danish Territory," Berlinske Tidende, 10 February 1976, FBIS, VII (17 February 1976), p. 1.

⁸Nils Orvik, "Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two Dimensional Threat," Orbis, XVI (Fall, 1972), 725.

⁹Ibid., quote from Wolf H. Halsti, Me venja ja mut, (Helsinki: Otava, 1969).

Soviet air and naval activity is conspicuous also in the Iceland-Faero gap,¹⁰ while Warsaw Pact forces have reinforced Socialist dominance throughout the Baltic.¹¹

In a strategic survey published by the Rand Corporation in 1974, author Thomas W. Wolfe concludes that Soviet strategic parity has weakened the credibility of the U.S. dominated NATO structure; and, in the eyes of the Soviets, the U.S. is becoming "de-coupled from that alliance as its military participation wanes. If a state of military apathy is perceived by the Soviets to exist in NATO, says Wolfe, a challenge to the northern "rim of Europe" is not unlikely.¹²

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

The political perspective of Soviet foreign relations encompasses two dimensions. One, we can imagine as the horizontal plane, consists of official, state to state relations which are conducted through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a department of the Council of Ministers. The other dimension, we can imagine as the vertical plane, consists of Communist Party relations which are conducted directly by the Politburo (political bureau) of the Communist Party.¹³

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹"Discussion of Eastern Military Activity Close to Danish Territory," op. cit., p. 1.

¹²Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions in Europe, Rand Corporation, (1974), p. 36.

¹³Darrell P. Hammer, USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy, (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1974), pp. 31 and 52.

Affairs of State

As of this writing, Moscow is maintaining diplomatic relations with all the Scandinavian states. Diplomatic interaction between the Soviet Union and each of the Scandinavian states except Iceland was traced through a computer search (WEIS Program) of topical data extracted from the New York Times over a nine-year period (6/66-12/75). From 76 Soviet-Scandinavian diplomatic dialogues reported, a quantitative assessment of the harmony versus discord in diplomatic relations over time is presented in Appendix B.

The spirit of the Soviet-Finnish relationship is documented in an October, 1974, TASS account of the visit of Soviet Praesidium President Nikolay Podgornyy to Helsinki on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet-Finnish armistice and founding of the Finland-USSR Society:

The president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet pointed out that relations between the USSR and Finland 'are justly considered as an example of peaceful co-existence and cooperation of states with differing social systems.' This example is especially important now, in the contemporary situation, when significant positive changes are taking place in the international arena, including Europe, when the world moves step by step in the direction of detente, when the principles of peaceful co-existence receive broad recognition and application in practice.¹⁴

Thus, it is no coincidence that Helsinki was selected by the Soviet Union as the site for the 1975 European Security and Cooperation

¹⁴"Speech to Soviety," TASS, 14 October 1974, in FBIS - Soviet Union, III (15 October 1974), E7.

Conference, which Podgorny called "a reflection of the general recognition of Finland's services to this cause all-important for the destinies of the European continent."¹⁵ Soviet diplomacy with Finland has set the stage for Soviet relations with the remainder of Scandinavia. The immediate objective is to bring about a passivity among the USSR's pro-West neighbors that will encourage their independence from Western bloc diplomacy (e. g., NATO and the ECC) and will ultimately facilitate Soviet bidding in an alliance-free Europe.¹⁶

Party Affairs

International relations as practiced by the Soviet Union is officially, since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a promulgation of Marxist-Leninist ideology. In fact, it had been the intention of the founders of the Soviet state that it was not to continue as a state at all, but rather the epicenter for a world-wide revolution to unite the world into a politically amorphous state of socialism in quest of a utopian communism.¹⁷ Even though the forces of reality -- balance of power politics -- have inevitably brought the USSR into the mainstream of international diplomacy to insure its own survival, the Party voice in those relations has persisted. Foreign

¹⁵ Ibid., p. E8.

¹⁶ Lord Layton, "What Finlandization Means," Economist, 4 August 1973, p. 15.

¹⁷ Hammer, op. cit., p. 385.

policy is the indisputable domain of the Politburo, an expression of Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) goals.¹⁸

The management of an ideologically based foreign policy has been a challenging task. Starting with the Communist International, or Comintern, in 1919, a uniting of the world's communist parties has proven futile. Stalin himself may have unwittingly validated the cause of separatism when he advocated the dissolution of the Comintern, in 1943, and the support of Common Front organizations at the national level to defeat "fascism." The Comintern was succeeded by the Cominform, which foundered just after its christening when a charter member, Yugoslavia, bolted in the name of democratic centralism.¹⁹

It remained for another charter member, Italy, to deal the coup de grace to monolithic communism. Upon convening a session of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party on 24 January 1956, General Secretary Togliatti, (alias Ercoli), uttered perhaps the most portentous statement since Lenin:

For us, there is no doubt that the Soviet Union remains the first great historical model of conquest of power by the working class ... but this experience cannot include either the ready made solution of all the problems which today present themselves in those countries which are already ruled by the working class and the communist parties, or much less,

¹⁸Ibid., p. 372.

¹⁹Robert H. McNeal, ed., International Relations Among Communists, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 175-176.

the ready made answer to the questions which arise where, instead, the communist parties or the parties oriented toward socialism are opposition parties which moved the vanguard of the working class in Russia during and after the seizure of power. The experiment accomplished in the building of a socialist society in the Soviet Union cannot contain instruction for solving all the questions which may present themselves today to us and to the communists of other countries, whether in power or not, and to all the vanguard parties of the working class and of the people.

Thus, various points or centers of development and orientation are established . . . a polycentric system corresponding to the new situation, to the alteration in the world make-up and in the very structure of the workers' movements, and to this system correspond also new types of relations among the communist parties themselves.²⁰

Even though a Communist diaspora followed the polycentric developments of the Fifties, Moscow never abandoned its position of authority:

"Today, despite the existence of the mighty socialist system, Communists also consider the Soviet Union to be the center of the world Communist movement."²¹

In June of 1969, the third international conference of Communist parties since the dissolution of the Comintern convened in Moscow. Its foremost purpose was to align the world's Communist parties with Moscow and to ostracize the wayward Communist Party of China. Again, the unifying effort was a failure from the start. Of the 90 recognized

²⁰Ibid.

²¹I. E. Kravtsev, Proletarskii Internatsionalizm, Otechestvo i Patriotizm (Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1965), p. 298, quoted in W. W. Kulski, op. cit., p. 259.

world Communist parties, only 75 attended; and of the 14 ruling Communist parties, five were absent. One of the ruling parties, Cuba, sent only an observer rather than a participating delegate, to protest the prevailing CPSU policies in Latin America which favored recognition of existing governments rather than guerrilla insurrection.²² It is worth noting, however, that all of the Scandinavian Communist parties were represented at this last international conference. And although conference attendance revealed breaks in allegiance to Moscow, it also highlighted the expansion of the communist movement in general.

No other political movement of our time can compare with the Communist movement regarding either its total membership or the dynamic pace of its growth. This due primarily to the fact that Communist parties have become ruling parties in fourteen countries where over one-third of mankind lives. The ranks of the Communist movement have also multiplied beyond the frontiers of socialist countries. The number of communists in European capitalist countries has increased in the sixties five times (from 500,000 to²³ 2,500,000) in comparison with 1939. [emphasis added.]

Perhaps a more significant Moscow event, in terms of the changing international outlook of the Soviet Communist Party, was the centennial celebration of Lenin's birth in 1970. W. W. Kulski notes that Moscow invited a more diverse assortment of guests to this memorial than is

²²W. W. Kulski, "1969 Moscow Conference of Communist Parties," Russian Review, XXVIII (October, 1959), p. 385.

²³Zhilin, "Glavnaia tendentsiia: Aktual'nye problemy kommunisticheskovo dvizheniia," MEMO, No. 4, 1968, p. 13, quoted in Kulski, Soviet Union in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 276.

usual for such occasions. Three segments of "progressive mankind" were represented: socialist states, the non-ruling Communist parties, and the "revolutionary democrats" of the Third World.²⁴ Given this broader scope of international communist interests, the Soviets seized the occasion to proclaim the essence of the communist movement, "proletarian internationalism":

Proletarian internationalism means the international solidarity and fraternal alliance of the working people of all countries The extent of proletarian internationalism is revealed by observing the relations between the main revolutionary forces which exist in the era of transition from capitalism to socialism. These forces in our time are the world socialist system, which is the main offspring of the international workers' movement; the world Workers' and Communist movement; and the national liberation movement of those peoples who have liberated or are liberating themselves from colonial dependence . . . V.I. Lenin defined one of the principal tasks of proletarian internationalism in the following slogan: 'Proletarians of all countries and oppressed peoples, unite!'²⁵

This proclamation can be regarded as the newest theme of Soviet Communist Party international relations.

The primary link between Moscow and the national communist parties in non-socialist states is the regional conference. The regional conference can serve two purposes: it can lend respectability to national Party movements where the incumbent government is anti-communist; and it can enhance the image of the CPSU as leader and standard bearer.

²⁴Ibid., Kulski, p. 274.

²⁵Ibid.

The Scandinavian Communist parties participate in two regional organizations, the Nordic and the European. The last assembly of a Nordic Conference of Communist Parties was at Karja-Lohja, Finland during 5-7 September 1974. TASS reports:

The communist parties of the Nordic countries have declared their willingness to cooperate with all peace forces in the struggle for stronger European security and for the earliest convocation of the third stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at summit level. This is said in a communique issued by a conference of the communist parties of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.²⁶

The assembly of West European Communist Parties, held in Brussels during 25-28 January 1974, focused on "the present crisis of capitalism in Europe." Denmark, Finland and Sweden were represented there, but not Iceland and Norway. The conference concluded with a declaration calling for "an alliance of the broadest social forces, of all working class and democratic forces, to bring about a new upsurge in their common struggle" and "resistance to U.S. imperialism's attempts to heighten its already rigid control over the economics and policies of European countries and 'revitalize' NATO."²⁷ The most recent European Communist summit was held during the first week of July, 1976, in East Berlin. Delegates from all of the Scandinavian Communist parties except Iceland's attended.

²⁶ TASS, 9 September 1974, FBIS - Soviet Union, III (10 September 1974), p. E1.

²⁷ J. A. Lauwerys, Scandinavian Democracy: Development of Democratic Thought and Institutions in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, (American-Scandinavian Foundation, Publisher, 1959), p. 10.


As reported by Time correspondent Herman Nickel, the conference proved to be a forum for anti-Kremlin communists.²⁸ Spain's Party leader Santiago Carrillo summed up the effect of the assembly, "There can be no doubt that we Communists today have no center of leadership and are not bound by any international leadership." Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev himself conceded to the gathering that the USSR does not wish to reassert an "organizational center," such as the Cominform, to control national parties. The formal declaration endorsed by the Conference delegates affirmed the complete independence "of each party in accordance with the socio-economic condition and specific national features prevailing in the country concerned."

The new stance of Moscow in wary deference to "Eurocommunism" reflects a political pragmatism characteristic of the Brezhnev-Kosygin era. The preferred relationship between Moscow and Western Europe is one stressing trust, rather than authority; conflicts are to be resolved through conciliation, not coercion. This is the spirit of Helsinki, the precedence of diplomacy over dialectics. It is also the process of Finlandization.²⁹

²⁸Herman Nickel, "Communists: The Last Summit: No Past or Future," Time, 12 July 1976, p. 24.

²⁹George Kennan cautions that "Finlandization" is a theory that has no relevance beyond Scandinavia, though some would apply it to Western Europe generally. See Kennan's article, "Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices," in Foreign Policy, Spring, 1974.

For a contrary view, extending Finlandization to Europe as a whole, see R. J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe, Adelphi Paper No. 119 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975).



I. INTRODUCTION

Scandinavia is not a stranger to international conflict. From the expansion and contraction of its own Viking exploits at the turn of the first millenium (850-1050 A.D.) to the conflagration of two European wars in the present century, Scandinavia has wreaked and suffered the havoc of European warfare. Today, Scandinavia lies as a median separating the bi-polar centers of world power. Using a globe, one can run a string from Washington, D.C. to Moscow and see that it passes through the heart of Scandinavia. Similarly, using the great circle route of nearest range, the strategic forces of both powers confront each other across a Scandinavian fence. From the point of view of the Soviet Union, which is lacking an Atlantic coastline, Scandinavia, depending upon its commitment to either East or West, looms as either a defender's bulwark or an attacker's pedestal. Finland has tentatively teamed with the USSR under the provision of a 1948 treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual defense, (see Attachment A); Sweden is non-aligned and professedly neutral; Denmark and Norway are conditional members of NATO, proscribing nuclear weapons and foreign bases; and Iceland has tentatively acquiesced to non-military membership in NATO and has permitted limited use of naval and air facilities by U.S. Armed Forces.¹

¹ Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security, Adelphi Papers No. 81 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 21.

To describe the Soviet foreign policy toward this realm, I will trace Soviet relations with the five Scandinavian states through four media of interaction: Communist Party, diplomatic, trade and military.

Critical readers will rightfully question the validity of incorporating for analysis an area that includes five independent states and ranges over an expanse exceeding the distance from Paris to Istanbul. The scope of analysis is justified on four grounds. First, the pattern of Soviet international relations reveals a regional coherence;² second, the region of Scandinavia does in fact comprise a geo-strategic entity for the purposes of Soviet strategic planning and defense;³ third, the people and institutions of Scandinavia's five states (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland) exhibit a remarkable homogeneity, unequalled in any other national grouping;⁴ and fourth, a more accurate and coherent definition of Soviet foreign policy is likely to emerge from a holistic, regional survey of Soviet foreign relations than from a narrower analysis of Soviet policy toward a particular state.⁵ To fit a global perspective, the world's most powerful states are increasingly obliged to organize the

²W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs: A Documented Analysis, 1964-1972. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973), p. 9.

³Richard B. Foster, et. al., eds., Strategy for the West: American-Allied Relations in Transition (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974), p. 165.

⁴John H. Wuorinen, Scandinavia (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 3 and 11.

⁵Kulski, op. cit., p. 9.

conduct of foreign relations on a regional basis. The progress of regional integration, which affects the Scandinavian states in the form of the Nordic Council and even all-European groupings such as the EEC and the Council of Europe, demands a commensurately comprehensive scope of foreign policy.⁶ The regional nature of alliances, the regional divisions of responsibility within the U.S. State Department and the regional focus of much of the United Nations' business (Articles 51 and 52, UN Charter, for example) testify to the regional structure of global relationships and the consequent regional focus of foreign policy. Soviet foreign policy toward individual Scandinavian states is, accordingly, best seen in the context of Soviet relations collectively within the Scandinavian region.

Given the scope of analysis, there are other problems confronting the student of Soviet foreign policy. Alfred Grosser, addressing the complexity of Soviet foreign policy in Western Europe in Professor Kurt London's compendium, The Soviet Impact on World Politics, observes that

The 'foreign policy of the Soviet Union' comprises at least three different subjects that should not be confused even if they do overlap from time to time. These are:

1. The policy which is deliberately pursued by those in power in accordance with the objectives they have set.

.....

2. The policy that is in fact pursued, though not necessarily deliberately.

⁶Nils Orvik, "Nordic Cooperation and High Politics," International Organization, XXVIII (Winter, 1974), p. 62.

.....

3. The image of this policy to outside interlocutors...⁷

In the course of this paper, the Grosser differences in Soviet foreign policy will become apparent. The declared purpose of Soviet foreign policy is to further the cause of socialism through the vehicle of proletarian internationalism. This is the ideological aspect of Soviet foreign relations championed by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev proclaimed at the most recent Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held on 24 February 1976:

In the domain of foreign policy the 24th Party Congress advanced a Peace Programme. Its main purpose was to achieve a turn in international relations with reliance on the might, unity and dynamism of world socialism⁸ We Soviet Communists consider defense of proletarian internationalism the sacred duty of every Marxist-Leninist.⁹

The promotion of Marxist-Leninist ideology represents the first function of foreign policy identified by Grosser, "Policy which is deliberately pursued by those in power in accordance with the objectives they have set." This ideological aspect of foreign policy is seen in Soviet support

⁷ Alfred Grosser, "Western Europe" in The Soviet Impact on World Politics, edited by Kurt London (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974) p. 73.

⁸ L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign Policy," New Times, No. 9, Moscow, February, 1976, p. 29.

⁹ Ibid., p. 40.

of Communist, and to an increasing extent, Socialist party participation in national governments and international assemblies. The recruitment and political mobilization of diverse economic and social interest groups (from trade unions to ethnic minority caucuses) under socialist banners world wide are other tasks of the ideological arm of Soviet foreign policy.¹⁰ Secretary Brezhnev, like every Soviet leader since Lenin, has unflaggingly stressed the pre-eminence of Marxist-Leninist ideology in prosecution of every foreign policy program.

While pressing for the assertion of the principle of peaceful coexistence, we realize that successes in this important matter in no way signify the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle. On the contrary, we should be prepared for an intensification of this struggle and for it to assume an increasingly more acute form of struggle between the two social systems.¹¹

Chapter One of this paper concerns the ideological conflicts incurred by Soviet foreign policy in Scandinavia. Marxist party advances in Scandinavian politics have been low keyed, but they have been a force to reckon with in the increasingly socialistic states of Scandinavia. The distinctively "national" character of most Scandinavian socialist programs appear to be consistent with Soviet support of "national independence, democracy and socialism all over the world" resolved

¹⁰L. I. Brezhnev's speech of 27 June 1972, Pravda, 28 June 1972; in Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy," Chapter One in London, op. cit., p. 8.

¹¹Ibid.

at the Conference of European Communist and Workers Parties on 30 June 1976.¹²

Despite the Utopian or visionary aspects of its ideology, Soviet foreign policy adapted rapidly after the Bolshevik Revolution to an external world of realpolitik.

V. I. Lenin often warned Soviet diplomats against being excessively carried away by theses and slogans which had been correct in certain circumstances but had become erroneous and harmful in other circumstances Contemporary international reality, which is marked by a great complexity of processes, demands a particularly careful study and sober evaluation of actual situations; any abstract arguments and schemes are inadmissible.¹³

This blend of ideology and realpolitik has produced a foreign policy that differs in fact from the declared "policy which is deliberately pursued by those in power in accordance with the (Marxist-Leninist) objectives they have set."¹⁴ Grosser's differentiation of "policy in fact" from a declared policy of world revolution is explained by Leonard Shapiro as being "the logical implementation of Lenin's policy of combining trade and correct diplomatic relations on the one hand with subversion and political warfare on the other."¹⁵ Shapiro continues,

¹²Declaration of the Delegates to the Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, 20 June 1976, New Times, No. 28, Moscow, July 1976, p. 32.

¹³A. Kaplin quoting V. I. Lenin in MZh (International Life) No. 6, 1961, p. 9; Kulski, op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁴Alfred Grosser in London, op. cit., p. 73.

¹⁵Leonard Shapiro, in London, p. 8.

The overwhelming strength the Soviet Union has built up against the forces of NATO is such a political force. ... This intimate link between the armed forces and foreign policy was characteristic of Lenin's outlook from the start, since Lenin, who greatly admired Clausewitz, drew no firm distinction between war and politics, and whose specific contribution to twentieth century foreign policy is its militarization.¹⁶

After ideology, then, trade, formal diplomatic relations and military strength will each be considered in turn as they affect the Scandinavian region. "The image of this policy to outside interlocutors," Grosser's third cut at Soviet foreign policy, will be considered in the conclusion to assess the overall impact of Soviet foreign policy in Scandinavia.

Because the Soviets themselves ascribe an overriding importance to ideology in the formulation of foreign policy, Communist Party developments in Scandinavia cannot be ignored as an element of Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless, as an observable element in foreign relations, Communist Party interrelations are certainly the most elusive aspect of Soviet foreign policy -- and today, maybe the most insignificant.¹⁷ But even before an examination of regional Communist Party activity can be attempted, a review of the Scandinavian social, economic and political heritage is essential.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Eric Willenz, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and East Europe, U.S. State Department (Washington, D.C.; telephone interview by author, 0820-0855 hrs., PDT, 20 October 1976).

II. PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN SCANDINAVIA

A. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SCANDINAVIA

Marxism brought about a profound revolution in the whole conception of world history Marx discovered that society, like nature, develops according to specific laws By this is meant the great discoveries that put socialism on a firm scientific foundation and showed that socialism is the necessary and logical result of the whole course of development of civilization.¹

In order to comprehend the ideological campaign for Scandinavia as an element of Soviet foreign policy, the prospect of Scandinavian socialism must be viewed through Marxist lenses. With so much attention given to the inexorable march of history in Marxist doctrine, it is appropriate to examine the history of Scandinavian social development to determine if the region conforms to Marxist theory.

The economic structure of capitalistic society has grown out of the economic structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements of the former.²

The foregoing quote from Karl Marx's Capital may have validity under the assumed socio-economic conditions, namely where a feudal aristocracy once dominated a peasant class. But the question is, to what extent did fiefdom, fealty and serfdom prevail in Medieval

¹ A. Leontiev, Marx's Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1946), pp. 9-11.

² Karl Marx, Capital (New York: Random House, 1932), p. 183.

Scandinavia? Since Marx relies upon the historical presence of a feudal aristocracy, or a landed class, as his premise and point of departure in arguing the inevitability of a class struggle and the ultimate victory of labor over property in the form of communism, what basis does his premise have in fact, as revealed by the actual history of social development in Scandinavia?³

³ The development of Marx's argument of the historical inevitability of the victory of labor over property runs as follows: History documents that the feudal serfs were eventually emancipated by "enlightened" monarchs whose power was formerly dissipated by a land-controlling aristocracy. But the toiling serfs were freed from the land, not with the land, and thus formed a vast labor pool that was "free" to go where it pleased. Where did the laborers go? They went to work on the lands of the wealthy aristocrats, except now as voluntary tenant farmers -- i. e., "freemen," rather than serfs. This is the first phase of emancipation alluded to by Marx in his dialectics of historical materialism, or the acquisitive pursuit of property which begets a class struggle between labor and the owners of property. With the dawn of industrialization, the peasants at an increasing rate abandoned the farms to become industrial laborers in the cities, or urban proletariat. As labor units in factories of mass production, the laborers have forfeited the creativity of artisans and have become essentially property (chattels) themselves, owned (wage-earners) and operated by a ruthlessly competitive class of capitalists, the inheritors of the old aristocracy. Marx has hypothesized that the increasing numbers of proletarians, the dwindling numbers of capitalists and the swelling ranks of unemployed resulting from exhaustive, monopolistic competition will inevitably result in a proletarian revolution to institute a policy of socialism, the penultimate goal of proponents of communism. After Marx, Lenin modified and embellished the theory of proletarian revolution to provide for a) an elite vanguard of intelligentsia to lead the undisciplined proletariat and b) an intermediate stage of "imperialism" to explain the international phenomenon of capitalism that appeared to be postponing the occurrence of socialism in most of the world's states.

Basic Assumptions:

Environment	+	denizens	⇒	ecosystem
Resources	+	people	⇒	economy
Custom (usage)	+	creeds	⇒	institutions
Language	+	institutions	⇒	culture
Culture	+	economy	⇒	social system
Organization of social structures within a social system or the organization of two or more social systems				⇒ political system

Proceeding from the assumptions listed above, economy is a cornerstone of any social system. Social mobilization is spurred by changes in economy. Social mobilization has occurred in its own distinct fashion in Scandinavia.⁴ The first inhabitants traced by anthropologists arrived in the northern reaches of Scandinavia as the glaciers of the last ice age were receding 12,000 years ago. It is believed that they migrated as hunters and fledgling herdsman into the haven of Scandinavia from temperate and barren habitats within the central Asian continent. A plentitude of fresh water from thawing glaciers, the circulation of warming currents from the ocean to the southwest, and an abundance of fish and grazing herds presumably sustained human life for several millenia.⁵

⁴ Karl Deutsch, et. al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957); see also, Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953), Chapter 6, "The Rate of Mobilization; Finland Example," p. 104.

⁵ Franklin D. Scott, Scandinavia, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 19.

But the resources did not support any significant propagation of society until circa 1500 B.C.

By then, with the Bronze Age under way, there is evidence from physical anthropology that the people of the far north dwelling in the village settlements of the Varengenfjord were of the same "nordic" racial type as the inhabitants of the Oslo-fjord in the south; while Denmark and the more southerly regions of the Scandinavian peninsula were entering upon a period of comparative wealth, social change, modes of belief and artistic achievement informative in themselves and prophetic of things to come. To pay for tin and copper, and also gold from the peoples farther south, Denmark had the high priced amber of Jutland, and soon native smiths and artists were rivalling and at times excelling their southern masters in the working of bronze.⁶

By the onset of the Iron Age, however, one can find evidence of decline -- grave offerings became fewer, silver had not yet appeared, gold and bronze were less apparent among artifacts and artistic standards were diminished. Two reasons are given for this decline: severely cold climatic changes and the onslaught of the Celts.⁷ But the hardy inhabitants of the Northern Peninsula, identified now as the Cimbri and the Teutones by the Greek geographer Pytheas, survived the cold and the Celts and engaged the Romans at home and abroad, in trade and in war. Caesar Augustus and then Nero, circa A.D. 60, received emissaries from Scandinavia, as recorded by Pliny the Elder. Trade and cultural contacts between the north and south flanks of Europe increased exponentially

⁶Gwyn Jones, A History of the Vikings, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 18.

⁷Ibid., p. 19

with the expansion of the Romans and the decline of the Celts. Cultural confrontation was evident in Bohemia, and traders traveled the Rhine, the Danube, the Vistula rivers as well as the Mediterranean, Black, Baltic and Atlantic sea routes. Silver and gold coins and tableware were left in the North in exchange for skins, furs, amber, sea-ivory and slaves headed south. "And with the profits of trade were combined the profits of war."⁸

The proliferation of traders and raiders who encountered other cultures coming and going resulted in a differentiation of northern peoples by 5 A.D. The Teutones and Cimbri of old had now branched or merged into Danes, Norse, Swedes, Jutes, Angles and Saxons. Russian history (Russian Primary Chronicle, or Povest' Vremennykh Let) records that certain Scandinavian traders known as the "Varangian Rus" were invited by the Slavic inhabitants of what is today Kiev to join and govern them:

They said to themselves, 'Let us seek a prince who may rule over us and judge us according to the Law.' They accordingly went overseas to the Varangian Russes: these particular Varangians were known as Russes, just as some are called Swedes, Northmen, Angles and Gotlanders, for they were thus named. The Chuds, the Slavs, the Krivichians, and the Ves' then said to the people of Rus, 'Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come to rule and reign over us.' They thus selected three brothers, with their kinfolk The oldest, Rurik, located himself in Novgorod; the second ... (860-62, A.D.)⁹

⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

⁹ Ibid., p. 245.

So it appears that not only were Scandinavians of the Viking Age (780-1070) the founders of Kiev and nearby towns, but, in time, a whole nation assumed their adopted name, "the Russes."¹⁰ Viking exploits were more brutal in Western Europe, where the "Normans" savagely subdued all peoples they encountered in their rambling over the western coasts of the Carolingian Empire. By the Tenth Century Normandy and the eastern coastal regions of England were theirs. By 1018, Knut the Great was King of Denmark, Norway and England. "The whole 'movement' of these thrusts was a prodigal dispersion of power, never centrally directed, never quite focused, but with far reaching results impossible to calculate."¹¹ Such far flung exploits -- commerce with Byzantium, rampages of the Carolingian coast and dominion over the North Atlantic -- exceeded the capabilities of Rome and they certainly overextended the means of the Vikings, who assimilated no foreign "citizens" and worked from a population base that was as paltry as its native resources. The high water mark of "Viking civilization" probably occurred on the eve of Hastings in 1066, when England's domination by a series of Danish Kings after Knut was ended by the invasion of William the Conqueror from Normandy, by then detached from Norse rule. The Viking era faded as Norse adventurers settled upon new lives as

¹⁰Scott, op. cit., p. 27.

¹¹Ibid., p. 28.

they dispersed from Byzantium to Ireland and those back home sought increasing differentiation among themselves -- Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Iceland were now separate and at odds with one another.¹²

It is imperatively borne in on us that as colonizers or conquerors the Vikings were too few for the many and varied causes they bore in hand. And this told more and more against them as their initial advantages of surprise and mobility were whittled away.¹³

"The Viking Period . . . is unique in the early history of the North."¹⁴ It is, therefore, germane to a study of socio-economic development to reflect upon this bizarre history, and its probable effect upon later social development.

The deeper causes of the Viking movement overseas were rooted in human nature: the northern peoples had needs and ambitions, were prepared to make demands, and had the will, strength, and technical means to enforce them. They wanted land to farm, wealth to make life splendid, or bearable, and some of them wanted dignity or fame. Trade, colonization, piracy and war would get them these things, and such could be practiced only at the expense of neighbors near and far.¹⁵

Vikingologist Johannes Steenstrup in his classic work Normannerne uses demography to explain the movement of Norsemen to outlying territories. Historian Gwyn Jones interprets this theory:

¹² Jones, op. cit., p. 390.

¹³ Ibid., p. 394.

¹⁴ John H. Wuorinen, Scandinavia, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 16.

¹⁵ Jones, op. cit., p.

The limitations imposed on both crop and animal husbandry in parts of Scandinavia in early times by sea, mountains, latitude, and cold ... were always constrictive and, at times, severely so. Domiciled in this circumscribed and vulnerable region was a vigorous and fast-breeding race whose members increased considerably from the seventh to the tenth century.¹⁶

With reference to Marx's interpretation of history, the most striking omission of Capital is any serious consideration of mobility as is characterized by the Viking period. Here is a people that almost instinctively dispersed to new horizons when their sparse resources were constricted by increasing demand. They did not naturally succumb to domination by a better endowed class of property owners. In fact, when King Olaf of Norway sought to enlarge his realm and prosecute wars of Christian liberation, independent-minded warriors killed him.¹⁷ While it must be conceded that the warring Vikings smack of the "brutishness" innate in a Hobbesian society, their history lends no special credence to the theory of continuous class conflict argued by Marx; unless by resorting to the most tortuous logic one gathers all manner of "the vanquished" under an all-encompassing definition of "the oppressed class." To be sure, matter was appropriated to the construction of highly sophisticated vehicles of commerce and personal property. But the accumulation of property-

¹⁶ Johannes Steenstrup, *Normannern*, (Copenhagen, 1876-82); cited in Jones, op. cit., p. 196.

¹⁷ Scott, op. cit., p. 37.

wealth was not a means of exploitation or of domination. Rather, the emphasis was upon subsistence, freedom and communality. The booty of war, the acquisitions of commerce and the yields from the land were shared in common, though the communities were numerous and hostile.

There was no private ownership of land, except for what a man cleared himself When the first houses could no longer hold more inhabitants, new homes were built to one side, and the growing flock obtained its sustenance by a common -- or partially common -- cultivation of the soil.

.....

At the earliest stage the land was the property of the clan, or group, and the individual could collect his share only by living on the land and taking part in its cultivation.

.....

The peasant of the Viking Age was a free holder, and his mode of thought was shaped by this condition. The defiant independence and the stern sense of honor which were ancient traits of his race were enhanced where he ruled over his land . . . , but less pronounced in districts where property rights consisted in claims on a certain share of the common output or yield of a village.¹⁸

This legacy of rugged individualism, migration and militarism as a means of social mobilization, contrary to the premises of Capital, is deeply engraved upon the descendents of the Norsemen, in Scandinavia and abroad.

Something like the converse of Lenin's theory, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, took place after the Viking period. With

¹⁸Axel Olrik, Viking Civilization (New York: The American Scandinavian Foundation, W. W. Norton, Inc., Publishers; Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), pp. 23-26.

the receding of overseas exploits and emigration, a landed aristocracy and feudalism evolved in the Nordic homeland.¹⁹ Having exhausted either their reach or their frontiers abroad, competition for the resources of Scandinavia forced rivalries and divisions in that domain. The limited amount of tillable land assumed increasing value. "The new chieftains were landed men, concerned with stability and peaceful development."²⁰ Groups and clans with like interests allied with each other to secure their needs against those of others. Those who came by good land invited others to cultivate it and enjoy the yield in return for mutual defense. The king, in turn, provided for the organization and defense of the realm in return for pro rata arms and revenues from the incorporated lands. "Alas for private enterprise and the rights of free men! Monarchs had taken over the business of war."²¹

But alas, disunity within the Danish aristocracy and the resulting weakening of the realm's defenses led to an absolute monarchy in 1658.²² Feudalism gained its strongest hold in Denmark,

¹⁹V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Communism, Vol. I, Part II of Lenin's Collected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952); reprinted by Foreign Language Press (Peking, 1969).

²⁰Jones, op. cit., p. 391.

²¹Ibid., p. 392.

²²Vincent H. Malmstrom, Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 39.

where the percentage of independent farmers declined from 50 to 15 between 1250 and 1400.²³ The 400 years of aristocratic domination of Denmark was not typical of the remainder of Scandinavia. European influence upon Denmark, "The Crossroads of the North," has always been stronger than elsewhere in Scandinavia. Of the five domains that comprised Scandinavia by the beginning of the 12th century -- the Kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the republic of Iceland (930 A.D.) and Finland, a dominion of Sweden -- only Denmark allowed serfdom to supersede the freedom of traditional peasant society extensively.

Denmark had rich resources during a period when agriculture was the backbone of economic life of the state. These fortunate circumstances made it possible for the country to build up a far more developed society of the continental European type than was possible in any other of the Nordic countries.²⁴

Denmark had the blessings of fertile land and a central location. Elsewhere, agriculture remained at the subsistence level and there was little potential for mass marketing. The settlement pattern was widely dispersed and the commodities of trade remained the raw products of nature -- fish, fur, timber, amber and metals. These goods were in demand at home and abroad, and merchantmen at key

²³ Nils Andren, Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1964), p. 28.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 177.

points like Bergen, Aarhus, Copenhagen, Malmö, Visby and Stockholm thrived. Soon, they came within the economic and political sphere of the Hanseatic League. The Hansa began to exploit the Scandinavians ruthlessly and numerous wars resulted. In the course of Hansa expansion, timber and mineral extraction were developed to new heights of technology in Norway and Sweden. It was also in the later Middle Ages that the Scandinavians drew upon their special skill to tap a growing market for merchant ships, whalers and fishing boats.²⁵

By the dawn of the industrial age, it is apparent that whatever "surplus value" had been acquired in the form of profits or wealth had been won through favorable trade rather than production, with a few notable exceptions. Danish squires prospered at the expense of toiling peasants on rich soils. Swedish smiths turned out fine ironwork and chartered what is reputedly the oldest corporation in the world to produce copper, at Bergslag (Stora Kopparbergs) in 1347. Norwegians were known for their exported iron stoves by the eighteenth century.²⁶

Industrialization occurred gradually in Scandinavia. The first factories were situated near water power sites such as Sarpsborg, Norway; Göteborg, Sweden; and Tampere, Finland. Heavier production was not possible without steam power and that depended upon

²⁵Scott, op. cit., p. 55.

²⁶Ibid., p. 54.

imported coal. Accordingly, factories dependent upon the steam engine appeared later in the port cities of Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Helsinki. The real boom in industrialization was delayed until the harnessing of hydro-electric power in recent decades. Nevertheless, relying upon imported fuels, Denmark led the way in urban manufacturing. By 1890, one-quarter of its population lived in cities and one-third of the population was employed in industry. The urban-industrial movement increased by only five percent by 1950. By contrast, only five percent of the population of Norway worked in industry in 1890, increasing to 37 percent by 1950. In Sweden it was one fifth in 1890 and 40 percent by 1950; and for Finland, 10% in 1890 and 30% by 1950. Industrialization in both Sweden and Norway have overtaken Denmark in terms of both employment of the population and industrial output, while Finland has overtaken all three in rate of industrial expansion.²⁷

Irrespective of these differences in the development patterns of the Nordic countries, the economic and social changes of the societies concerned have almost uniformly advanced in the same direction. In Denmark, Finland and Sweden the earlier estate-dominated societies have dissolved The departure point for Norway and Iceland was different, for the aristocratic and bureaucratic foundations of a traditional "estate society" were almost completely lacking. Therefore, the development in these two countries has in part proceeded along different lines. Nevertheless, thus far, the results are essentially similar to those which have been attained in the other three Nordic countries. One notable feature of this new class society is that it emerged as an "organization society" in which all interests, whether

²⁷Nordiska Radet, Nordisk Statistisk Arsbok (Stockholm: Nordic Council, 1971), p. 62.

manifested by class, by vocation or by idealistic aims are represented through organizations of shifting but increasing strength.²⁸

The history of Scandinavian economic development clearly does not conform to Marx's historical premises for proletarian revolution. The salient distinctions in Scandinavian social progress have been mobility, cooperation and a lack of class consciousness. Historian Franklin Scott has commented on the attribute of individual initiative that has been discernible since the earliest societies of Scandinavia:

'Who is chief among you?' a Viking was asked. He replied, 'None, we are all chiefs here.' Individual freedom was preserved within a voluntary, deeply treasured, social and economic organization.²⁹

The best explanation for the relative social harmony and lack of class conflict within Scandinavia is not to be found in a qualitative cultural analysis, but most likely in a systemic analysis of economy. The Nordic peoples have succeeded in maintaining a finer balance of people and resources than most cultures. A key was emigration:

Each of these countries ('those people whom the northern pole aspects') was like a mighty hive, which by the vigor of propagation and health of climate, growing to full of people, threw out some new swarm at certain periods of time, that took wing, and sought out some new abode, expelling or subduing the old inhabitants, and seating themselves in their rooms.³⁰

²⁸Andren, op. cit., p. 20.

²⁹Scott, op. cit., p. 57.

³⁰Sir William Temple, "Of Heroic Virtue," 1690, quoted from Works, iii, 363, 1814. (populos quos despiciat arctos from Lucan); in Jones, op. cit., p. 196.

As a result of large scale emigration that occurred on the eve of industrialization, population growth has not outrun economic development. Peak emigration from Denmark and Sweden (7,600 and 44,700 respectively) occurred in 1880; Iceland (6,300) in 1890; and Norway and Finland (35,000 and 15,900 respectively) in 1910.³¹ On the contrary, the population base was so modest that per capita increase in wealth was the highest in Europe during its period of industrialization and has given Scandinavia today a higher standard of living (GNP per capita) than any other sector of Europe.³²

It is not the wealth of the area and average income derived from GNP per capita that excludes Scandinavia from Marx's prototype in Capital; rather, it is the distribution of income that defeats the theory of Marx. Today, unskilled labor receives a higher income in Denmark than anywhere in Europe; and the remainder of Scandinavia is almost even with Denmark in this respect.³³ The explanation here lies in cooperation and government regulation. Unlike the Marxist prototype economy, the pre-twentieth century economy of the northern communities, founded upon raw resources, involved little processing

³¹Andren, op. cit., Appendix I, pp. 220-222.

³²CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. viii. See also Kenneth E. Miller, Government and Politics in Denmark (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1968), p. 11.

³³Brian Patrick McGuire, "Denmark's Predicament," Nation, 22 March 1975, p. 327. See also Nordiska Radet, op. cit., p. 91.

except for the small domestic market. The more isolated they were, the more they realized the value of cooperation, in building houses, constructing boats and organizing farming and fishing. The state, early on in the person of the king, realized the need to protect the interests of the people and preserve the integrity of his domain by intervening to thwart the rapacious developments stemming from Hanseatic ventures. King Sverre, witnessing the predatory competition for control of goods and commerce in Bergen in 1186, said in a speech:

We thank Englishmen who have brought wheat, flour, honey and cloth, and those who brought flax linen wax [sic] or kettles, and any who have brought useful goods, as well as our friends from Orkneys, Shetlands and Iceland. But the Germans take out cod and butter and thus create want, and bring wine, which produces evil and no good. Some of our people have lost lives or been dishonored or beaten. If these Germans wish to keep their lives or their goods, they will have to depart immediately, as their visit has been of little benefit to us and to our realm.³⁴

Thereafter, the Nordic states acquired increasing control over the forests and took an active interest in management of commerce. Monarchs of Denmark and Sweden, who dominated the region after the twelfth century, acquired monopolies over trade in Greenland and Finland. Much later, governments guided the foundation of industrial establishments and the important natural resources were recognized

³⁴ Quoted in Wilhelm Keilhau, Norway in World History (London: McDonald, 1944), p. 88; in Scott, op. cit., p. 55.

as state or community property. Likewise, the land itself was assured to the peasants who worked it, rather than remote landlords. This liberating of the land gave rise to the cooperative movement in Denmark and then the rest of Scandinavia. Harvard historian Franklin Scott concludes, "The modern socialist state is in many ways the natural heir of the paternalistic state of the Middle Ages and of the mercantilistic epoch."³⁵

The Marxist preconditions for socialism to the contrary, uniform social progress has taken place in Scandinavia through a distinctive process of mobilization: emigration, cooperation and responsible government.

B. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCANDINAVIA

Custom/usage	+	creeds	➤	institutions
Language	+	institutions	➤	culture
Culture	+	economy	➤	social system
Organization of multiple social structures or social systems			➤	political system

Once the basis of an economy has been derived, the customs and usages of a people are considered in conjunction with their concept of the universe (creed or belief system) to yield institutions. Depending upon the degree of specificity in their social organization, the

³⁵op. cit., p. 57.

concept of "universe" is reduced to domain of habitation or local social structure to yield commensurately specific institutions. One such institution is law. Another is government.

Marx, Lenin and their apostolic practioners in the Socialist States have forecast social and political development on the basis of economic, or material, determinism. Although Part A of this paper denies that Marx's economic premises -- dialectical materialism, class conflict and capitalistic monopoly of the means of production -- historically obtain in Scandinavia, this section will proceed, nevertheless, to a consideration of the institutions that Marx maintains are "the super-structure" of the economic base of society.

Then comes an epoch of social revolution. With the change in the economic foundation the whole immense superstructure is slowly or rapidly transformed. In studying such a transformation one must always distinguish between the material transformation in the economic conditions essential to production -- which can be established with the exactitude of natural science -- and the juridical, political, religious, artistic or philosophic, in short the ideological forms, in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.³⁶

³⁶ The discussion which precedes this quote, a classic justification for the ideological struggle of Marxism, is as follows:

In the social production of their subsistence men enter into determined and necessary relations with each other which are independent of their wills -- production-relations which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum of these production-relations forms the economic structure of society, the real basis upon which a juridical and political superstructure arises, and to which definite social forms of consciousness correspond. The mode of production of the material subsistence, [sic] conditions the social, political and spiritual life-process in general. It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence, but on the contrary, it is their social existency

The thesis of this paper does not argue the validity of a relationship between economic conditions and institutional structure, as the sequence of "Assumptions" (above) suggests. Rather, it attempts to show that the process of economic development hypothesized by Marx's theory of dialectical materialism is not corroborated by the available history of socio-economic development in Scandinavia. Furthermore, certain institutional developments not unrelated to the existing economy, but contrary to Marx's theory of socio-economic development, have reinforced social harmony and mitigated or pre-empted class conflict in Scandinavia. Foremost among these institutions is the law.

One of the most far reaching conceptual differences between the early Scandinavians and other peoples in both Europe and Asia was the acceptance by the latter peoples of rule by divine right or heavenly mandate. These concepts were institutionalized and extended over time to justify master-servant relationships and to simply bring about resignation to one's fate. By the time Christianity took root in

36 (continued)

which determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development the material productive forces of society come into contradiction with the existing production relations, or what is merely a juridical expression for the same thing, the property relations within which they have operated before. From being forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into fetters upon their development. Then comes ..."

From the Introduction to "Critique of Political Economy," Capital, Part II, A. Z., Marx, op. cit., p. 10.

Scandinavia hundreds of years after the advent of Christ, primitive apotheosis of the self-sufficient man had long since been inscribed upon the Nordic culture and soon became institutionalized in law. Perhaps the adoption of English of so many originally Norse words such as knee, eye, hand, and arm attests to the importance of mann (Norwegian) in ancient Nordic society.³⁷ Exaltation of the man, or every man of character, was institutionalized by common law in Scandinavia at an earlier age than in most cultures. "Lawman" and "outlaw" are evolutions from Old Norse.³⁸ Scott notes that the institution of law was strong in Scandinavia and reflective of its social structure: "Law regulates the relationship of individuals within a community; it is given character by the moral standards and ideals of society and is thus closely associated with religion."³⁹

The development of law by these northern peoples preceded the establishment of the state. If we except the canons and precepts of the Church and the codes set out by ruling elites of Mediterranean empires, the "common law" of the teutonic peoples may be unprecedented in European civilization. The effect of this institution was to

³⁷ M. O'D. Walshe, Introduction to the Scandinavian Languages, (London: Andre Deutsch, Ltd., 1965), pp. 161-163. See also John Geipel, The Viking Legacy (London: William Closer & Sons, Ltd., 1971).

³⁸ Geipel, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

³⁹ Scott, op. cit., p. 42.

reinforce the concept of an egalitarian society and to negate the acceptance of hierarchical authority. The common law evolved naturally into tribunals and representative assemblies to guarantee the rights of the people, a germinating polity. The oldest legislature in the world, the Althing, was founded in Iceland in A.D. 930, the date which marks the creation of Iceland as a republic.⁴⁰ Gradually, kings in Sweden and Denmark took over the administration of government, but Things persisted in Norway to guarantee representative decisions. The resistance of the Thing to arbitrary hierarchical authority is documented in an ultimatum delivered by "Torgny the Law-man" from the Thing to the King:

We freemen wish that you, King Olof, make peace with Olaf Digre, Norway's king, and give him your daughter Ingegard to marry. But if you want to reconquer the kingdom in the east that your forefathers have owned, then we will all follow you. If you do not wish to do as we say, so will we go against you and kill you, for we will not tolerate lawlessness or disorder of you. So have our ancestors before us done. [Note reliance upon precedent, or authority of previous decisions in common law.] They threw five kings in a well at Mora Thing, when they were full of presumptuousness as you now are toward us. Say quickly, which will you choose.⁴¹

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 43. See also Oliver Wendall Holmes, The Common Law, edited by M. D. Howe (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963), p. 17.

⁴¹Quoted in E. Ingers, Bonden i svensk historia, I (Stockholm: Lautbrukets Tidskriftsaktiebolag, 1949), pp. 31-32; translated by Scott in Scandinavia, op. cit., p. 43.

Common law was progressively codified, especially with the beginning of monarchies. Article VI, item one of the Norwegian Frostathing Law (circa 1270) declared: "The first provision in our law of personal rights is, that every one of our countrymen shall be inviolate in his rights and in his person, both in the kingdom and outside the kingdom."⁴² Monarchies were elective throughout Scandinavia until Denmark's King Frederick III summoned the pluralistic Rigsdag to decide on an absolute, hereditary monarchy to be ruled "as should seem best to his majesty for the general good."⁴³ The King effected this constitutional change by allying himself with the commoners in the Rigsdag against the increasingly powerful but less popular nobility. It was, therefore, the pre-existing (1320) democratic institution of the Rigsdag that permitted the constitutional monarchy to become hereditary, as it is today in all three Scandinavian kingdoms. And the power of the monarchs has always been kept in check by representative assemblies, as when the Swedish Riksdag deposed King Gustavus IV Adolphus in 1809, replaced him with Bernadotte and amended the constitution to strengthen parliamentary government. Norway, when it became independent of

⁴²Kenneth E. Miller, Government and Politics in Denmark (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1968), p. 26; see footnote

⁴³Translated from documents in E. Ingers (Note 59) in Scott, op. cit., p. 44.

Sweden in 1905, invited a Danish prince to be its King (with royal succession henceforth in Norway) and patterned its constitutional monarchy after the liberal one of Sweden. "It is remarkable that Denmark remained so little affected by the constitutional and ideological theories of the French Revolution," writes Nils Andren in his primer for English speaking students of government at the University of Stockholm. "In fact, this tends to show that the absolute monarchy in Denmark was enlightened, reforming and scarcely oppressive, and that absolutism was almost as appreciated by its contemporaries as it has been by subsequent historians."⁴⁴

Sweden had the earliest start as a democracy, creating a constitutional government in 1718, with roots in the Middle Ages.⁴⁵ Norway adopted a free constitution in 1814, Denmark in 1848 and Finland in 1906. What is perhaps more significant regarding the thesis of this paper, the transition to constitutional democracy was accomplished throughout Scandinavia without revolution. In fact, there seems to be a deep-seated aversion among Nordic countries to popular revolt, even though there is a continuum of reform through the constitutional or "legal" process.⁴⁶

⁴⁴Andren, op. cit., pp. 31, 142, 161.

⁴⁵J. A. Lauwerys, Scandinavian Democracy: Development of Democratic Thought and Institutions in Denmark, Norway and Sweden (American-Scandinavian Foundation, Publisher, 1959), p. 10. See also, William L. Langer, ed., Encyclopedia of World History (New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1940), p. 478.

⁴⁶Ibid.

It is historically clear, then, that Scandinavia has a political heritage that bears no comparison to the states of eastern or even central Europe. The historical momentum of the Scandinavian democratic political process demands an alteration of the Marxist-Leninist theories which might be applied to other areas of Europe, and this fact is recognized by the Soviets and the Scandinavians alike. Trond Gilberg sets out the differences between Soviet and Scandinavia communist party development in well researched analysis, The Soviet Communist Party and Scandinavian Communism: The Norwegian Case (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973). Although Lenin visited Copenhagen in 1910 to attend a Soviet Democratic Congress, he was disappointed by the lack of Danish commitment to revolutionary methods and assigned that cause to a comrade, O. W. Kuusinen.⁴⁷

Given this background, Scandinavia nevertheless emerged from World War II and German control with a tinge of sympathy for Soviet communism. Some of Denmark's most distinguished statesmen, such as Mogens Fog and Aksel Larsen, were elected to the post-war Folketing (Danish parliament) as members of the Communist Party.⁴⁸ The Soviets capitalized on the potential political base provided in those areas of

⁴⁷ A. F. Upton, Communism in Scandinavia and Finland: Politics of Opportunity (New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1973), p. 7.

⁴⁸ Poul Hansen, Danish Politicians (Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab, 1949), pp. 88-91, 154-157.

Nazi occupied Scandinavia that had been "liberated" by Soviet troops.⁴⁹ Soviet support can still be found today among the people in Sweden's northern provinces, the Norbotten, many of whom have a close kinship with the Finns and regard the Bolsheviks as champions of emancipation from the tyranny of Czardom.⁵⁰

The fortunes of the pro-Moscow Communist Parties flourished in the post-War parliamentary elections, mostly as a result of their reputation for Nazi resistance (the Communist parties were banned by the Nazis). Denmark, Norway and Sweden all registered Communist Party high water marks in their immediate post-war elections, never to be equaled since:⁵¹

Denmark	(1945)	12.5%
Norway	(1945)	11.8%
Sweden	(1945)	11.2%

But Soviet popularity was short lived. Trust turned to skepticism among the Norwegians in 1946 when the USSR began heavy-handed negotiations with Norway to establish joint military control of the

⁴⁹TASS, 12 November 1974, in FBIS, Soviet Union, Vol. III, 13 November 1974, p. E6.

⁵⁰Daniel Tarschys, "The Unique Role of the Swedish Communist Party," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIII (May-June, 1974), 37.

⁵¹Ibid. See also, Richard F. Starr, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1975).

Svalbard Island and to override a 1920 international sanction against military development of that archipelago.⁵² And skepticism turned to fear with the news of the Czech Coup in 1948 and the isolation of East Germany under Soviet suzerainty. Sweden took the initiative, citing the Soviet threat, in proposing a Nordic Defensive Alliance. Negotiations toward this Nordic pact became bogged down between 1948 and 1949 over a disagreement regarding the need for arms support from the U.S. Sweden, having the best equipped and organized military of the three, insisted that the Alliance be totally independent of the major powers. Norway was adamant in demanding the aid of modern arms from the West while Denmark endeavored to effect a compromise. Sweden abandoned the effort and continued on its independent course, and Norway and Denmark opted for NATO.⁵³

The Finnish relationship to the USSR warrants special attention as a prototype for Soviet foreign policy in Scandinavia. After World War II, Finland was expected to show penitence for its collaboration with Hitler in attacking Russia. Accordingly, in preparing a new government to ensure its expiation, the "keystone" of Party foreign affairs was agreed to be "friendship with the Soviet Union; there must be no deviation into

⁵² Nils Orvik, "Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two Dimensional Threat," Orbis, XVI (Fall, 1972), 725.

⁵³ Lauwerys, op. cit., p. 10.

'agitation for forming a so-called Scandinavian bloc, which reactionaries in Sweden and at home are proposing.'"⁵⁴ The Communist program for Finnish foreign policy was largely realized in the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948, which has been ominously depicted by many western political analysts as the Soviet model for "finlandization" of the remainder of Scandinavia and even Western Europe.⁵⁵

So the Scandinavian states stand today, although debate over independence versus participation in NATO seems to be resurfacing in direct response to the Soviet promise of detente and U.S. demands upon its NATO allies. The tension of the fifties and sixties caused by the Soviet counter-coup in Hungary (1956), the Berlin crisis culminating in the walling off of the East Sector (1961), and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968) has been tranquilized by the latest Soviet overtures toward detente, the spirit of Helsinki (Resolution of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, Summer, 1975), and the peace-loving protestations of the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in February, 1976. The latter day Peace Program,

⁵⁴ Quoted from keynote speech by V. Persi, General Secretary of Finnish Communist Party, to the 7th Congress of the Party, 19-23 October 1945, reported in *Kommunisti*, nos. 44-45 (1945); from Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

⁵⁵ A strong case for the theory of Finlandization is given by R. J. Vincent in Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe, Adelphi Paper No. 119 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975). A strong rebuttal of the theory is given by George Kennan in "Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices," Foreign Policy, Spring, 1974, pp. 3-16.

reiterated in the last two CPSU congresses, appears to be winning more and more believers in Scandinavia as witnessed in the following reports:

Reykjavik, 5 September 1974: 'Icelanders Reject Rightist Views on NATO, Favor Detente' - Under conditions of detente, relations between Iceland and the USSR are also improving. The circle of contacts is becoming increasingly broad and Soviet-Icelandic business links are growing and strengthening.⁵⁶

Danish and Norwegian governments have been under increasing pressure from left-wing factions, demanding a break with NATO and a retreat to some kind of a non-aligned Nordic security arrangement.

.....

Under these circumstances, exposed to a considerable degree of pressure at all levels of society, the Norwegian and Danish governments have chosen to keep their NATO membership cards but to limit direct involvement with NATO, politically and militarily.⁵⁷

USSR press agency TASS welcomes Norway rejection by popular referendum of EEC as a 'movement against splitting into blocs.'⁵⁸

Soviet foul play, however, keeps cropping up to undermine their own efforts toward detente, causing suspicion to persist.

Copenhagen, Berlingske Tidende: "Soviet Espionage 'Strains Detente.'" The report that in recent years up to 50 Soviet agents have been expelled from France with the same discretion that has been shown by the Danish Government in connection with the recent expulsion of four KGB agents does not make the Danish modus operandi any more reasonable.

⁵⁶ FBIS - Soviet Union, 10 September 1974, p. E2.

⁵⁷ Orvik, op. cit., p. 736.

⁵⁸ "World Event Interaction Study Report," computer program constructed by School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California from N. Y. Times survey, 1/66 to 12/75.

.....
The Soviet Union has always had a mania for gathering information in secret and occasionally unlawful ways -- as if the information were the better for it. This despite the fact the Russians have so many opportunities to gather information perfectly legally in the Western societies. Instead, they choose by repeated violations of the laws in the Western countries to strain the detente of which they declare themselves the keenest and most active champion.⁵⁹

The Scandinavian attitude toward the Soviet Union can be seen in both historical and contemporary contexts as one of cautious maneuvering to preserve national autonomy and independence of action in a region critical to the defensive strategies of both Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

C. THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF SCANDINAVIA

In the Cold War Era, only the Communist Parties of Finland and Iceland enjoyed a dependable popular support. The three-state core of Denmark, Norway and Sweden has not voted its Communist parties to more than a minimal representation (2-6%) since the Party fell out of grace in 1948.⁶⁰ But their popularity has increased significantly in the present decade throughout Scandinavia. (See Tables 1-5, pp. 79-85.)

Finland

A sanctuary of Lenin during his exile from Russia in the course of the Bolshevik Revolution, Finland is part of the heritage of Soviet

⁵⁹FBIS - Western Europe, Vol. VII, 23 January 1976, p. P1.

⁶⁰Starr, 1968, op. cit.

Communism. Its Social Democratic Party was conceived in the dogma of Marxist revolutionary doctrine in 1903. Its major enemy was czarist Russia and that orientation provided a common ground for the ambitions of Lenin and Stalin who met each other, as it happened, at a Bolshevik meeting in Tampere, Finland in 1905.⁶¹ After the Bolshevik Revolution succeeded in Russia, however, the first objective of the Finns proved to be independence, rather than international Marxism. Nevertheless, right in step with their Russian cohorts, the Finnish Social Democratic revolutionaries opted for the new title of Finnish Communist Party (SKP) in August, 1918.⁶²

Adroit diplomacy with the Soviet Union has steered the independent Finnish governments clear of Soviet Communist Party control of local party politics.⁶³ The present Finnish Communist Party and its electoral front, the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) has consistently secured between a fourth and a fifth of the national vote. In the last election in 1972, it obtained 37 of the parliament's 200 seats, second only to the Social Democratic Party (SDP).

The Soviet Union ... has given conflicting signals on whether it puts higher priority on SKP unity, communist participation in a broad based government (such as Finland's president Urho Kekkonen would probably prefer), or greater communist loyalty to Moscow.⁶⁴

⁶¹Upton, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.

⁶²*Ibid.*, p. 115.

⁶³*Ibid.*, p. 350.

⁶⁴Starr, 1975, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

There is recent evidence that the USSR is growing increasingly impatient with Finnish recalcitrance:

Pravda accuses Finland of promoting anti-communist campaign through large Finnish newspaper.

.....

Pravda denounces Finnish press for spreading lies about USSR involvement with Finnish Communist Party.⁶⁵

Party electoral gains appear to be tied to labor sentiment resulting from national economic troubles blamed on the incumbent government.⁶⁶

Iceland

The Communist Party of Iceland is known today as the People's Alliance (PA), an electoral front that includes leftist Social Democrats, a self-proclaimed "Marxist political party." Its origin dates back to 1930 when it was formed, in typical European fashion, as a splinter group of the Social Democrats.⁶⁷ The Iceland communist movement deserves special attention as it is the only one that has achieved a broad base of support and has consistently held a respectable position in a Nordic parliament -- outside of powerful Soviet influence, as in Finland.

⁶⁵WEIS Report, op. cit.

⁶⁶Starr, 1975, op. cit., p. 155.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 203. Its relatively late start might be attributable to the fact that Iceland did not achieve home rule from Denmark until 1918 nor independence until 1944. Also it was about 1930 that Danish Communist party organization and influence advanced under the dynamic leadership of Axel Larson, one of the first two Communist representatives elected to the Danish parliament in 1932.

It has been one of the few Western European communist parties to participate in a democratically elected government, polling between 12 and 20 percent of the popular vote since World War II. In the 1971 parliamentary election, it gained 17.1 percent of the vote and 10 of the Althing's (parliament) 60 seats. It thereby secured a position in a left-center coalition government and occupied two of the cabinet's seven posts.

Although it gained in electoral standing in the most recent election of 30 June 1974, it forfeited participation in government to a new Progressive-Independent coalition.⁶⁸

Iceland has the largest number of communist party members of any Scandinavian country. Its membership was between 2,000 and 2,500 out of a population of 207,300 in 1973.⁶⁹ Trond Gilberg, writing in Problems of Communism, explains that Iceland, much like pre-war Finland, offers a good example of "Wilderness Communism."

According to this analysis, communism in Scandinavia has not been primarily an urban movement, for the strong Social Democrat parties and trade union organizations in the cities have effectively precluded mass support for other left wing movements. In the poorer rural areas, on the other hand, lumberjacks, marginal farmers, and people in closely knit fishing villages have tended to exhibit considerable radicalism and an inclination to vote for Communists.⁷⁰

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 204.

⁶⁹World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations - 1973, U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 21.

⁷⁰Trond Gilberg, "Patterns of Nordic Communism," Problems of Communism, XXIV (May-June, 1975), p. 32.

Factors which contribute to this phenomenon in Iceland are found in the traditional social patterns of village solidarity, an egalitarian culture and fervent nationalism.⁷¹ An example of the latter is seen in the political reaction of single-industry fishing villages to foreign encroachment on their waters.⁷² Gilberg continues:

With perceptive understanding of the individualistic spirit so prevalent among the people, the Communists have always played down the collectivist elements of their own faith: [sic] nevertheless recognizing that most of the country's economic activities originally began as branches of Danish state monopolies . . . and that broad sections of the population seem to take state ownership for granted, they have pushed for state ownership of much of industry and other major economic ventures. The communists have also sought consistently to validate their nationalist credentials, and they have acquired a reputation as one of the most nationalistic political forces in the country.⁷³

In summing up the Icelandic Communist Party success, it must be emphasized that its willingness to participate in coalitions with other more moderate parties and its image as a local brotherhood in no way associated with "alien elements" has distinguished it from its Scandinavian counterparts.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "Iceland: Action in the North Atlantic," Time, 8 March 1976, p. 38.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 34.

⁷⁴ Starr, "International Party Contacts," 1975, op. cit., p. 206.

The People's Alliance strongly advocates Iceland's withdrawal from NATO and elimination of the U.S. dominated Icelandic Defense Force, while 40% inflation (1974) over the previous year poses an opportunity for unseating the incumbent government.⁷⁵

Denmark

The Danes founded their Communist Party in 1919. Membership today is approximately 8,000, against a national population of 5,100,000 (1973). The most dedicated members of the Danish Communist Party and its Marxist offshoots have been characteristically intellectual types. The present rector of the University of Copenhagen, Mogens Fog, was a leading member of the DKP and later the Socialist Left Party just after World War II. The chief theoretician and party liaison to most Moscow summits is Ib Norland, an atomic physicist and nephew of Nobel laureate Niel Bohr, discoverer of the neutron and director of Copenhagen's famous institute of theoretical physics. A charismatic politician and former Chairman of the DKP, Axel Larson was joined by aristocrat Kaj Moltke and zoology professor Morten Lange in forming a new Marxist party, the Socialist Left in 1958. All three took seats in the Folketing following the new party's first election campaign in 1958. Despite strong support to the Left parties by a liberal-intellectual element of Danish society, organized labor has remained almost exclusively the province of the Social Democrats.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 204; see also, FBIS - Soviet Union, 10 September 1974, p. E1.

⁷⁶ Peter P. Rohde, "The Communist Party of Denmark," in A. F. Upton, op. cit., pp. 10, 21, 30.

In 1973, the Party (DKP) scored its biggest electoral gains (3.6% of vote) since 1953, and returned to parliament for the first time in 12 years. Since the 1973 election, opinion polls have registered a popular gain to nearly 6% approval. The improved image was reflected in recent (1974) municipal elections in which the DKP jumped from 6 seats to 54 seats. This gain was achieved in spite of severe competition among parties of the Left. Since World War II, the DKP has splintered twice into rival Marxist oriented parties: the Socialist People's Party (SF) in 1958 and the Left Socialists (VS) in 1967. So the latest election, in which the leftist rivals declined in popularity is seen as a vindication of the Moscow-aligned DKP policies.⁷⁷

This latest boom in the fortunes of the Danish communists is a cause of consternation among political scientists and sociologists who had predicted the demise of Marxist parties with the advance of material prosperity and narrowing of income differentials in industrialized nations.⁷⁸ Denmark, with the highest income for unskilled labor in Europe,⁷⁹ has not borne out that prediction. The puncturing of the prediction of social tranquility with material prosperity has led Scandinavian political scientist Trond Gilberg to a new hypothesis:

⁷⁷Starr, 1975, op. cit., p. 149.

⁷⁸Gilberg, op. cit., p. 20.

⁷⁹Brian Patrick McGuire, op. cit., p. 327.

The erroneous expectation that political radicalism would gradually wither away in modern society . . . was based on the logic that with the development of social welfare states and growing prosperity, the general public would become increasingly middle-class in social status and economic position, and public opinion would cluster in the middle of the spectrum. Political trends in Western Europe -- including Norway, Denmark, and Sweden -- during the last decade have disproved this notion; in fact, it now appears that prosperous welfare states may be especially prone to the upheavals of a new form of radicalism originating precisely in the middle class and leading to the polarization of the entire political spectrum.⁸⁰

Gilberg ascribes a major cause of this new development -- the alienation of the middle class foundation in a welfare state -- to heavy taxation on a broad middle-income base, while economic privileges accrue to owners of industry. The author further postulates that the Communist Party will capitalize upon the disaffection of the masses through the issues of:

- 1) Big Power Policies - suggesting the ruthless exploitation of Scandinavian resources and strategic geography to enhance the strength of Continental and U.S. power;
- 2) Internal Political Trends - pointing toward the "bourgeoisization" of Scandinavian social democracy;
- 3) The EEC Issue - which could be used to claim a sellout to West European powers necessitating a compromise of Scandinavian labor gains; and
- 4) Political Polarization - of socialist-labor-liberal group and the conservative, financially well entrenched group.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Gilberg, op. cit., p. 25.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 23-25.

As in the other countries of West Europe during the present period, the rampant inflation (20%, March 1975) and unemployment (13%) associated with the incumbent parties prove to be the most immediate means of marshalling popular backing for Communist Party entry into government.⁸²

Norway

Founded in 1923 as an offshoot of the Norwegian Labor Party, the Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) has suffered from relentless competition on the Left: the Norwegian Labor Party (DNA) on one side, and the Socialist People's Party (SF) and a variety of extremist groups on the other. As elsewhere in Western Europe during the seventies, the fortunes of the NKP has improved through electoral alliance. The SF-NKP-DNA-dissident Front captured 10.1 percent of the 1973 popular vote and took 16 seats in the parliament -- one of them occupied by the NKP.⁸³

The Norwegian Communist Party remains more aloof of Moscow than does their Danish counterpart. But even without Soviet intercession the NKP was instrumental in blocking Norway's entry into the EEC by

⁸² McGuire, op. cit., p. 20. Many observers of the Scandinavian political scene predict a conservative reaction by voters. See "Denmark: Something Rotten," Newsweek, 17 December 1973, p. 50.

⁸³ Starr, 1975, op. cit., p. 225.

campaigning with other anti-Common Market groups before a referendum in September of 1972.⁸⁴

The potential for further inroads into Norwegian Labor Party leadership is similar to that cited by Gilberg for the Danish Party (preceding section), although the biggest problem will be welding leftist factions together before the Party disintegrates from within. The development of oil reserves in Norway has drawn the Party into a campaign against private control and possible cooperation in OPEC.⁸⁵

Sweden

The Swedish Communist Party (SKP) grew out of a dissident faction of the Social Democratic Party in 1921. In 1967, it changed its name to the Left-Party-Communist (VKP) to increase its appeal among those opposed to the traditional pro-Moscow stance. But the change proved in vain as it has since further splintered into pro-Mao and pro-Moscow groups.⁸⁶ In a tense 1973 election, a perfect split between the socialist left and the so called bourgeois parties, forced the SD Prime Minister to depend upon the Communist VKP for a government of the Left.⁸⁷

⁸⁴Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations - 1973 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1973), p. 33.

⁸⁵Starr, 1975, op. cit., p. 243.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 245.

⁸⁷Tarschys, op. cit., p. 43.

In the most recent election, 19 September 1976, a "bourgeois" coalition of Center, Moderate and Liberal parties ousted the socialist parties after 44 years of uninterrupted government.⁸⁸

The VKP has shown itself to be one of the most adaptable Scandinavian communist parties in cooperating with the Social Democrat establishment in that the VKP leader C. H. Hermansson has demonstrated a political agility unsurpassed by his Scandinavian communist party cohorts by entertaining a wide spectrum of communists in his liberal band. However, as long as the Social Democrats have retained control over labor, the VKP has been willing to accept participation in government at the pleasure of dominating Social Democrats. This fact has caused increasing agitation among Marxists to withdraw from Social Democrat alliance and to offer a revolutionary alternative to disenchanted proletarians.⁸⁹ The VKP dilemma for the future, then, is where to trade off the prestige of participation in government for the opportunity of increased radical support.

D. EUROCOMMUNISM

It is apparent that socialism and communism in their contemporary European forms are in desperate need of redefinition. It is indisputable

⁸⁸"Sweden, Social Democrats: 44 and Out," Time, 4 October 1976, p. 46.

⁸⁹Tarschys, op. cit., p. 43.

that the trend of Scandinavian government is toward the left,⁸⁹ but what does that auger for the Soviet Union? What does it mean to be a "Social Democrat," a "Socialist" or a "Communist" in Scandinavia?

Degrees of Socialism

There are degrees of socialism that are traceable back to the communaute movements that were spawned by the French Revolution.⁹⁰ Karl Marx was among the first to attempt a precise, even a "scientific," definition of socialism that would distinguish it from the broadly egalitarian movements of the day. And it was mainly at this juncture, about the time of Das Kapital, (Vol. I, 1867), that differences over the structure, means and goals of socialism became pronounced. These fundamental differences persist largely intact today and define the competing schools of socialism.⁹¹

Bases for differentiation of "socialist" parties:

a) Structural

1. Popular based, bourgeois based, peasant based or proletariat (Marx) based movement?
2. Local, national or universal (Marx) scope?
3. Decentralized (self-governing), representative or hierarchical organization of society?
4. Common or elite leadership?

⁹⁰ Robert Owen, New View of Society (London: 1813); in An Encyclopedia of World History by William L. Langer, ed., (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, Company, 1974), p. 591.

⁹¹ Joseph Shumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, (New York: Harper, 1950), p. 150.

b) Methodological

1. Evolutionary or revolutionary attainment of goals?
2. Democratic or anarchic change

c) Aspirational

1. Comprehensive Social Welfare
2. State Socialism
3. Guild Socialism
4. Marxian Socialism
5. Marxian-Leninist Socialism
6. Marxian-Maoist Socialism

Prior to Marx, socialism was generally regarded as an end in itself. After Marx, socialism was to be regarded as a vehicle of the proletariat to a more perfect society -- Communism, where the practice "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" prevailed.⁹² All "socialists," however, do not share this vision with Marx. The Oxford English Dictionary defines socialism as "a theory or policy that aims at or advocates the ownership or control by the means of production -- capital, land, property, etc., -- by the community as a whole and their administration in the interests of all."⁹³

⁹² Ibid., p. 47.

⁹³ Julius Gould and William L. Kolb, A Dictionary of the Social Sciences, (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 670.

The core concept of socialism, by any denomination of socialist, is the "ownership or control of the means of production . . . in the interests of all." Beyond this principle, proponents of socialism diverge in their interpretations of the degree of ownership or control that is required and how the interests of all are best served. It should be noted that socialism, per se, does not assume either equality or democracy in its application. To this extent, it is strictly a modus operandi of government. For example,

In the emergent states socialism is more intimately concerned with problems of nationalism and economic development than with the nuances, paradoxes, and symbols of social status. The vision of the 'good society' in such states is of one in which problems of acute poverty have been abolished. Socialism, as an economic instrumentality, here has the prime aim of fostering economic growth -- an aim to which many other economic, political, and social values may be subordinated.⁹⁴

Given this range of construction -- from minimal governmental controls to a dictatorship of the proletariat -- within the scope of "ownership or control of the means of production," what forms of contemporary socialism can be found in Scandinavia?

1. Comprehensive State Welfare: The means of production are reserved to private enterprise, but state control of the economy -- trade, tariffs, prices, wages, cost of capital (discount rate), money supply, etc. -- is maintained in the interest of public welfare, or a minimum

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 671.

subsistence level. "Excess profits" are taxed and distributed in payment or services to the public at large.

2. State Socialism: The state owns or manages the means of production on behalf of the public.

3. Guild Socialism: The guild industries retain ownership and control of the means of production and administer all profits in the interest of all employed.

4. Pure Marxian Socialism: The proletariat owns and controls the means of production pursuant to the withering away of the state and the emerging of a communist society.

5. Marxian-Leninist Socialism: The proletariat has title to the means of production under the direction of an elite vanguard. Eventually, the proletariat will dissolve into a completely classless society of communism.

6. Marxian-Maoist Socialism: The peasantry own and operate the means of production and ultimately eliminate state bureaucracy through a continuing revolution of ascendancy to a communist society.

Among these variants of socialism, revolution is the intervening variable which determines the ultimate character of society. In the first three forms of socialism, revolution is construed in the mildest sense to mean peaceful reform of the existing social system through technological breakthrough, political upheaval and changes in the social structure (for example, mass movements to urban areas in the wake of industrialization). In the case of pure Marxian socialism, proletarian

revolution is generally considered a sine qua non of liberation from capitalism, especially after the publication of the Communist Manifesto. However, early treatises and correspondence by Marx indicate that the means of transition to socialism is dependent upon the socio-economic conditions existing at the moment.⁹⁵ Lenin, despite his advocacy of violent revolution when the "objective conditions" were right, conceded that different conditions call for different tactics. Lenin was adamant, however, in his insistence upon a "revolutionary vanguard" to organize and lead the proletarian cause -- something which Marx did not reckon on.⁹⁶ The Maoist version of socialism places heavy emphasis upon the need for a "continuing revolution," which both Marx and Lenin would abandon after the proletariat's emancipation from capitalism. Mao also ascribes a much higher value to the peasantry in forging a revolution than does either Marx or Lenin.⁹⁷

The last three forms of socialism described above have in common an ultimate goal: a classless, communist society. The Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held on 31 October 1961, put forth the following definition in its Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

⁹⁵See Karl Marx, Das Kapital; in Marx and the Marxists: The Ambiguous Legacy by Sidney Hook, (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1955).

⁹⁶W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs, op. cit., pp. 270-273.

⁹⁷See Robert C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953).

What is Communism? Communism is a classless social system with one form of public ownership of the means of production and full social equality of all members of society ... Communism is a highly organized society of free, socially conscious working people in which public self government will be established, a society in which labor for the good of society will become the prime vital requirement for everyone, a necessity recognized by all, and the ability of each person will be employed to the greatest benefit of the people.⁹⁸

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia explains that:

The transition into Communism will be effected by strengthening the Socialist order and without a revolution. ... and the state will have withered away.⁹⁹

The Parties

The various socialist and communist parties of today have evolved as exponents of the various interpretations of socialism outlined above. To broadly distinguish the socialists from the communists by party, one could assign a socialist label to the first three forms of socialism mentioned (Comprehensive Social Welfare, State Socialism and Guild Socialism) and a communist label to the latter three (Marxist, Marxian-Leninist and Marxian-Maoist). The clarification given by Marx and Engels in the preface to their Communist Manifesto in 1848, is revealing:

Communists do not form a separate party as opposed to other working class parties ... they do not set up any sectarian principles of their own ... but are simply the

⁹⁸New Times, 29 November 1961, p. 27.

⁹⁹Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 9 September 1953; in Gould, op. cit., p. 114.

most advanced and resolute section of every country, that section which pushes forward all others.¹⁰⁰

Against this background, a wide spectrum of parties have come into existence across Scandinavia that espouse varying degrees of socialism (see Party Tables 1-5). While it could be said that Russian socialist rivalries at the turn of the century -- Narodniki, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks -- are ghosts of today, that would be an oversimplification. The connotations of Social Democrat, Left Socialist, and Communist are the product of intervening history. Today, except for the recent developments in Southern Europe, "Communist" calls to mind a Soviet sympathizer; "Socialist" evokes a wayward Marxist Revolutionary; and "Social Democrat" suggests a moderate socialist of the Bernstein school.¹⁰¹ But behind these contemporary classifications lurks an immutable legacy. The "backwoods communists" of Iceland (the People's Alliance Party) have a historic kinship with the Narodniki; the Communist Parties of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland are the direct descendants of Bolshevik comrades; and the Social Democrats are the prospering nephews of Menshevik dissidents (of the Russian Social Democrats) who held out for political pluralism.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 1848; in Gould, op. cit., p. 113.

¹⁰¹Lt. Jan Christiansen, Royal Danish Air Force; conversation at his home, Monterey, California, 10 September 1976.

¹⁰²Gilberg, op. cit.

The Soviet model may not prove to be the best way to Communism. As Milovan Djilas pointed out in The New Class, a burgeoning bureaucracy breeds a managerial class to supplant the capitalists' control of the means of production.¹⁰³ Under such conditions, socialism is defeated and communism is preempted by the rigidity of a new social hierarchy. In this situation, the prospect of socialism through popular mandate -- rather than proletarian revolution -- is the more logical method. The politics of this decade in France and Italy have given communism a new appeal. A rereading of Marx and even Lenin might disclose that the Soviets have taken a very biased view of socialism to suit their own needs. The Spanish Party Program proclaims:

No student of Marx has ever rationalized a one-party system or a Communist Party that is by law more privileged than other parties. Nor would he justify the elevation of Marxism to an official national philosophy and the subjugation of the arts and culture to a government monopoly.¹⁰⁴

Typical of Scandinavian socialism, the Danish Social Democrat Party's draft "program of principles" for its 1977 congress includes the following proposals:

¹⁰³ Milovan Djilas, The New Class; in "Ideologies in Conflict," Air University Research Study (AU-202-71-1PD), Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, 1972), p. 51.

¹⁰⁴ "Communism's New Face," Atlas World Press Review, August 1976, p. 34; reproduced from "A Historic Compromise," Die Zeit, 9 April 1976.

1. "Joint ownership of the means of production" and support of movements opposing economic and political repression.
2. Collective ownership for all wage earners and governmental control of credit, insurance and other private concentrations of economic power, including multinational corporations.
3. Doctors and dentists under state employment and pharmaceutical firms under public control.
4. Continued membership in NATO only as long as the alliance provides a balanced foundation for East-West detente and cooperation.¹⁰⁵

It is intriguing that the symbol appearing on the cover of the Party program is a clenched hand holding a rose. It thus appears that in the final analysis a party label is simply a political calling card. The genotype, as opposed to the phenotype, of the party is to be found in the application of its program for social and economic organization of the state and its long-term means of achieving its goals. Seen in this light, the program of Denmark's Social Democrats may be in deed be more "Marxist" than the present program of Italy's Communists.

In the case of Scandinavia, one cannot judge the Marxist potential from the party label alone. In Denmark, labor groups that are well committed to and well fed by the Social Democrats have advanced to levels of socialism well beyond those known to the French and Italian

¹⁰⁵"News of Norden," Scandinavian Review, December, 1975, p. 65.

communists.¹⁰⁶ Remembering that V. I. Lenin stressed that the "historical fate of social systems will be decided in the final account not on the battlefields but in economics,"¹⁰⁷ and that each country "finds for itself the forms through which it realizes social reconstruction,"¹⁰⁸ the rapid progress to Marxian socialism in Scandinavia is sobering. Soviet author I. E. Kravtsev, a respected Party ideologue, also allows that

Under contemporary conditions the national factor has become an important force in ideology and politics. One should not overlook this . . . A nihilistic attitude toward national feelings sometimes makes its appearance. People who hold this view say that national feelings allegedly contradict internationalism and even patriotism. This point of view is incorrect. National feelings are by themselves sound, all-human phenomena characteristic for men of all nationalities. As long as nations exist, men will have national feelings.¹⁰⁹

Owing to the fervent nationalism peculiar to the Scandinavian states, the course of communism there is likely to be an independent one. The best bet for Moscow, then, is to cultivate a tolerant rapprochement with potentially socialist states while Nordic communists labor toward a sympathetic social system, on their own terms.

¹⁰⁶ See McGuire, *op. cit.*, p. 329, describing intra-Scandinavian collaboration of labor and labor take-over of industry.

¹⁰⁷ Miroshnichenko, Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskovo Soiuz, p. 47 in Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

¹⁰⁸ Kommunisti, No. 9, (1945), p. 3; nos. 14-15, p. 10 in Upton, *op. cit.*, p. 249. (Quote from V. I. Lenin).

¹⁰⁹ Kravtsev, *op. cit.*, p. 3 in Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs, *op. cit.*, p. 255-256.

SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Table 1: Finland

(January, 1972)

	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Electoral %</u>	<u>Seats</u>
	Finnish People's Democratic League: (SKDL-Communist Front-2nd strongest party in Finland)	17.0	(37)
Government	<u>Social Democrat:</u>	25.8	(55)
Government	<u>Center (Agrarian):</u>	16.4	(35)
	Rural:	9.1	(18)
	Christian League:	2.5	(4)
Government	<u>Liberal:</u>	5.2	(7)
Government	<u>Swedish People's:</u>	5.3	(10)
	National Coalition:	<u>17.6</u>	<u>(34)</u>

2,573,751 votes

200 seats

Communist Party membership: 49,000 (estimated)

Communist Party orientation: Pro-Moscow

Supplement to Table 1: Finland

<u>Political Party</u>	<u>1975 Electoral %</u>	<u>1975 Seats</u>
Social Democrats	695,394	54
People's Democratic League	528,026	40
National Coalition	513,213	35
Center (Agrarian	488,930	39
Swedish People's	141,381	10
Liberal People's Party	121,722	9
Finnish Rural Party	100,771	2
Christian League	92,108	9
Others	113,593	2

Table 2: Iceland

(June, 1974)

	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Electoral %</u>	<u>Seats</u>
	Communist (People's Alliance), "PA":	18.3	(11)
	Organization of Liberals and Leftists:	4.7	(2)
	Social Democrat:	9.3	(5)
Government	<u>Progressive Party:</u>	24.9	(17)
Government (PM)	<u>Independence Party:</u>	<u>42.8</u>	<u>(25)</u>
		103,330 votes	
		60 seats	

Communist Party membership: 2,000 - 2,500 (estimated)

Communist Party orientation: Neutral; no relations with CPSU

People's Alliance chairman Ragnar Arnolds stated in an interview that his
that his party is "more in tune with Scandinavian Social Democrats than
with communists in those countries." (Die Welt, December 27, 1973)

N.B.: Party data and quote extracted from World Strength of Communist Party Organizations - 1973, U.S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research; updated from Starr's Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975.

Table 3: Denmark

(December, 1973)

	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Electoral %</u>	<u>Seats</u>
	Danish Communist, "DKP":	3.6	(6)
	Left Socialist, "VS":	1.5	(0)
	Socialist Peoples, "SF":	6.0	(11)
	Social Democrat, "SD":	25.6	(46)
Minority Government (PM)	<u>Center Democrat:</u>	7.8	(14)
	<u>Radical Liberals:</u>	11.2	(20)
	Moderate Liberals:	12.3	(22)
	Conservatives:	9.2	(16)
	Christian People's:	4.0	(7)
	Justice:	2.9	(5)
	Progressive:	<u>15.9</u>	<u>(28)</u>

3,052,434 votes

175 seats

+2 Greenland

+2 Faeroes

Communist Party membership: 7,500 - 8,000 (estimated)

Communist Party orientation: Pro-Moscow

Supplement to Table 3: Denmark

	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Electoral %</u>		<u>Seats</u>	
		Jan, 1975/ Feb, 1977		1975/1977	
Minority Government	Communists	4.2	3.7	7	7
	Left Socialists	2.1	2.7	4	5
	Socialist People's	4.9	3.9	9	7
	<u>Social Democrats</u>	30.0	37.0	53	65
	Liberal Democrats	23.3	12.0	42	21
	Radical Liberals	7.1	3.6	13	6
	Christian People's Pty	5.3	3.4	9	6
	Conservatives	5.5	8.5	10	15
	Center Democrats	2.2	6.4	4	11
	Progress Party	13.6	14.6	24	26
	Single-Tax Party	1.8	3.3	0	6
	Pensioners' Party	—	.9	—	0
		2,913,885 votes (75)			
		3,105,980 votes (77)			
		175 seats (75/77)			
		+2 Greenland			
		+2 Faeroes			

Table 4: Norway
(September, 1973)

	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Electoral %</u>	<u>Seats</u>
	Socialist Electoral Alliance:	10.1 (as follows)	
	Communist "NKP"		(1)
	Socialist People's		(9)
	Labor Dissidents		(6)
	Red Alliance:	.4	(0)
Government:	<u>Norwegian Labor:</u>	42.3	(62)
	Liberals:	2.0	(2)
	New People's:	3.1	(1)
	Center:	6.1	(21)
	Christian People's:	10.6	(20)
	Non-socialist joint list:	5.3	
	Conservative:	15.6	(29)
	Party for Reduction of Taxes:	<u>4.5</u>	<u>(4)</u>
		2,373,662 votes	
		155 seats	

Communist Party membership: 2,500 (estimated)

Communist Party orientation: Neutral toward Moscow, international
communism

Table 5: Sweden
(September, 1973)

	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Electoral %</u>	<u>Seats</u>
Government	Left-Communist, "VKP":	5.3	(19)
	Communist League Marxist-Leninist, "KFML":	.1	(0)
	Swedish Communist, "SKP":	.4	(0)
Government PM	<u>Social Democrat:</u>	43.6	(156)
	Center:	25.2	(90)
	Liberals:	9.4	(34)
	Christian Democrat:	1.7	(0)
	Moderates:	<u>14.3</u>	<u>(51)</u>

5,158,839 votes

350 seats

Communist Party membership: 17,000 (estimated)

Communist Party orientation: Open split between Soviet and Chinese supporters

Supplement to Table 5: Sweden
(September, 1976)

	<u>Political Party</u>	<u>Electoral %</u>	<u>Seats</u>
	Left Communist	4.7	17
	Communist Party of Sweden	.3	0
	Social Democrats	42.9	152
Government (PM)	<u>Center</u>	24.1	86
Government	<u>Liberals</u>	11.0	39
Government	<u>Moderates</u>	15.6	55
	Christian Democrats	<u>1.4</u>	<u>0</u>
		5,423,310 votes	
		349 seats	

III. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES

While it is essential to understand that Marxist-Leninist ideology is the raison d'etre of the Soviet state and that the very purpose of Soviet foreign policy is to realize a world revolution to socialism as promised in that ideology, it is equally important to appreciate that the method of attaining the ultimate foreign policy goal of world socialism is definitely pragmatic. This is to say that in analyzing Soviet foreign policy toward the non-Socialist states, the analyst must always reckon with ideology as a motive of Soviet foreign policy while coping with routine international diplomacy as a method of Soviet foreign policy. Hannes Adomeit, a West German lecturer at the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow, stresses the importance of this differentiation of motive and method in order to comprehend what non-socialist analysts often perceive as a failure between theory and practice.

Some of the major indications are that Soviet state activity and the reliance on traditional 'classic' forms of diplomacy has become more important in revolutionary strategy than supporting local Communists and 'progressive forces' so as to create revolutionary transformations which, in turn, might serve Soviet foreign policy objectives.¹

¹Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Co-existence? Adelphi Paper 101 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 19.

Mr. Eric Willenz, Senior Analyst for Communist Affairs in the U. S. State Department Office of Research and Analysis concurs in this assessment of current Soviet foreign policy toward Scandinavia. He describes Soviet foreign policy today as being very malleable to meet the requirements of the area. In the case of Scandinavia, the Soviet Union is very intent upon not creating tension which will drive those states into the full embrace of NATO.² This pattern of diplomacy conforms to the model of Soviet relations with Finland and has given currency to the theory of Finlandization.³

Lenin himself was the personification of pragmatism in guiding Soviet foreign policy. His instructive essay Infantile Disease of Leftism in Communism "remains a monument to the Soviet view of policy in conditions of coexistence."⁴ In 1967 a latter day Soviet specialist, V. Israel'ian, construed Lenin's concept of foreign policy to be holistic:

Leninist theory regards international life as a whole where particular events are related to and condition each other. Marxist-Leninists do not view international life as something

²Eric Willenz, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and East Europe, U. S. State Department (Washington, D.C.; telephone interview by author, 0820-0855 hours, PDT, 20 October 1976).

³For a thorough analysis of this theory, pro and con, see: Layton, "What Finlandization Means," Economist, (4 August 1973), p. 15; also, R. J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe, Adelphi Paper No. 119 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975 (PRO); and George Kennan in "Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices," Foreign Policy, Spring, 1974, pp. 3-16 (CON).

⁴Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy," in The Soviet Impact on World Politics, Kurt L. London, editor, (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1974), p. 7.

frozen and unchangeable; they see, first of all, its dynamic force. At the same time, they fully realize that any diplomatic action or foreign policy demarche is insolubly linked to an actual but constantly changing historical situation, which in turn constantly produces new diplomatic actions and new foreign events.⁵

How has this Leninist concept of a continuously changing foreign policy affected traditional diplomacy in the West? The answer is that the standards of Western diplomacy have only gradually adapted to the "new rules of the game."⁶ Ever since the emergence of states, envoys, protocols, treaties and other vehicles of diplomacy have had the express purpose of fixing the status quo between sovereigns.⁷ But how does a traditional, sovereign state conduct diplomatic relations -- i. e., agree upon a status quo -- with a "state" that explicitly rejects sovereignty on the basis of political legitimacy and, moreover, is explicitly committed to world revolution?⁸ There is no solution to this predicament except either to refuse diplomatic recognition to the non-sovereign state, or to alter the meaning and function of diplomacy. The non-socialist

⁵V. Israel'ian, "Leninskaia nowka o mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniialsh i vneshnepoliticheskaiia real'nost'," MZh (Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn'), No. 6, 1967, pp. 70-71; in W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1973), p. 9.

⁶Adam B. Ulam, "The Soviet Union and the Rules of the International Game," in London, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

⁷See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), Chapter One.

⁸Ulam in London, op. cit., p. 40.

states of the West have invariably opted for the latter course, and thereby accepted different rules of diplomacy with regard to the Soviet/Socialist states than had prevailed in the state system ante Sovietum.

In a review of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Scandinavian states, therefore, one must define the significance of diplomatic activity that in fact takes place. Given the self-admitted opportunism of Soviet foreign policy -- to exploit the "crisis of capitalism" in non-Socialist states -- and the poor Soviet record in honoring treaty obligations, the importance of diplomatic relations as a measure of mutual affinity with the Soviet Union is questionable.⁹ Substantively, Soviet treaties have seldom been remarkable for binding the Soviets to a prescribed course of action.¹⁰ But for the analyst of trends in Soviet foreign relations, a review of treaties and diplomatic communiques is useful in tracing the direction of Soviet foreign relations.¹¹ For this purpose, a quantitative analysis of bilateral treaties concluded between

⁹L. I. Brezhnev, "Report on the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign Policy," at the 25th Congress of the CPSU (Moscow, 24 February 1976); in New Times, No. 9, (Moscow, February 1976), p. 39; and Peter Sager, The Soviet Union's Treaty Record (Berne, Switzerland: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1962).

¹⁰Peter Sager, The Soviet Union's Treaty Record, A Study in Soviet Legal Morality (Berne, Switzerland: Swiss Eastern Institute, 1962), p. 29.

¹¹Nils Orvik, "Nordic Cooperation and High Politics," International Organization, Vol. 28, no. 1 (Winter, 1974), p. 83.

the Soviet Union and the five Scandinavian States between 1920 and 1970 was undertaken by the author.

While a longitudinal breakdown of the number of treaties negotiated periodically since 1920 illuminates the progress of diplomacy (improved Soviet-Scandinavian State relations?), perhaps the more significant data concerns the number of Soviet/Scandinavian State treaties relative to the number of Soviet treaties concluded bilaterally with certain other states. The analysis includes the United Kingdom and West Germany as comparative treaty partners because of their historical roles, together with the USSR, in the international relations of the Scandinavian states.¹² The United States is included to compare the diplomatic effort (in terms of treaties) expended by the superpowers bidding for influence in Scandinavia; while Poland and East Germany are included to gauge the diplomatic importance of representative East Bloc states versus established relations of the U.K. and the FRG with Scandinavian states. (For a chronological listing of treaties concluded between the USSR and each of the Scandinavian states and pertinent topical data, see Appendix B).

A. Scandinavian state treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (See Treaty Chronology, Appendix A)

Finland

Finland maintains the closest diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union of the five Scandinavian states. In fact, the Soviet Union is

¹²Ibid.

Finland's leading partner in international relations and has concluded twice as many treaties with Finland as Finland has with the U.S., as of 1970. The majority (20 out of 50) of these agreements were concluded in the post-war period from 1945 to 1950, which included the benchmark Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1948 (see Attachment B for the full text). Under the terms of this agreement, Finland became a conditional ally of the Soviet Union. Article One declares that

Should either Finland, or the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland become the object of military aggression on the part of Germany or any Power allied with Germany, Finland will carry out the duty as a sovereign State and will fight to repel aggression. . . . with the help, if necessary of the Soviet Union or together with the Soviet Union.¹³

Some analysts of Soviet foreign policy regard this treaty as a harbinger of "Finlandization" destined to envelop greater Scandinavia and perhaps the rest of Europe.¹⁴ The salient clauses, from which a prototype for Finlandization is constructed, are contained in Articles Four and Six.

¹³Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Finland, Signed at Moscow, on 6 April 1948, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 28 (New York: United Nations, 1950), pp. 149-160. UNTS No. 100742; see Appendix B, this paper.

¹⁴See George W. Kennan, "Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices," Foreign Policy, Spring, 1974, pp. 3-16; H. Peter Krosby, "Scandinavia and 'Finlandization,'" Scandinavian Review, No. 2, (June, 1975), pp. 11-19; Lord Layton, "What Finlandization Means," Economist, 4 August 1973, pp. 15-16; R. J. Vincent, "Military Power and Political Influence," Adelphi Paper, No. 119 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975).

Article Four:

The High Contracting Parties confirm the undertaking contained in article 3 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris on 10 February 1947 not to enter into any alliance or take part in any coalition directed against the High Contracting Party.

.....

Article Six:

The High Contracting Parties agree to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for their national sovereignty and independence and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State.¹⁵

These clauses have been construed by Western Sovietologists to characterize the present Soviet foreign policy toward Finland -- and the projected Soviet foreign policy for the rest of Scandinavia -- as demanding deference to the Soviet Union in matters of international relations, such as regional alliance (Article Four) in return for freedom of action in domestic affairs (Article Six). H. Peter Krosby, an acknowledged authority on Finnish affairs at the State University of New York in Albany, explains:

What the Russians did demand of the Finns after the end of the war was that Finland's foreign policy henceforth consider -- and not clash with -- the vital security interests of the Soviet Union ... Finland was free to align itself with the Soviet Union in any way it wished, but not with potential adversaries of the Soviet Union. ... Within the limits of these restrictions, Finland was free to pursue its own policies at home and abroad.¹⁶

¹⁵ 48 UNTS 149, op. cit., p. 158.

¹⁶ H. Peter Krosby, "Scandinavia and 'Finlandization,'" Scandinavian Review, No. 2, June 1975, p. 17.

Even if one concedes the most benign intentions to the Soviets in concluding this treaty with Finland, the treaty itself represents a prima facie forfeiture of sovereignty on the part of Finland. No independent state would choose to renounce its sovereign right to engage in international relations, to include alliances or "coalitions" (Article Four), except under coercion from its High Contracting treaty partner; and it is superfluous for High Contracting Parties who are both independent and sovereign states to stress "non-interference in the internal affairs of the other state" (Article Six). Notwithstanding this superfluous pledge of non-interference, the Soviet Union has repeatedly sought to enjoin Finnish internal political competition viewed by the Soviets as detrimental to the Finnish communist movement.¹⁷

The Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948 is an anomaly in international law. It is not a mutual defense treaty, but, by its peculiar phrasing, a self-defense treaty. Article One specifies what Finland must do to "carry out its duty as a sovereign State and ... to repel aggression," but not what the Soviet Union must do to reciprocate Finland's efforts. Also, curiously, Article Two, which simply declares that the "Parties will consult together in case there is found to be a threat of the military aggression referred to in Article 1," has proven to be a Soviet lever to enlist Finnish military support of Soviet foreign policy. In this respect,

¹⁷"Pravda Accuses Finnish Press of Promoting Anti-Communist Campaign," New York Times, 21 March 1975.

the Finno-Soviet Treaty serves as a deterrent to military or political coalitions among the non-signatory states of Scandinavia and northern Europe. This view is expressed in a study by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, in regard to Soviet reaction to the U-2 incident (U.S. reconnaissance aircraft downed over Soviet territory) on 1 May 1960, among several other Soviet crisis reactions. Premier Krushchev traveled to Helsinki to confer with President Kekkonen and

argued that the cause of peace in Northern Europe would depend on the policies of Norway and Denmark.

In Norway Mr. Krushchev's declarations were viewed as an attempt by the Soviet Union to enlist Finland in the struggle to lessen Norwegian and Danish NATO ties.¹⁸

On 6 April 1965, Pravda and Izvestia published commentaries to celebrate the anniversary of the Finno-Soviet Treaty of 1948, wherein "Izvestia in particular argued that recent developments had shown the continued and even increased value of the Friendship treaty as an instrument for securing peace in Northern Europe and for guaranteeing the security of the Finnish-Soviet border."¹⁹

The bilateral treaty history of Finland and the USSR after 1950 shows a decline from 20 to an average of seven per five-year periods up to 1970. This is about twice the treaty rate of any other non-communist

¹⁸Arne Olav Bruntland, The Nordic Balance, Past and Present (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 1966), p. 18.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 21.

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European state with the Soviet Union. The most common subjects of negotiation have been, in order, administrative/diplomatic procedures, economic/trade; social/science programs, aid, and military agreements (See Table 6, p. 113a).

Iceland

After Finland, Iceland has the highest percentage of treaties with the Soviet Union. Eleven percent of Iceland's total of recorded treaties (1970) name the Soviet Union as partner. It is interesting that most of these treaties were negotiated relatively recently, compared to the history of USSR diplomacy with the rest of Scandinavia. Iceland did not become an independent state until 1944, and the Soviet Union had recorded only one treaty, concerning trade, with pre-independent Iceland in 1927. (Iceland progressed from home rule in 1874 to becoming an autonomous state in Union with Denmark in 1918). The next formal treaty, also covering trade relations, was not concluded until 1953. Following the renewal of treaty relations in 1953, the Soviet Union launched a veritable diplomatic offensive to establish close ties with Iceland, based primarily on trade. Author Vincent H. Malmstrom, who has followed the geopolitical development of the Nordic countries in the U.S. and in Norway since 1950, notes the coincidence of increased Soviet diplomatic activity in Iceland and two other international factors: 1) the deterioration of Icelandic-United Kingdom commercial relations over disputes regarding Icelandic territorial fishing boundaries; and 2) the denunciation of U.S.

military rights by Icelandic parliament and referendum.²⁰ (See Table 7, p. 114).

Norway

Norway has devoted seven percent of her treaties to agreements with the USSR. It is significant that by far the largest number of these agreements (over 50%) have been in the category of diplomatic and administrative procedures. More specifically, the majority of these treaties have concerned territorial rights at issue since the USSR-Finland treaty ceding the Pechengo area of northern Finland to the USSR. This is yet another irony of the far reaching effect Soviet diplomacy with Finland was to have on the rest of Scandinavia. Cession of the Pechengo (Petsamo) area by terms of the Russo-Finnish armistice, 19 September 1944 (confirmed by Russo-Finnish protocol of 26 October 1945 and ratified with the Russo-Finnish Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947) made Norway an abutting neighbor of the Soviet Union across a 210 mile border south of its North Cape. Norway was merely a spectator to this border change but has attempted to accommodate its new neighbor in a series of territorial negotiations (see Appendix B, Treaty Chronology). Norway has also been indirectly juxtaposed to the Soviet Union as a result of an international agreement, the Spitzbergen Treaty of 1920, concerning the administration and sovereignty of the Svalbard

²⁰Vincent H. Malmstrom, Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1965), pp. 109-110.

Archipelago. By the terms of this Treaty, Norway was recognized as having sovereign authority in the administration of that arctic domain, with the reservations that 1) all signatories enjoy equal rights to mineral resources; and 2) the islands remain demilitarized.²¹ The Soviet Union was not one of the original 15 signatories, but subsequently acceded to the Treaty on 7 May 1935.²² Disputes over the use and inhabitation of the islands, particularly Spitzbergen, the largest of the group, have flared between the Soviets and the Norwegians following the recent discoveries of large oil reserves in addition to the substantial coal deposits that are being mined by both countries.²³

Aside from territorial settlements, trade agreements comprise the bulk of other treaty topics, one fourth of all Soviet-Norwegian treaties up to 1970. (See Table 8, p. 115.)

Sweden

Sweden, the most economically developed of the five Scandinavian countries, has maintained a proportionately lower level of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union than her flanking neighbors. A review

²¹"Svalbard Archipelago Jurisdiction Issue" (U/FOUO) Monthly Intelligence Digest, (Norfolk, Virginia: Naval Field Operations Office, Fleet Intelligence Center), April 1975, p. 28.

²²Robert M. Slusser, et. al., A Calendar of Soviet Treaties (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 100.

²³Axel Somme, The Geography of Norden (Bergen, Norway: J. W. Eides Boktrykkeri, A. S., 1960), p. 291.

of Sweden's treaty profile reveals that her fairly even distribution of treaties gives to the Soviet Union only a slightly smaller share than to the United States, both having about four percent of Sweden's total. However, almost 60 percent of Sweden's agreements with the Soviets were concluded immediately following World War II and have tapered off in frequency to an average of one treaty per five-year period since 1960. The bulk of these treaties (8 out of 18) have concerned economic and trade relations. In keeping with her international policy of "non-alignment in peace and neutrality in war," Sweden has conspicuously avoided bilateral covenants in her preference for multilateral accords reached through the auspices of the United Nations.²⁴ (See Table 9, p. 116.)

Denmark

Unlike Sweden, Denmark's international relations are weighted heavily in favor of the United States (nine percent of the treaties), while the Soviet Union ranks number six, behind the United Kingdom, Sweden, West Germany and Norway. Nevertheless, Denmark, although now allied with NATO, has shown a history of neutralism that inclines toward accommodations of convenience. Vincent H. Malmstrom notes in his study Norden: Crossroads of Democracy that by the late eighteenth century, Denmark's

²⁴Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 167-171.

foreign policy was a realistic expression of her geopolitical position:

Friendly relations with Russia, the new mistress of the Baltic, became the cornerstone of Danish policy, and to that end Denmark enumerated a doctrine of armed neutrality for her large merchant fleet. During the American Revolutionary War, the Danes propounded several basic resolutions which have since been incorporated into the body of international law -- namely, that the oceans were free to the trade of all nations, that the flag covers the cargo, apart from contraband, between belligerents, and that neutral ships cannot be denied access to ports and harbors that are not effectively blockaded.²⁵

Perhaps the most threatening diplomatic encounters that the Danes have had with the Soviets have been over the issue of Danish sovereignty and military rights on the Island of Bornholm. While Denmark was occupied by German forces during World War II, Soviet forces occupied the Bornholm Island, the "Baltic cork," prior to the liberation of Denmark by Allied armies. They remained there even after peace had been restored until an unpublished agreement was announced jointly by the Danes and the Soviets on 20 March 1946, whereby the Soviet Union removed forces from the Island after extracting Denmark's promise not to permit non-Danish military on the Island. The later use of the Island by Denmark for a radar site has caused repeated Soviet protests, and has provided a pretext for escalated Warsaw Pact maneuvers in its vicinity (official Soviets documented in January, 1953, December 1961, and Fall 1975).²⁶ The topics of Soviet-Danish treaties have been

²⁵ Malmstrom, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

²⁶ Nils Orvik, The Scandinavian Members of NATO, Adelphi Paper No. 23, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 3. See also, "NATO's Listening Post Behind the Iron Curtain," Christian Science Monitor, 26 May 1976, p. 20.

evenly distributed over categories of trade/economics, diplomatic procedure and social cooperation. Frequency of agreements has not varied significantly since the conclusion of World War II, averaging four per five-year period. (See Table 10, p.117.)

It is noteworthy that an increasing responsibility for Soviet foreign policy is being transferred to its socialist sister states in Eastern Europe. Thomas W. Wolfe cites the Bucharest Conference as a turning point in Soviet foreign policy toward West Europe which signaled a new diplomatic offensive of the Brezhnev-Kosygin era which continues to the present day.

With the promulgation of the Bucharest declaration in mid-1966 [6 July 1966], the forging of a new Soviet European policy line under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime was for all practical purposes complete. In regard to Western Europe, this policy seemed pointed primarily toward the familiar aim of breaking up NATO and loosening Europe's links with the United States, although a secondary element, reflected in negotiations with the United States on a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, also kept alive the notion of Soviet-American collaboration on matters affecting Europe's future.²⁷

The recommendations of the Bucharest Declaration were as follows:

1. Cultivation of good-neighbor relations among European countries and the development of closer economic, technical, and cultural contacts.
2. Liquidation of military alliances in Europe, with the added proviso that, if the West was not prepared for this step, the military

²⁷ Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 312.

organizations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact might be abolished, with the alliances themselves tenuously remaining.

3. Commencement of incremental disarmament "toward a military detente in Europe," to include

- a) dismantling of foreign bases,
- b) withdrawal of all foreign troops within their national frontiers,
- c) phased reductions of the armed forces of the two German states,
- d) creation of nuclear free zones,
- e) and cessation of flights over European territory by nuclear-armed foreign aircraft.

4. Preclusion of West German access to nuclear weapons "in any form whatsoever."

5. Recognition of the immutability of Europe's postwar boundaries as the basis of a durable peace.

6. Acceptance of the reality of two German states incorporated into a peace settlement.

7. Convening of "an all-European conference to discuss security and promote European cooperation."²⁸

The Bucharest Declaration outlined the idea of detente which has been the hallmark of Soviet foreign policy ever since. Four of these objectives (4, 5, 6 and 7) have since been realized, expressly in the Final Act of

²⁸Ibid., p. 310.

the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which was endorsed in Helsinki on 1 August 1975 by the High Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Yugoslavia. To give even further force and scope to this document as an international covenant, the opening and closing sessions of the Conference were solemnly addressed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, into whose jurisdiction the Act was ultimately consigned.²⁹ CPSU General Secretary Leonid

²⁹ Final Act, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1 August 1975; text in World Marxist Review, No. 15 (15 August 1975), p. 5. Section A of the Final Act, "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States," consists of 10 articles within which the commitment of the signatories to economic, technical and cultural cooperation; the inviolability of Europe's existing boundaries (status quo); and the postwar status of separate German states is subsumed. Those articles are designated as follows: I. Sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; II. Refraining from the threat or use of force; III. Inviolability of frontiers; IV. Territorial integrity of States; V. Peaceful settlement of disputes; VI. Non-intervention in internal affairs; VII. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; VIII. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; IX. Cooperation among States; X. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

I. Brezhnev, in his address to the Conference on the eve of its conclusion, presented his view of the Declaration:

The document that we are signing is a broad but clear-cut platform to guide unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions of states in the years and, perhaps, the decades to come. What has been achieved, however, is not the limit. Today, is the maximum of the possible but tomorrow, it should become a starting point for making further headway along the lines mapped out by the Conference.³⁰

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe brought the fruition of more than half of the declared policy objectives set out by the Bucharest Conference nine years earlier. What is significant about this accomplishment is that it represents the success of a new Third Division in Soviet foreign relations. That is, the Bucharest Conference mobilized the socialist states of Europe as an important force in Soviet foreign policy. This is an unprecedented development in Soviet foreign policy, and perhaps in international relations overall. As the introduction to this paper notes, Soviet foreign policy has always appeared to be a bifurcated one, deferring both to traditional interests of the State and to the ideological interests of a Party which regards the state as a passing institution. One could see in the Comintern (1919-1943) and its successor the Cominform (1947-1956) a transnational vehicle of Soviet foreign policy. But the enlistment and

³⁰L. I. Brezhnev, "In the Name of Peace, Security and Cooperation," speech to Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki; text in World Marxist Review, Ibid., p. 75.

direction by the Soviet Union of "sovereign" states to do its bidding, as contrasted to the extra-legal direction of a "communist movement," is a novel development in international relations.³¹ The Bucharest Declaration outlined the idea of detente which has been the hallmark of Soviet foreign policy ever since.

It remains for the new diplomatic offensive of the Soviet Union on Europe to secure the remaining three objectives (2, 3 and 4) of Bucharest, and it is apparent that Soviet diplomacy is geared to that very purpose.³² Consistent with the aims of Soviet sponsored programs to unite Europe in order to decouple the Atlantic alliance, interaction between the

³¹ Following the reconstruction of the European state system by the Congress of Vienna, nothing compares to the new diplomatic offensive launched at Bucharest in July, 1966. Even the Machiavellian maneuvering of Bismark, the "honest broker of Europe," is hardly comparable. For a consideration of the difficulties posed to the U.S. in assembling a diplomatic counter-force in the West, see Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965). Certainly, the world of Metternich has long since expired.

³² The specific objectives of the Soviet Peace Program -- primarily to liquidate military alliances in Europe and to remove nuclear weapons from Europe -- are reaffirmed in the "'Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Objectives in Home and Foreign Policy.' Delivered by General Secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, February 24, 1976," at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, New Times, No. 9 (February, 1976), pp. 29-64; in particular, "Development of Relations with the Capitalist States," Ibid., pp. 34-38. See also Speech by L. I. Brezhnev at the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties on 30 June 1976 in Berlin, New Times, No. 28 (July, 1976), pp. 17-23; also, Conference resolution "For Strengthening the Process of Detente by Taking Effective Measures Towards Disarmament and Towards Strengthening Security in Europe," Ibid., pp. 28-29.

Communist states of East Europe and the NATO states of West Europe has increased markedly. The increased diplomatic activity between the Scandinavian states and the Communist states of Europe has been especially pronounced. Of 25 states comprising the Western Europe group, the five Scandinavian states have concluded 41 percent of the treaties negotiated between Western European states and the Communist States.³³ Excluding Austria, the average number of treaties concluded by a Scandinavian state with the Communist states is twice that of any other West European state. Finland leads the states of West Europe in diplomatic ties with the Communist group, committing 28 percent of all its treaties to the Communist group. Sweden follows with 13%; Norway, Denmark and Iceland have each allotted 12% of their treaty ties to the Communist states. Besides Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, only four other West European states are listed among the top 30 treaty partners of Communist states. They are Austria (15%), Italy (8%) and the United Kingdom (5%). By comparison, West European states ranking among the top partners of the Soviet Union

³³Peter H. Rohn, Director of the Treaty Research Center at the University of Washington, Spokane, has grouped the countries for treaty analysis as follows: West Europe (25 states) -- Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany West, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trieste, Turkey, Holy See. Communist (12 States) -- Albania, Bulgaria, China People's Republic, Czechoslovakia, Germany East, Hungary, Korea North, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, Vietnam. Treaty Profiles (Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Press, 1976), p. 37.

alone are Iceland (11%), Norway (7%), Sweden (4%), Austria (4%), Denmark (4%), Italy (3%), France (2%) and the U.K. (2%). (See Table 11, p. 118.)

It thus appears that the Nordic states have been more affected by the new diplomatic offensive from the East than have been their NATO neighbors. It remains to be seen how successful the Soviet Union will be in attaining its expressed objectives of the dissolution of military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), the removal of nuclear weapons and the progressive disarmament of Europe. But it should be noted that the Nordic countries have gone farther toward these ends than any other NATO members. Even though Denmark, Norway and Iceland have subscribed to NATO membership, none of the Nordic countries will permit either nuclear weapons or allied forces on their soil (with the exception of Iceland, which lacks a military force of its own and grants the U.S. limited force and base rights, but also bans nuclear weapons).³⁴ Moreover, many in high government circles have responded enthusiastically to Soviet calls for increased regional integration. Nils Orvik reported some recent developments toward this end in an article for International Organization:

There already exists an organization for "Northern Cap cooperation," within the northernmost counties in Finland,

³⁴Egil Ulstein, "Nordic Security," Adelphi Paper, No. 81. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 9.

Norway, and Sweden, which is working in close connection with the Nordic Council. So far local issues have been in the foreground but prominent national politicians have been involved. The Norwegian ex-premier, Einar Gerhardsen, is among those who have publicly raised the question of whether the Soviet Union ought not to be formally included in the organizational framework for Nordic cooperation in this area.³⁵

In evaluating the Soviet proposals for liquidation of NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, it should be pointed out that the Warsaw Pact is reinforced by bilateral treaties between the Soviet Union and each of the Warsaw Pact members, while NATO is an exclusively multi-lateral alliance.³⁶ Therefore, if both alliances were dissolved tomorrow, a collection of bilateral mutual defense arrangements would be retained by the Soviet Union, while the defensive arrangement of the North Atlantic Alliance would evaporate. Similarly, if nuclear weapons were banned in Europe, the Soviet Union's conventional forces, even without East Bloc support, would outweigh the conventional forces available in Western Europe. And given the Brezhnev Doctrine, the maintenance of a formal military alliance in Eastern Europe is superfluous anyway.³⁷ In short, the diplomatic offensive mobilized

³⁵Nils Orvik, "Nordic Cooperation and High Politics," International Organization, Vol. 28, no. 1 (Winter, 1974), p. 87.

³⁶Kulski, op. cit., p. 49.

³⁷"The Military Balance, 1976/77," Air Force Magazine, December, 1976, pp. 98-105. See also, "NATO: Still Strong Enough to Block a Blitz?", Time, 13 December 1976, pp. 42-53; "In terms of numbers, the alliance [NATO] today is outmanned, outgunned, out-tanked and out-planed. . . . its only substantial quantitative edge in combat power in Europe is its 2-to-1 superiority in tactical nuclear weapons." (p. 47).

by the Soviet Union in the company of Europe's socialist states would dissolve the existing alliances and therefore the confrontation between East and West, but it would also make the Soviet Union an unchallenged and dominant force on the Continent.

Treaty Patterns

The following tables show bilateral diplomatic relations of the respective Scandinavian states with a) each other, b) selected "Socialist" states and c) selected "Capitalist" states. The Soviet Union is cited as the focal state of this paper; Poland, a Warsaw Pact member, is cited because it is an important Baltic state, a likely trade partner; the United States offers a Western reference for contrast to the USSR; and the U.K., an Atlantic ally of the U.S., is a valuable referent against which diplomatic variations can be gauged, given its long standing, equitable relations with most of the Scandinavian states. Treaties between the Scandinavian states and each of the Germanies are cited as a further indicator of East/West bias.

The following data was extracted from Peter H. Rohn, ed., World Treaty Index, (Santa Barbara, California: ABC Clio Press, Inc., 1974), Vol. IV.

Treaty Classifications

ADMINISTRATION AND DIPLOMACY

General relations and amity

General amity

Frontier formalities

Refugees and stateless persons

Status of state recognition

Diplomatic and consular relations

Extradition, deportation, repatriation

Administrative cooperation

Privileges and immunities

Dispute settlement

International organizations (IGO's)

IGO establishment and status

IGO operations, privileges, immunities

Adherence to UN Charter

Optional Clause ICJ

Disposition of particulars

Various particular matters

Specific claims or waivers

Facilities and property

Boundaries of territory

Specific goods and equipment

Conservation of specific resources

SOCIAL COOPERATION

General health education, culture, welfare, labor

Sanitation

Education

Culture

Humanitarian matters

Labor and social security

Research and scientific projects

General and other social cooperation

Transportation

General transportation

Air transport

Water transport

Land transport

Communications

General communications

Postal service

Telecommunications

Mass media

Economic Cooperation

General economics

General trade

Economic Cooperation (continued)

Finances and payments

Claims, debts and assets

Commodity trade

Most-favored nation clause

Taxation

Patents, copyrights, trademarks

Customs duties

General and other economic matters

Aid

Aid and development

General aid

Technical assistance

Direct Aid

Loans and credits

Agricultural commodities assistance

Atomic energy assistance

World Bank projects

Non-Bank projects

Military

Military

General military

Military assistance

Military (continued)

Military assistance missions

Status of military forces

Military installations and equipment

Military service and citizenship

Peace and disarmament

War claims and reparations

Occupation regime

War graves and other military matters

TABLE 6

TREATY STATISTICS: FINLAND

Selected Partner Ranking	Part-ners World Total	Dyads (1946-66)		Time							Topics				
		Abso-lutes	Ratios Self Other	'46 '50	'51 '55	'56 '60	'61 '65	'66 '70	Admin & Dipl	Social Coop	Econ Coop	Aid	Mil		
1 USSR (Soviet Union)	1556	43	18%	3%	20	6	10	7	7	19	7	10	4	3	
2 USA (United States)	2599	21	9%	1%	4	7	6	4	2	4	3	8	6		
3 Sweden	483	21	9%	4%	8	4	6	3		6	6	9			
4 Norway	461	19	8%	4%	5	8	4	2		10	2	5	1	1	
6 UK Great Britain	981	11	4%	1%	3	2	1	5	2	5	2	3		1	
8 Denmark	380	10	4%	3%	4	3	1	2		2	2	6			
13 Germany, East	556	5	2%	1%	1		4					5			
24 Poland	493	2	1%					2	1		2				
29 Germany, West	890	2	1%		1			1			1	1			
GROUPS															
Commonwealth	1641	25	10%	2%	6	4	5	10		13	5	6		1	
Communist	3310	69	28%	2%	22	11	20	16		19	12	31	4	3	
Western Europe	5906	101	41%	2%	25	32	25	19		26	23	50	1	1	
*TOTALS		245			61	59	63	62	12	67	46	98	27	7	

*The above treaties plus all others on record included.

TABLE 7

TREATY STATISTICS: ICELAND

Selected Partner Ranking	Part- ners World Total	Dyads (1946-66)			Time							Topics				
		Abso- lutes	Ratios Self Other		'46 '50	'51 '55	'56 '60	'61 '65	'66 '70	Admin & Dipl	Social Coop	Econ Coop	Aid	Mil		
1 USA (United States)	2599	32	32%	1%	4	6	11	11	4	3	2	5	15	7		
2 USSR (Soviet Union)	1356	11	11%	1%		4	5	2		4	1	5	1			
3 Sweden	483	10	10%	2%	4	6				1	1	8				
4 UK Great Britain	981	6	6%	1%	3		1	2	1	4	1	1				
6 Germany, West	890	6	6%	1%	2	1	2	1	1	3	1	2				
7 Denmark	360	4	4%	1%	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1				
11 Norway	461	2	2%			2					1	1				
19 Finland	245	1	1%				1				1					
GROUPS																
Commonwealth	1641	8	8%		3	1	1	3		5	1	2				
Communist	3310	11	11%			4	5	2		4	1	5	1			
Western Europe	5906	33	33%	1%	11	15	5	2		6	8	19				
*TOTALS		99			22	33	24	20	5	21	15	32	24	7		

*Include the above treaties plus all others on record

TABLE 8
TREATY STATISTICS: NORWAY

Selected Partner Ranking	Part-ner's World Total	Dyns (1946-66)			Time						Topics				
		Abso-lutes	Self	Ratios Other	'46 '50	'51 '55	'56 '60	'61 '65	'66 '70	Admin & Dipl	Social Coop	Econ Coop	Aid Mil		
1 Sweden	483	39	8%	8%	18	10	8	3		12	8	19			
2 USA (United States)	2599	31	7%	1%	13	10	6	2	8	2	6	4	5	14	
3 USSR (Soviet Union)	1356	30	7%	2%	9	2	12	7	2	16	6	7		1	
4 UK Great Britain	981	20	4%	2%	8	4	4	4	3	8	4	5	1	2	
5 Germany, West	890	19	4%	2%	3	6	6	4		4	3	6	1	5	
6 Finland	245	19	4%	8%	5	8	4	2		10	2	5	1	1	
7 Denmark	380	18	4%	5%	7	2	5	4		4	4	10			
17 Poland	498	8	2%	2%	4	1	1	2	2		2	6			
GROUPS															
Commonwealth	1641	38	8%	2%	15	9	10	4		14	7	9	1	7	
Communist	3310	54	12%	2%	15	4	19	16		18	13	22	1	1	
Western Europe	5906	222	48%	4%	75	58	58	31		53	42	111	6	10	
*TOTALS		461			132	106	134	89	15	127	97	182	21	34	

*The above treaties plus all others on record included.

TABLE 9
TREATY STATISTICS: SWEDEN

Selected Partner Ranking	Part-ner's World Total	Byads (1946-66)			Time						Topics					
		Abso-lutes	Ratios Self	Ratios Other	'46 '50	'51 '55	'56 '60	'61 '65	'66 '70	Admin & Dipl	Social Coop	Econ Coop	Aid Mil			
1 Norway	461	39	8%	8%	18	10	8	3		12	8	19				
3 UK Great Britain	981	23	5%	2%	6	6	7	4	3	6	5	11	1			
4 Denmark	380	23	5%	6%	11	9	3			1	5	17				
5 Finland	245	21	4%	9%	8	4	6	3		6	6	9				
7 USA (United States)	2699	20	4%	1%	8	5	1	6	2	3	5	6	2			
8 Germany, West	890	20	4%	2%	5	5	9	1		5	3	10	2			
10 USSR (Soviet Union)	1356	17	4%	1%	10	2	4	1	1	2	6	8	1			
17 Poland	493	12	2%	2%	8	2	2			1	1	10				
20 Iceland	99	10	2%	10%	4	6				1	1	8				
GROUPS																
Commonwealth	1641	39	8%	2%	11	13	9	6		9	9	19	2			
Communist	3310	64	13%	2%	40	10	12	2		6	12	45	1			
Western Europe	5906	274	57%	5%	110	90	56	18		45	58	168	1			
*TOTALS		483			191	143	107	42	6	77	109	277	11			

*The above treaties plus all others on record included.

TABLE 10
TREATY STATISTICS: DENMARK

Selected Partner Ranking	Part- ner's World Total	Dyads (1946-66)		Time					Topics				
		Abso- lutes	Ratios Self Other	'46 '50	'51 '55	'56 '60	'61 '65	'66 '70	Admin & Dipl	Social Coop	Econ Coop	Aid	Mil
1 USA (United States)	2599	33	9% 1%	9	14	7	3	3	3	9	7	3	11
2 UK Great Britain	981	28	7% 3%	11	4	8	5	1	6	6	9	1	6
3 Sweden	481	23	6% 5%	11	9	3			1	5	17		
4 Germany, West	590	22	6% 2%	1	4	9	8		10	6	4		2
6 USSR (Soviet Union)	1356	16	4% 1%	5	3	6	2	1	5	4	7		
9 Finland	245	10	3% 4%	4	3	1	2		2	2	6		
11 Poland	493	9	2% 2%	4	3	1	1	2	2	7			
GROUPS													
Commonwealth	1641	43	11% 3%	19	7	10	7		9	11	14	1	8
Communist	3310	45	12% 1%	15	10	14	6		5	10	30		
Western Europe	5906	167	44% 3%	60	38	38	31		28	37	95	1	6
*TOTALS		380		117	98	93	72	4	58	98	177	17	30

*The above treaties plus all others on record included.

TABLE 11
TREATY STATISTICS: COMMUNIST GROUP

Selected Partner Ranking	Part-ner's World Total	Dyads		Time					Topics				
		Abso-lutes	Ratios Self	'46 '50	'51 '55	'56 '60	'61 '65	'66 '70	Admin & Dipl	Social Coop	Econ Coop	Aid Mil	
1 USSR (Soviet Union)	1356	651	14%	48%	147	127	292	85	151	168	141	162	29
3 Germany, East	556	429	9%	77%	37	145	173	74	82	190	123	26	8
4 Poland	493	288	6%	58%	58	59	112	59	69	129	53	28	9
15 USA (United States)	2599	70	1%	3%	22	8	20	20	22	21	7	11	9
16 Finland	245	69	1%	28%	22	11	20	16	19	12	31	4	3
17 Austria	445	67	1%	59%	3	15	15	34	20	25	20	1	1
19 Sweden	483	64	1%	13%	40	10	12	2	6	12	45	1	
20 Italy	755	61	1%	8%	12		25	24	10	11	34	1	3
21 France	1033	60	1%	6%	15	6	16	23	4	24	27	2	3
23 Norway	461	54	1%	12%	15	4	19	16	18	13	22		1
25 UK Great Britain	981	50	1%	5%	20	6	14	10	9	16	19	1	5
26 Denmark	380	45	1%	12%	15	10	14	6	5	10	30		
GROUPS													
Commonwealth	1641	77	2%	5%	31	10	21	15	19	21	29	3	5
Communist	3310	2910	61%	88%	442	692	1026	570	582	1114	766	378	70
Western Europe	5906	579	12%	10%	164	84	167	164	102	149	302	13	13
*TOTALS		4765			765	899	1847	1254	960	1621	1457	618	109

*The above treaties plus all others on record included.

TABLE 12
TREATY STATISTICS: USSR

Selected Partner Ranking	Part-ner's World Total	Dyads		Time					Topics				
		Abso-lutes	Ratios Self	'46 '50	'51 '55	'56 '60	'61 '65	'66 '70	Admin & Dipl	Social Coop	Econ Coop	Aid	Mil
2 Poland	493	84	6%	17%	21	9	36	18	22	20	14	24	4
4 Germany, East	556	75	6%	13%	7	23	32	13	19	22	15	12	7
9 Finland	245	43	3%	18%	20	6	10	7	19	7	10	4	3
12 USA (United States)	2599	33	2%	1%	8	7	10	8	13	13	1	2	4
13 Norway	461	30	2%	7%	9	2	12	7	16	6	7		1
22 UK Great Britain	901	20	1%	2%	3	1	7	9	5	10	4	1	
23 Italy	755	19	1%	3%	6		9	4	6	2	10		1
25 Austria	445	18	1%	4%	1	12	5		7	4	5	1	1
26 Sweden	483	17	1%	4%	10	2	4	1	2	6	8	1	
28 France	1033	16	1%	2%	1	3	9	3		5	11		
29 Denmark	380	16	1%	4%	5	3	6	2	5	4	7		
Iceland	99	11	1%	11%		4	5	2	4	1	5	1	
GROUPS													
Commonwealth	1641	31	2%	2%	5	2	12	12	10	12	8	1	
Communist	3310	651	48%	20%	147	127	292	85	151	168	141	162	29
Western Europe	5906	211	16%	4%	63	38	76	34	70	44	84	7	6
*TOTALS		305			251	221	596	288	354	309	368	203	42

*The above treaties plus all others on record included.

IV. TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES

Trade and diplomacy are the natural avenues of peaceful foreign relations. For the Soviet Union, trade fulfills three functions: 1) augmentation of the domestic economy, 2) expansion of political influence abroad, and 3) access to foreign technology. General Secretary Brezhnev acknowledged as much in the course of the most recent Congress of the CPSU:

In foreign economic relations are intertwined politics and economics, diplomacy and commerce, industrial production and trade. Consequently, the approach to them and their guidance must likewise be comprehensive, linking up the efforts of all departments and our political and economic interest. This is exactly how this important issue is regarded by the Party's Central Committee.

.....

Like the other countries, we strive to use the advantages offered by foreign economic relations to muster additional potentialities for the successful fulfillment of economic tasks and saving time, for enhancing production efficiency and speeding up scientific and technological progress.

.....

We regard foreign economic relations as an effective means helping to carry out political and economic tasks.¹

With respect to domestic benefits, Soviet economics clearly appreciate the advantages of trade with the West:

¹ L. I. Brezhnev, Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, 24 February 1976, New Times, No. 9 (February, 1976), pp. 50-51.

The increase in trade with developed capitalist countries has helped in the solution of a number of economic problems which the Soviet Union has been facing in the postwar period. One of these problems has been and remains the acceleration of the Soviet economy's growth rate thanks to imports of industrial and transportation equipment as well as ²of those raw materials which are in short supply [in the USSR].

Leonard Shapiro assumes that trade has always been an integral part of Soviet revolutionary strategy.

In essence this view is the logical implementation of Lenin's policy of combining trade and correct diplomatic relations on one hand with subversion and political warfare on the other.³

To support this assumption, Shapiro cites a private memorandum attributed to Lenin. "After emphasizing that the 'deaf-mute' capitalists will only too readily believe Soviet assertions that their government organs are quite independent of both party and Comintern, he [Lenin] adds that the capitalists

will open their doors wide to us, and through these doors will speedily enter the emissaries of the Comintern and our party, investigation organs in the guise of diplomatic, cultural and trade representatives They will open up credits for us, which will serve us for the purpose of supporting Communist parties in their countries. They will supply us with the materials and technology which we lack and will restore our military industry, which we need for our future victorious attacks on our suppliers."⁴

²P. N. Kумыкин, ed., 50 Let Sovetskoi Vneshnei Torgovli, p. 215; in W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1973), p. 60.

³Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy," in The Soviet Impact on World Politics, Kurt London, editor (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974), p. 8.

⁴V. I. Lenin, part of a memorandum supposedly written to foreign minister Chicherin and later discovered by portraitist Annenkov in 1924; full text in Novy Zhurnal, no. 65 (New York, 1961), pp. 146-147; cited by Shapiro, op. cit., p. 7.

As with diplomacy, so also trade is a peculiar adjunct

High on the list of advantages in the conduct of foreign policy is government control over foreign trade and the absence of private uncontrolled capitalist enterprise. ... [I]n conditions of private enterprise where the state has no monopoly of foreign trade, it is difficult if not impossible for a government to restrict or direct the foreign commercial dealings of the private enterprise so as to correlate them with the government's political objectives. There is, of course, no difficulty about such correlation on the Soviet or Chinese side.⁵

But there is no more Comintern or Cominform and the new Soviet strategy in trade, like diplomacy, is traceable to the origins of detente. The Central Committee Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, as in the first item of the Bucharest Declaration and the ninth "basket" of the Helsinki Declaration (CSCE), stressed the importance of trade to enhance the further integration of East and West Europe.

A substantial increase of foreign trade is planned for the tenth five-year period.

.....

... economic, scientific and technical links with the capitalist states are consolidating and broadening the material basis of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

.....

Acting in the spirit of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance has, on behalf of the governments of its member states, offered to establish official

⁵Shapiro, in London, op. cit., p. 15.

relations with the European Economic Community. The EEC Council of Ministers has been given the draft of an Agreement on Principles of Relations envisaging the creation of favourable conditions for equal cooperation between the two organizations and between their member states. We are prepared for such cooperation.⁶

What is significant about Soviet trade relations in today's era of "detente," when Russian resources are increasingly in demand and Soviet manufacturing is essentially self-sufficient, is the dependency it can create on the part of its partners. Finland, again, is the best model. The Soviet Union gained a strong economic foothold in Finland by its Treaty of Peace with Finland in 1947. Under the reparation and indemnity terms of that treaty, Finland was obliged to pay over an eight year period compensating damages equal to \$300,000,000 "in commodities (timber products, paper, cellulose, sea going and river craft, sundry machinery and other commodities)."⁷ Specifically, 60 percent of the reparations were to be paid in the form of metallurgical items, the rest with the principal exports of timber, pulp, etc. "Since Finland's metallurgical industry was hardly sufficient to supply the domestic market an

⁶L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit. CEMA member states are the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. The EEC member states are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.

⁷"Treaty of Peace with Finland," quoted in Anatole G. Mazour, Finland: Between East and West (New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1956), Appendix XI, p. 264.

extraordinary rapid expansion of industry was called for."⁸ What the Soviet Union got was a captive industrial complex and a virtual monopoly over exported resources. Since the Soviet Union set the specifications for manufactured items to satisfy reparations, today she has guaranteed supplies from Finland, long after the fulfillment of treaty reparations. Under barter terms of trade today, Finland is dependent upon the Soviet Union for 70 percent of its crude oil requirements. The cost of that crude increased \$160 million in the first eight months of 1973 to \$500 million for the same period in 1975, which is still under the price plus transportation of crude from the Persian Gulf. Until Finland completes three nuclear power plants projected for operation in 1980, she will remain heavily dependent upon the USSR.⁹ As will be noted from the accompanying tables, Finland's dependence upon imports from Communist countries doubled from 1973 to 1974, the preponderance of which imports were from the USSR. This was the sharpest increase in trade with the USSR and communist countries registered by any European state (East and West). On the other hand, exports to the USSR and to CEMA increased during the same year less than one percent. During a tumultuous year of inflation and unemployment, Finland managed in 1975 to almost double

⁸ Mazour, Ibid., p. 173.

⁹ CIA, "Finland's Oil Imports," (Unclassified) Weekly Intelligence Summary, 12 December 1975, p. 15.

its exports to her trade partners in the USSR and CEMA over the previous year, while letting imports decline (see Table, "Finland's Trade Partners"). Finland was the first state in Western Europe to join CEMA in May, 1963.¹⁰

The important lesson to be drawn from Finland's 1975 experience is that she was buoyed by exports to the Communist countries while most of her partners in the West were foundering in rough economic seas -- rampant inflation and unemployment. This is the advantage wielded by the USSR and the other Communist states over their capitalist rivals. The state-run economic systems of the Communist countries can expand or contract their trade at will, if only to the detriment of their laboring population, to accommodate the foreign policy of their governments. In this usage, trade becomes a political weapon. (See Tables 23/24, pp. 141-142.)

The pattern of Iceland's trade relations with the USSR bears a close resemblance to the Finnish pattern. Vincent Malmstrom observed this development, which evolved from the deterioration of Icelandic relations with Britain as a result of Iceland's extension of her territorial limit.

Such an open break between two NATO allies was much too tempting a prospect to go unnoticed by Moscow. The death of Stalin and Krushchev's call for 'peaceful coexistence' heralded the beginnings of an all-out trade offensive in which little Iceland promised to become one of the prime targets.

¹⁰ Peter H. Krosby, "Finland: The Politics of Economic Emergency," Current History, April 1976, p. 174.

Although the Soviet Union conducted almost no trade with Iceland in 1952, by 1955 it had become the leading buyer of Icelandic exports and the second largest supplier of Icelandic imports.¹¹

The U. S. State Department, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in its annual report (no. 635, 1971-1975) on Trade of NATO Countries with Communist Countries called attention to Iceland's increasing dependence on Communist trade partners. As a percentage of total trade, Icelandic trade with the Communist bloc represented 13.5 percent of imports and 12.5 percent of exports in 1975. Iceland's trade with the USSR alone in 1975 represented 10.4 percent of all imports and 10.5 percent of all exports. During the 1975 recessionary fall-off of trade in the West, the PRC and Czechoslovakia moved in to pick up a big share of Iceland's exports of fish, feeding stuffs and clothes; thereby displacing Poland, who has long been runner-up to the Soviet Union in westward trade among the Communists. Iceland, like Finland, depends now almost exclusively upon the Soviet Union for petroleum to meet its fuel/energy requirements.¹² Perhaps the most significant development in Icelandic trade is the steady decline of its trade with the West, in inverse proportion to its growing dependence on the Soviet market -- and to its growing alienation from

¹¹ Vincent H. Malmstrom, Norden: Crossroads of Destiny and Progress (New York: Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 109.

¹² Nordiska Radet, Nordisk Statistisk Arsbok (Stockholm: The Nordic Council, 1970), p. 100.

the UK and the EC fraternity.¹³ (See Tables 18 and 19, p. 136.)

It remains to be seen whether Iceland's gravitation toward the Soviet Union in trade relations will lead to Iceland's disengagement from NATO.¹⁴

Of the other Scandinavian states, highly industrialized Sweden maintains the most active trade with the Communist countries, who in 1974 provided 5.7 percent of her imports and took in return 5.6 percent of Sweden's foreign sales. The Soviet Union contributed 44.9% of those imports in petroleum, ores and metals; in exchange for machinery, transportation equipment and boats representing 20.1 percent of Sweden's business with the Communist bloc.¹⁵ Sweden's trade with the Communist countries has been consistently with the USSR, Poland and East Germany, increasing only gradually in imports from USSR and in exports to Poland. (See Tables 25 and 26, pp.144-146.)

Denmark, over the past five years has held its percentage of imports from the East Bloc slightly above the European NATO average, while her exports have held slightly below the European NATO average. The USSR and Poland are her principal partners among the CEMA states, providing processed iron and steel mainly in exchange for non-electrical machinery,

¹³ Ibid., pp. 119-120; Trade with the EEC, 1959-1969.

¹⁴ Mr. Zubho, "At the Foot of a Volcano," Izvestiya, 5 September 1974, in "Icelanders Reject Rightist Views on NATO, Favor Detente," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Soviet Union, Vol. III (10 September 1974), p. E2.

¹⁵ Nordiska Radet, op. cit., pp. 104-105.

transportation equipment and ships -- as does Sweden.¹⁶ Norway, by contrast, over the last five years has steadily decreased its percentage of imports from Communist states but expanded its percentage of exports in that direction, ranging from foodstuffs to paper products.¹⁷ The exports are distributed mainly among the PRC, USSR, Poland and East Germany. In 1975, Norway conducted nearly twice as much trade with the PRC as any other Nordic country, exports totaling 108 million. (See Denmark Trade Tables 16 and 17, pp. 134-135 ; and Norway Trade Tables 20 and 21, pp. 137-138).

The effectiveness of the Helsinki accord (CSCE, August 1975) in merging the economic development of East and West Europe has not yet been reflected in standard compilations of trade statistics. As of this writing, the only clear-cut inroads to Scandinavian economic life blazed by Soviet trade have been in Finland and Iceland. But these are striking examples of the strategic potential of trade. In both cases the Soviet Union supplanted Great Britain as the latter's influence waned.¹⁸

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 96-97.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 102-103.

¹⁸ Britain was a signatory to the 1947 Finnish peace treaty, but acceded to Soviet power in the Baltic. In the case of Iceland, the British after 1952 receded from former North Sea fishing grounds (and forfeited naval maneuvering room) as Icelandic territorial limits were progressively expanded from 3 to 200 nautical miles seaward. See Malmstrom, op. cit., p. 109.

As Soviet technology gains, the USSR is showing an increasing interest in the trade of more industrial states, as the overtures of CEMA to EEC testify. Reflecting on the Finland-Iceland patter, future recessions in the West may prompt invitations to the East.

TRADE STATISTICS
(Tables 13-29)

The following tables of trade statistics are provided through the courtesy of LUCI KORNEI with the permission of the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (reference INR Reports No. 635, 30 Nov 76 and No. 619, 2 Nov 76)

TABLE 13

SUMMARY TABLE I

TRADE OF NATO WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,* 1972-1975
(In millions of dollars)

Country/Area	1972			1973			1974			1975		
	Total from (or to) entire world	From (or to) Communist countries	Trade with Communist countries as % of world trade	Total from (or to) entire world	From (or to) Communist countries	Trade with Communist countries as % of world trade	Total from (or to) entire world	From (or to) Communist countries	Trade with Communist countries as % of world trade	Total from (or to) entire world	From (or to) Communist countries	Trade with Communist countries as % of world trade
Imports (c.i.f.)												
European NATO	162,501.1	6,904.0	4.3	228,460.1	9,637.3	4.2	311,682.2	12,542.1	4.0	321,551.0	13,682.1	4.3
Canada (f.o.b.)	18,921.8	161.4	0.9	23,305.6	200.8	0.9	32,295.7	325.7	1.0	33,954.7	292.1	0.9
US (f.o.b.)	55,582.8	354.0	0.6	69,475.7	593.0	0.9	100,972.3	1,006.8	1.0	96,940.3	894.1	0.9
Total NATO	237,007.7	7,419.4	3.1	321,241.4	10,431.1	3.2	444,950.2	13,874.6	3.1	452,446.0	14,868.3	3.3
Exports (f.o.b.)												
European NATO	158,977.2	7,225.3	4.5	219,186.0	10,704.7	4.9	286,530.6	15,514.8	5.4	307,503.2	19,132.0	6.2
Canada	20,178.1	681.7	3.4	25,195.9	764.2	3.0	32,782.1	807.3	2.5	32,301.5	1,201.2	3.7
US	49,778.2	882.5	1.8	71,338.8	2,490.7	3.5	98,507.2	2,240.1	2.3	107,651.8	3,091.9	2.9
Total NATO	228,933.5	8,789.5	3.8	315,720.7	13,959.6	4.4	417,819.9	18,562.2	4.4	447,456.5	23,425.1	5.2

* Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba.

TABLE 14

SUMMARY TABLE II

TRADE OF NATO COUNTRIES WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,* 1974 AND 1975

IMPORTS (In millions of dollars c.i.f.)

Country/Area	Total, from entire world		Of which from Communist countries		Imports from Communist countries as percent of world imports	
	1974	1975	1974	1975	1974	1975
Belgium-Luxembourg	29,466.1	30,706.8	631.4	674.4	2.1	2.2
Denmark	9,869.8	10,328.6	454.8	551.1	4.6	5.3
France	52,866.0	54,241.3	1,539.3	1,941.1	2.9	3.6
Federal Republic of Germany	70,235.9	75,566.2	4,480.8	4,858.3	6.4	6.4
Greece	4,385.2	5,317.4	202.0	280.2	4.6	5.3
Iceland	518.4	487.3	70.0	61.0	13.5	12.5
Italy	40,918.5	38,363.6	2,048.6	2,087.1	5.0	5.4
Netherlands	32,630.7	35,144.8	768.0	886.9	2.4	2.5
Norway	8,414.4	9,674.8	239.1	257.6	2.8	2.7
Portugal	4,496.1	3,827.0	48.1	152.3	1.1	4.0
Turkey	3,739.6	4,640.9	262.5	266.0	7.0	5.7
UK	54,141.5	53,252.3	1,797.5	1,666.1	3.3	3.1
Total European NATO	311,682.2	321,551.0	12,542.1	13,682.1	4.0	4.3
Canada (f.o.b.)	32,295.7	33,954.7	325.7	292.1	1.0	0.9
US (f.o.b.)	100,972.3	96,940.3	1,006.8	894.1	1.0	0.9
Total NATO	444,950.2	452,446.0	13,874.6	14,868.3	3.1	3.3

* Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba.

TABLE 15
SUMMARY TABLE II (cont'd)
TRADE OF NATO COUNTRIES WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,* 1974-1975
EXPORTS (In millions of dollars f.o.b.)

Country/Area	Total, to entire world		Of which to Communist countries		Exports to Communist countries as percent of world exports	
	1974	1975	1974	1975	1974	1975
Belgium-Luxembourg	28,133.4	28,809.0	920.8	963.9	3.3	3.4
Denmark	7,719.8	8,709.6	318.9	378.0	4.1	4.3
France	45,934.1	52,211.4	1,956.9	3,117.7	4.3	6.0
Federal Republic of Germany	90,588.4	91,614.4	7,620.3	8,795.0	8.4	9.6
Greece	2,031.0	2,292.9	242.7	269.2	11.9	11.7
Iceland	330.7	307.8	41.2	52.2	12.5	17.0
Italy	30,248.7	34,829.8	1,835.7	2,442.1	6.1	7.0
Netherlands	32,818.6	34,440.4	867.7	998.5	2.6	2.9
Norway	6,274.5	7,195.7	269.3	390.5	4.3	5.4
Portugal	2,276.8	1,934.7	20.3	44.5	0.9	2.3
Turkey	1,535.9	1,401.1	162.5	124.0	10.6	8.9
UK	38,638.7	43,756.4	1,258.5	1,556.4	3.3	3.6
Total European NATO	286,530.6	307,503.2	15,514.8	19,132.0	5.4	6.2
Canada	32,782.1	32,301.5	807.3	1,201.2	2.5	3.7
US	98,507.2	107,651.8	2,240.1	3,091.9	2.3	2.9
Total NATO	417,819.9	447,456.5	18,562.2	23,425.1	4.4	5.2

* Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba.

TABLE 16

DENMARK'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)

Country of Origin	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS			
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1972	1973	1974	1975
Albania	insig	insig	0.1	0.1	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	3.3	5.2	6.5	6.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovakia	25.1	35.8	38.8	40.4	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4
GDR	22.9	32.9	58.4	60.7	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.6
Hungary	12.8	23.6	25.0	26.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Poland	51.3	70.9	147.7	183.1	1.0	0.9	1.5	1.8
Romania	5.9	9.7	22.8	32.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3
USSR	37.1	93.6	125.3	170.3	0.7	1.2	1.3	1.7
PRC	11.2	20.3	29.6	21.6	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.1	insig	insig	insig	insig
Cuba	0.4	0.6	0.2	10.0	insig	insig	insig	0.1
Total Communist Countries listed	170.1	292.7	454.8	551.1	3.4	3.8	4.6	5.3
Total imports from entire world:	5,043.7	7,704.4	9,869.8	10,328.6				

TABLE 17

DENMARK'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)

Country of Destination	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS			
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1972	1973	1974	1975
Albania	0.1	0.4	0.9	0.7	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	2.9	3.8	8.8	11.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovakia	17.1	21.6	26.7	30.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4
GDR	24.7	31.8	29.3	26.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3
Hungary	16.3	24.4	35.2	27.6	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.3
Poland	41.4	61.4	121.2	135.1	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.6
Romania	11.3	13.7	15.3	10.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1
USSR	26.8	37.8	42.7	64.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7
PRC	8.8	3.7	14.1	22.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3
Other Asian Communist Areas	0.3	0.5	3.6	22.4*	insig	insig	insig	0.3
Cuba	5.8	3.6	21.1	26.9	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3
Total Communist Countries listed	155.5	202.7	318.9	378.0	3.6	3.3	4.1	4.3
Total Exports to entire world:	4,330.1	6,118.9	7,719.3	8,709.6				

* Other Asian Communist Areas:

North Korea	19.8
North Vietnam	2.5
Mongolia	0.1
Total	22.4

TABLE 18/19
ICELAND'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars, imports c.i.f., exports f.o.b.)

IMPORTS								
Country of Origin	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL			
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1972	1973	1974	1975
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	insig	insig	insig	insig
Czechoslovakia	3.0	3.3	5.1	4.1	1.3	0.9	1.0	0.8
GDR	0.8	0.8	1.2	0.9	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2
Hungary	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	insig	insig
Poland	6.7	4.5	13.8	4.6	2.9	1.3	2.7	0.9
Romania	insig	0.1	0.1	0.1	insig	insig	insig	insig
USSR	13.5	22.6	49.1	50.5	5.9	6.4	9.5	10.4
PRC	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	-	-	insig	-	-	-	insig	-
Cuba	insig	insig	-	-	insig	insig	-	-
Total Communist Countries listed	24.5	31.9	70.0	61.0	10.6	9.0	13.5	12.5
Total imports from entire world:	230.4	355.7	518.4	487.3				
EXPORTS								
Country of Destination								
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	insig	insig	0.1	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig
Czechoslovakia	2.1	1.7	1.7	4.2	1.1	0.6	0.5	1.4
GDR	1.0	0.3	3.5	0.3	0.5	0.1	1.1	0.1
Hungary	0.5	0.8	0.4	insig	0.3	0.3	0.1	insig
Poland	4.3	10.6	11.6	3.9	2.3	3.7	3.5	1.3
Romania	insig	0.1	0.1	0.2	insig	insig	insig	0.1
USSR	14.0	10.4	23.6	32.4	7.4	3.6	7.1	10.5
PRC	1.1	1.4	0.2	11.2	0.6	0.5	0.1	3.6
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cuba	-	insig	-	-	-	insig	-	-
Total Communist Countries listed	23.0	25.3	41.2	52.2	12.2	8.7	12.5	17.0
Total exports to entire world:	188.9	289.2	330.7	307.8				

TABLE 20
NORWAY'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)

Country of Origin	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS			
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1972	1973	1974	1975
Albania	insig	-	insig	0.3	insig	-	insig	insig
Bulgaria	3.5	1.3	2.3	2.6	0.1	insig	insig	insig
Czechoslovakia	15.5	24.6	32.2	37.7	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
GDR	26.9	31.1	38.7	32.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.3
Hungary	7.7	11.3	15.8	14.6	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Poland	51.1	62.3	52.4	69.5	1.2	1.0	0.6	0.7
Romania	2.0	2.0	15.3	6.2	insig	insig	0.2	0.1
USSR	28.4	47.0	69.3	84.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.9
PRC	5.1	6.8	9.5	8.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Other Asian Communist Areas	0.1	0.2	0.3	1.4*	insig	insig	insig	insig
Cuba	1.3	3.0	3.3	-	insig	insig	insig	-
Total Communist Countries listed	141.6	189.6	239.1	257.6	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.7
Total imports from entire world:	4,372.6	6,219.0	8,414.4	9,674.8				

* Other Asian Communist Areas:

North Korea	1.4
North Vietnam	-
Mongolia	insig
Total	1.4

TABLE 21
NORWAY'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)

Country of Destination	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS			
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1972	1973	1974	1975
Albania	-	insig	-	insig	-	insig	-	insig
Bulgaria	9.8	3.6	5.2	4.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovakia	9.6	15.7	17.7	23.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
GDR	17.9	29.3	59.4	48.0	0.5	0.6	0.9	0.7
Hungary	6.7	11.4	11.8	9.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Poland	27.6	49.0	53.7	63.0	0.8	1.0	0.9	0.9
Romania	2.7	9.1	10.6	11.4	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
USSR	19.5	22.0	40.0	96.2	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.3
PRC	25.6	24.1	67.9	108.0	0.8	0.5	1.1	1.5
Other Asian Communist Areas	-	0.5	insig	17.7*	-	insig	insig	0.3
Cuba	0.4	1.4	3.1	9.7	insig	insig	insig	0.1
Total Communist Countries listed	119.8	166.1	269.3	390.5	3.7	3.5	4.3	5.4
Total exports to entire world:	3,281.2	4,679.9	6,274.5	7,195.7				

* Other Asian Communist Areas:

North Korea	0.1
North Vietnam	17.6
Mongolia	insig
Total	17.7

TABLE 22
SUMMARY TABLE

TRADE OF EUROPEAN NON-NATO COUNTRIES AND JAPAN WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,* 1973 and 1974
(In millions of dollars)

COUNTRY	Total from (or to) entire world		Of which from (or to) Communist countries		Imports (or exports) from (or to) Communist countries as percent of world imports (or exports)	
	1973	1974	1973	1974	1973	1974
A. IMPORTS (c.i.f.)						
Austria	6,769.9	9,022.1	583.7	900.5	8.6	10.0
Finland	4,341.1	6,807.0	706.0	1,539.2	16.3	22.6
Ireland	2,789.9	3,787.5	56.4	100.8	2.0	2.7
Spain	9,627.7	15,384.9	270.8	528.5	2.8	3.4
Sweden	10,585.1	15,836.6	547.9	896.7	5.2	5.7
Switzerland	11,620.8	14,421.4	283.5	408.0	2.4	2.8
Yugoslavia	4,511.1	7,542.3	1,121.1	1,739.0	24.9	23.1
Japan	38,313.2	62,067.4	2,468.5	3,579.2	6.4	5.8
B. EXPORTS (f.o.b.)						
Austria	5,020.7	7,161.0	621.6	1,126.4	12.4	15.7
Finland	3,836.9	5,523.0	560.6	960.1	14.6	17.4
Ireland	2,132.5	2,654.8	17.1	39.5	0.8	1.5
Spain	5,178.1	7,090.6	160.2	273.8	3.1	3.9
Sweden	12,114.1	15,909.6	592.4	895.5	4.9	5.6
Switzerland	9,525.0	11,794.0	483.4	677.8	5.1	5.7
Yugoslavia	2,852.6	3,805.1	973.9	1,581.8	34.1	41.6
Japan	36,930.4	55,511.3	2,060.7	4,126.9	5.6	7.4

* Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba.

TABLE 22 (supplement)

SUMMARY TABLE

TRADE OF EUROPEAN NON-NATO COUNTRIES AND JAPAN WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,* 1974-1975
(In millions of dollars)

COUNTRY	Total from (or to) entire world		Of which from (or to) Communist countries		Imports (or exports) from (or to) Communist countries as percent of world imports (or exports)	
	1974	1975	1974	1975	1974	1975
A. IMPORTS (c.i.f.)						
Austria	9,022.1	9,393.2	900.5	976.0	10.0	10.4
Finland	6,807.0	7,618.0	1,539.2	1,634.0	22.6	21.5
Ireland	3,787.5	3,807.4	100.8	95.8	2.7	2.5
Spain	15,384.9	16,261.1	528.5	813.3	3.4	5.0
Sweden	15,836.6	18,048.6	896.7	1,171.7	5.7	6.5
Switzerland	14,421.4	13,302.7	408.0	380.3	2.8	2.9
Yugoslavia	8,070.5	7,696.8	1,900.1	1,909.0	23.5	24.8
Japan	62,110.4	57,863.0	3,584.0	3,348.9	5.8	5.8
B. EXPORTS (f.o.b.)						
Austria	7,161.0	7,519.0	1,126.4	1,368.8	15.7	18.2
Finland	5,493.1	5,503.4	953.2	1,341.4	17.4	24.4
Ireland	2,632.1	3,210.9	39.5	39.4	1.5	1.2
Spain	7,090.6	7,683.5	273.8	457.0	3.9	6.0
Sweden	15,909.6	17,406.6	895.5	1,280.9	5.6	7.4
Switzerland	11,794.0	12,957.5	677.8	837.0	5.7	6.5
Yugoslavia	4,070.5	4,072.4	1,695.0	1,924.2	41.6	47.3
Japan	55,535.9	55,752.8	4,129.7	5,125.7	7.4	9.2

* Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR, People's Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba.

TABLE 23
FINLAND'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1971-1974
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)

Country of Origin	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS			
	1971	1972	1973	1974	1971	1972	1973	1974
Albania	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	2.7	4.5	3.6	4.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovakia	14.7	14.6	21.8	23.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3
GDR	18.0	19.2	22.9	41.1	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6
Hungary	9.6	12.0	19.7	25.9	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4
Poland	54.6	47.8	68.4	154.1	2.0	1.5	1.6	2.3
Romania	9.4	16.6	14.0	13.6	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.2
USSR	392.5	383.7	531.6	1,213.2	14.0	12.0	12.2	17.8
PRC	11.1	9.4	18.5	19.8	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	insig	insig	0.5	3.4*	insig	insig	insig	insig
Cuba	0.2	3.7	5.0	40.2	insig	0.1	0.1	0.6
Total Communist Countries listed	512.8	511.5	706.0	1,539.2	18.3	16.0	16.3	22.6
Total imports from entire world:	2,796.2	3,198.4	4,341.1	6,807.0				

* Other Asian Communist Areas:

North Korea	3.4
North Vietnam	-
Mongolia	-
Total	3.4

TABLE 24
FINLAND'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1971-1974
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)

Country of Destination	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS			
	1971	1972	1973	1974	1971	1972	1973	1974
Albania	0.1	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	2.9	3.3	5.9	7.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovakia	15.8	14.2	14.6	24.0	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4
GDR	15.5	16.8	24.1	28.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5
Hungary	8.8	9.1	12.4	25.1	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.5
Poland	22.5	28.0	30.6	47.6	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.9
Romania	9.7	13.4	7.2	3.9	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.1
USSR	254.1	364.0	452.2	767.1	10.8	12.4	11.8	13.9
PRC	12.0	17.0	10.6	21.1	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.4
Other Asian Communist Areas	0.1	0.1	0.5	31.6*	insig	insig	insig	0.6
Cuba	1.2	1.7	2.5	3.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total Communist Countries listed	342.7	467.6	560.6	960.1	14.5	15.9	14.6	17.4
Total exports to entire world:	2,356.4	2,947.0	3,836.9	5,523.0				

* Other Asian Communist Areas:

North Korea	31.6
North Vietnam	-
Mongolia	-
Total	31.6

TABLE 24 (supplement)
FINLAND'S TRADE WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
(Millions of dollars, imports c.i.f., exports f.o.b.)

IMPORTS								
Country of Origin	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL			
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1972	1973	1974	1975
Albania	insig	insig	insig	0.1	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	4.5	3.6	4.7	6.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovakia	14.6	21.8	23.2	31.1	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4
GDR	19.2	22.9	41.1	56.4	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.7
Hungary	12.0	19.7	25.9	28.2	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4
Poland	47.8	68.4	154.1	167.9	1.5	1.6	2.3	2.2
Romania	16.6	14.0	13.6	11.0	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.1
USSR	383.7	531.6	1,213.2	1,269.7	12.0	12.2	17.8	16.7
PRC	9.4	18.5	19.8	23.5	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	insig	0.5	3.4	0.5	insig	insig	insig	insig
Cuba	3.7	5.0	40.2	39.2	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.5
Total Communist Countries listed	511.5	706.0	1,539.2	1,634.0	16.0	16.3	22.6	21.5
Total imports from entire world:	3,198.4	4,341.1	6,807.0	7,618.0				
EXPORTS								
Country of Destination								
Albania	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	3.3	5.9	7.3	6.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Czechoslovakia	14.2	14.6	23.8	30.2	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6
GDR	16.8	24.1	28.4	43.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.8
Hungary	9.1	12.4	25.0	29.6	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5
Poland	28.0	30.6	47.3	70.2	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.3
Romania	13.4	7.2	3.8	3.4	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1
USSR	364.0	452.2	761.5	1,133.6	12.4	11.8	13.9	20.6
PRC	17.0	10.6	20.9	15.4	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.3
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	0.1	0.5	31.6	0.1	insig	insig	0.6	insig
Cuba	1.7	2.5	3.6	9.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2
Total Communist Countries listed	467.6	560.6	953.2	1,341.4	15.9	14.6	17.4	24.4
Total exports to entire world:	2,947.0	3,836.9	5,493.1	5,503.4				

TABLE 25
SWEDEN'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1971-1974
(Millions of dollars c.i.f.)

Country of Origin	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS			
	1971	1972	1973	1974	1971	1972	1973	1974
Albania	0.4	insig	0.3	1.3	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	2.8	3.7	4.9	7.1	insig	insig	insig	insig
Czechoslovakia	30.5	34.1	47.5	60.9	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
GDR	47.2	48.1	75.1	113.0	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.7
Hungary	21.6	26.4	35.0	47.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Poland	58.7	69.9	106.8	166.1	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0
Romania	12.8	17.3	31.0	43.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
USSR	163.1	159.4	207.8	402.7	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.5
PRC	17.2	20.9	28.4	39.5	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.4	insig	insig	insig	insig
Cuba	8.7	12.1	10.9	15.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Total Communist Countries listed	363.1	392.1	547.9	896.7	5.1	4.9	5.2	5.7
Total imports from entire world:	7,058.6	7,976.5	10,585.1	15,836.6				

TABLE 25 (supplement)
 SWEDEN'S IMPORTS FROM COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
 (Millions of dollars c.i.f.)

Country of Origin	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS			
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1972	1973	1974	1975
Albania	insig	0.3	1.3	2.3	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	3.7	4.9	7.1	7.9	insig	insig	insig	insig
Czechoslovakia	34.1	47.5	60.9	77.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
GDR	48.1	75.1	113.0	161.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.9
Hungary	26.4	35.0	47.5	54.8	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Poland	69.9	106.8	166.1	195.7	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.1
Romania	17.3	31.0	43.2	66.0	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4
USSR	159.4	207.8	402.7	525.7	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.9
PRC	20.9	28.4	39.5	47.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.7	insig	insig	insig	insig
Cuba	<u>12.1</u>	<u>10.9</u>	<u>15.0</u>	<u>32.6</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Total Communist Countries listed	392.1	547.9	896.7	1,171.7	4.9	5.2	5.7	6.5
Total imports from entire world:	7,976.5	10,585.1	15,836.6	18,048.6				

TABLE 26
SWEDEN'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1971-1974
(Millions of dollars f.o.b.)

Country of Origin	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS			
	1971	1972	1973	1974	1971	1972	1973	1974
Albania	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.4	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	9.2	10.0	18.6	21.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1
Czechoslovakia	35.1	33.5	46.2	62.8	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4
GDR	69.6	61.6	90.2	114.3	0.9	0.7	0.7	0.7
Hungary	27.5	25.7	37.3	62.0	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.4
Poland	59.9	87.1	175.0	296.1	0.8	1.0	1.4	1.9
Romania	22.0	27.7	38.2	52.6	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
USSR	88.0	84.5	115.4	180.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.1
PRC	30.3	42.1	50.2	60.2	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.4
Other Asian Communist Areas	1.1	0.8	8.0	21.8*	insig	insig	0.1	0.1
Cuba	<u>12.3</u>	<u>8.6</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>
Total Communist Countries listed	355.5	382.5	592.4	895.5	4.8	4.4	4.9	5.6
Total exports to entire world:	7,439.8	8,654.2	12,114.1	15,909.6				

* Other Asian Communist Areas:

North Korea	10.1
North Vietnam	11.7
Mongolia	<u>insig</u>
Total	21.8

TABLE 26 (supplement)
 SWEDEN'S EXPORTS TO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 1972-1975
 (Millions of dollars f.o.b.)

Country of Destination	VALUE				PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS			
	1972	1973	1974	1975	1972	1973	1974	1975
Albania	0.9	0.7	0.4	1.2	insig	insig	insig	insig
Bulgaria	10.0	18.6	21.1	37.7	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2
Czechoslovakia	33.5	46.2	62.8	74.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
GDR	61.6	90.2	114.3	154.2	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.9
Hungary	25.7	37.3	62.0	75.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Poland	87.1	175.0	296.1	411.2	1.0	1.4	1.9	2.4
Romania	27.7	38.2	52.6	50.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
USSR	84.5	115.4	180.2	293.5	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.7
PRC	42.1	50.2	60.2	41.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.2
Other Asian								
Communist Areas	0.8	8.0	21.8	97.4*	insig	0.1	0.1	0.6
Cuba	<u>8.6</u>	<u>12.6</u>	<u>24.0</u>	<u>44.3</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.3</u>
Total Communist Countries listed	382.5	592.4	895.5	1,280.9	4.4	4.9	5.6	7.4
Total exports to entire world:	8,654.2	12,114.1	15,909.6	17,406.6				

* Other Asian Communist Areas:

North Korea	66.4
North Vietnam	31.0
Mongolia	<u>insig</u>
Total	97.4

V. MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SCANDINAVIAN AREA

The proportion of defense literature addressed to Soviet strategy on Europe's northern flank is miniscule and has originated primarily from periodic staff reports of NATO's Northern Command. Current staff studies (contrasted to the ceremonial "reports," issued on anniversaries and following changes of command) of the Soviet strategy, a sine qua non of our own strategic planning have seldom been undertaken.

The purpose of this paper is to address Soviet strategy in the context of known geographical constraints, political vulnerabilities and Soviet force disposition.

- A. The Strategic Geography of the Scandinavian States in the Defense of the North Atlantic Community
- B. The Soviet Order of Battle in Norden
 - 1. The Baltic
 - 2. The North
 - 3. Force Development.
- C. The Manifest Soviet Strategy in Scandinavia
- D. The Defense Posture of the Scandinavian States
 - 1. Role in NATO
 - 2. Force Disposition
- E. The Challenge of Nordic Security
 - 1. Short of War
 - 2. In the Event of War

This paper is not in defense of geographic determinism, such as espoused by Sir Halford Mackinder at the turn of the century;¹ however, there are geographical constraints which cannot be ignored in an appraisal of military strategy.

In short, there is a geostrategic arena, deeply affected by economic and technical factors, within which international politics operates and which strongly conditions the range of military and other instruments of foreign policy.²

Scandinavia is such an arena. The distance from Copenhagen to Kirkenes equals the distance from Copenhagen to Crimea; from Oslo to Vardo equals Oslo to Rome. Ranging from the Icelandic archipelago to the Finlandic Taiga, Scandinavia is the redoubt of northern Europe. Europe's security is dependent upon this flank.

Its strategic value to Europe is amply attested to by history. In 1807, the British became apprehensive of the danger posed by Napoleon's control of the Danish fleet and consequent domination of the North Sea passage to England. The British, therefore, pre-emptively bombarded Copenhagen and seized the Danish fleet. At that time, Norway was a part of Denmark, as was Iceland. Sweden joined Russia in the coalition

¹H. J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," Geographic Journal, XXIII (1904) 421-444, in Systematic Political Geography, 2nd ed., by Harm J. de Blij, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), pp. 271-286.

²Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy, (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 98.

against Napoleon, while Finland was a duchy of Russia, taken from Sweden by war in 1809.³

When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, on July 28, 1914, Germany warned Denmark that any military preparations in Denmark would be met by German reprisals. Denmark, Norway and Sweden promptly responded with joint and separate declarations of neutrality. In spite of these declarations, Germany insisted upon mining the Store Baelt (Danish-Swedish straits), which Denmark acquiesced in doing herself. Iceland acquired importance from the trans-Atlantic traffic occasioned by American involvement in Europe. Finland pleaded futilely for support from the West, turned in despair to Germany and was disciplined by Russia as the war ended.⁴

Only one of the Nordic nations -- Sweden -- escaped the scourage of World War II. Protesting their neutrality to no avail, Denmark and Norway were forced to submit to the role Hitler assigned to them, while Finland was yet again the victim of unprovoked Russian (now Soviet) aggression. Iceland was taken into custody of Britain and then the U.S. to serve Atlantic defense and supply functions.⁵

³John H. Wuorinen, Scandinavia, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), p. 25-27; William L. Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1972), pp. 747-748.

⁴Ibid., p. 35.

⁵Ibid., p. 69.

In all of the great European wars Scandinavia has been indispensable to control of the Continent. Today, the contest for Europe has assumed wider dimensions, becoming an East-West conflict that straddles Scandinavia. The evolution of strategic bombers, land based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SCBM's), have created a triad of destruction balanced upon a Scandinavian fulcrum. General Sir Walter Walker, former Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Northern Europe remarked in 1970, "As I see it, there is a growing awareness in Britain of the importance of a successful defence of Denmark and Norway to the security of Britain herself."⁶ Rear Admiral Magne Braadland of the Norwegian Navy warned the same year, "The threat to the U.S. is not coming from Viet Nam and not from Central Europe either. It is sailing from Murmansk."⁷

What are the peculiar features in this geostrategic setting? Denmark is the cork in the Baltic bottle which contains an effervescent Soviet lake. Norway is Europe's North Atlantic rampart, at the northeast end of which is based the largest fleet in the Soviet navy, harbored in the ice-free waters of Murmansk, abutting Norway's North Cape. Iceland is a North

⁶General Sir Walter Walker, "The Challenge in the North," NATO's Fifteen Nations, April, 1971, p. 45.

⁷"The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank," Time, 18 October 1971, p. 39.

Atlantic mooring and look-out post. Finland and Sweden are contiguous buffers between East and West. Denmark, Norway and Iceland belong to NATO. Finland and Sweden do not. Sweden subscribes to uncompromising neutrality, while Finland defers to the USSR in security matters, though technically non-allied under the terms of a 1948 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

II. The Soviet Order of Battle

Until 1709, when the Swedes under Charles VII met defeat by the Russians at the Battle of Poltava, Sweden had thwarted Russian ambitions in the Baltic. Poltava marked the decline of Swedish power and the awakening of Russian interest in Europe. Peter the Great promptly established his window on the West by moving his court from Moscow to St. Petersburg and set himself to the task of building a respectable navy. But it was slow going for Peter against the weight of history. Russian security had always depended primarily upon control of the heartland.⁸

Prior to World War II, the Soviets owned only 60 miles of the Baltic Sea coastline, in the vicinity of Leningrad (formerly Petrograd). With the acquisition of territory from the Baltic States, Poland, and Finland and with control over the present coastlines of East Germany and Poland, the Baltic has become since World War II a Soviet sea. If Scandinavian

⁸Mackinder, op. cit.

defenses were to fail, the Soviet Baltic Fleet could break out and cut NATO sea communications to Norway and the North Cape, freeing the Northern Fleet and effectively collapsing the European north flank defenses.⁹ Such is the value of the Baltic to the defense of Europe.

Whereas the Baltic Fleet poses an immediate challenge to the control of northern Europe, the Northern Fleet is today the strategic bulwark of the Soviet Union's challenge to the entire North Atlantic Community. Once the smallest of the four Soviet fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Far East), the Northern Fleet has become since World War II the largest.¹⁰ The Norwegian Minister of Defense expressed the alarm in November, 1970: "Adjacent to our border in the North there has through the years been built up the world's mightiest complex of bases."¹¹ In the Northern Fleet alone are over 30% of all Soviet surface ships, nearly half of all submarines with 70% of the USSR's submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force -- the trump card of global strategic superiority -- and the USSR's primary anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and amphibious attack forces.¹²

⁹Colonel Albert Leo Romaneski, U.S. Army, "Nordic Balance in the 1970's," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August, 1973, p. 34.

¹⁰Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper 81, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 13.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Major General J. L. Moulton, Royal Marines (Ret), "The Defense of Northwest Europe and the North Sea," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May, 1971, p. 86.

A. The Baltic

The naval superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in the Baltic is about 4 or 5 to 1. A fair proportion of the Baltic Fleet is, however, ocean-going and intended for operations farther afield. What is most disconcerting to Europe is that the Baltic Fleet is much stronger than NATO opposition warrants, even if the Swedish Navy were added. Should the Soviet Command consider control of Danish territory desirable, it has at its disposal Soviet, Polish and East German specialized units particularly suited to assist regular military forces in such an operation. In the Baltic areas there are one Soviet and one Polish marine division especially trained for amphibious operations. The amphibious capacity includes 80 Soviet, 24 Polish and 18 East German landing craft able to land near one division, and to this should be added merchant ships for follow-up operations. Both the Soviet Union and Poland have considerable airborne forces in the area.¹³

The International Institute for Strategic Studies cautions in its 1975 assessment of area forces:

It is not possible to make precise calculations as to Soviet or Warsaw Pact formations that would be committed to the Baltic area rather than towards the NATO Central European Command, since in both land and air forces there is a considerable degree of flexibility to do either. For the Warsaw Pact this sector is a coherent front, though a number of Soviet divisions, notably in the Leningrad area and in the Kola

¹³Ibid.

Peninsula, would undoubtedly be directed towards Norway.¹⁴
(See Table One).

B. The North

Unlike the face-off in Central Europe over recent borders drawn between East and West, there is no legacy of territorial dispute north of the Baltic States. Nevertheless, an unprovoked expansion of military forces is underway. The Soviet forces permanently stationed in the two Military Districts bordering the Nordic Area already have a capability far in excess of what would be needed for defensive or offensive purposes against their neighbors. And judging from the nature of their equipment, they are not on station for the purpose of providing purely local defense. About 20 divisions (including two airborne divisions and three marine corps brigades) backed by a tactical air force of some 500 aircraft would not be needed for this purpose. The highly developed air defense system comprising all the known warning and control installations situated along the Baltic and Arctic coasts (including Moscow early warning systems) are clearly to shield an enlarged strategic capability in that region.¹⁵

The Soviet Naval Air Force operates continuously over the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. The Territorial, Tactical,

¹⁴The Military Balance, 1974-75, (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 95.

¹⁵Stefan Geisenheyner, "NATO's Northern Flank -- Vital, But Increasingly Vulnerable," Air Force Magazine, July, 1971, p. 58.

Strategic and Transport Air Forces operate more sporadically, but also regardless of weather and seasons, in the same area. The bases supporting these forces are located in Kola, from Murmansk to the Norwegian border, and include a variety of hardened facilities. Air bases and other air force facilities have a capacity much in excess of those needed for the units permanently stationed in the area. A few of the 700 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM's) targeted on Western Europe are also situated in Kola.¹⁶ It is estimated that the Soviet Arctic Fleet has conventional submarines carrying 70 strategic missiles and nuclear-powered submarines loaded with at least 215 SS-N-5 and SS-N-6 missiles (700 and 1,500 miles range respectively). "By 1974-75, it is thought that the Soviet Navy will comprise 35 - 50 nuclear-powered submarines and 560 - 800 missiles."¹⁷ It is now documented that the SS-N-8, with a range of 4,000 plus nautical miles, is in use in the SLBM force.¹⁸

C. Force Development

The most profound operational change has been in the employment of the Soviet Naval Infantry. The Naval Infantry has not been of any significance in previous wars and was reportedly disbanded at the

¹⁶Ulstein, op. cit.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸"The Military Balance, 1975/76," Air Force Magazine, December 1975, p. 90.

end of World War.II.¹⁹ A reappraisal of the force structure in the early sixties resulted in their re-institution and they now number 18 - 20,000 strong. Grouped in brigades, they are attached to each of the four Soviet fleets. The Baltic Sea Brigade can be expected to secure Baltic exits through Denmark and the strategically placed island of Bornholm. In this operation, they are likely to be assisted by Polish and East German naval forces, both of whom have specialized in amphibious landings with their own assault craft. To be sure, the Northern Fleet Brigade is prepared to make assault landings along the northern coast of Norway at the outset of any hostilities threatening Murmansk.²⁰

Concerning the present Soviet disposition of forces, Professor John Erickson has written for the Royal United Services Institute that the basic order of battle has not changed, but the capabilities have:

The basic framework has been retained (that is, there seems to be no expansion of the nominal order of battle), but existing forces are being 'filled out' with extra equipment and weapons, as well as being supported by material stored close to the frontier lines and available to reservists who can be flown in.²¹

The recent Soviet build-up, particularly the qualitative advances, expansion and diversification, has enhanced the prospect of pre-emption

¹⁹ E. P. Takle, "Soviet Naval Infantry," Royal United Services Institute Journal (RUSI), June, 1975, p. 29.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," RUSI, March, 1975, p. 67.

while at the same time increasing options -- for military and political leaders alike. The most likely rationale for this newly proportioned, forward deployed armed force is to prevail in a situation where weapons are not used, but where military force is deployed and displayed -- even brandished -- as a means of directly influencing political behavior, not least on the flanks of Europe.

While the concentration of Soviet striking power on the central sector may bring misgivings, it may be that the diversification of this capability -- with its multiple possibilities of bringing pressure to bear in a number of areas -- could bring the most disquieting results.²²

III. Manifest Soviet Strategy

Former Soviet Defense Minister A. A. Grechko recognizes three basic types of maneuver for achieving a military objective:

1) Encirclement and subsequent destruction of the enemy by the delivery of two attacks in converging directions, while at the same time shattering the enemy's defenses and pushing one's own offensive deep into the enemy rear.

2) One or more frontal attacks against an enemy defensive position, with the fragmentation of the enemy's resistance and the subsequent development of one's own offensive sideways in the flanks of the enemy's position and deep into his rear.

3) A single attack delivered with the intention of pinning the enemy up against an insurmountable natural barrier, such as an impassable mountain range or the ocean.²³

²²Ibid., p. 68.

²³P. H. Vigor and C. N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe," RUSI, March, 1975, p. 71; from Marshal A. A. Grechko, Soviet Strategy, p. 307.

Given these fundamentals of offensive strategy, it is generally assumed that the major thrust of a Soviet attack in Europe would be focused on West Germany, opposite the Warsaw Pact forces already massed immediately to the East. This is the "set piece" with which NATO must reckon. In this theater context, the vital flanks alluded to in principle (2) above, would be the Mediterranean and Scandinavian states.

To many observers, the Soviet naval threat takes the form of a three-pronged naval pincers with the southern arm through the Mediterranean, the northern arm curving down into the Atlantic from Murmansk; and the central arm emerging through the Baltic. Against the northern two arms of this naval threat, the Baltic and the Scandinavian Peninsula are of vital importance to the sea communications between the United States and its North Atlantic Allies.²⁴

Despite increasing alarm over the growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, the overwhelming preponderance of Soviet flanking forces -- naval, air and amphibious -- are poised on the northern flank.

Since 1963, a pattern of Soviet naval maneuvers has been occurring in the far north based upon two major exercises per year, one in the fall and the other in the spring. The area of operations extends to all of the Norwegian Sea and occasionally into the central portions of the Atlantic as well. The exercises indicate that Soviet naval planners may look to the Iceland-Faroes gap as their forward defense zone covering the access

²⁴Romaneski, op. cit., p. 34..

routes to and from the Atlantic. The major tasks of the Soviet navy in the Northeast Atlantic include the following:

- to counter Polaris/Poseidon submarines
- to neutralize U.S. strike carriers prior to aircraft launch
- to ensure control of the fleet areas
- to assure access for Soviet SSBN's to stations off the East Coast of the United States

- to intercept NATO lines of communication and supply
- to provide maritime fleet support for land operations in contiguous coastal areas

- to create and sustain impressions of Soviet power and reduce the perceived efficiency of American guarantees to Northern Europe.²⁵

At the North Cape, Norway shares more than 100 miles of frontier with the Soviet Union. If the North Cape fell, the Soviet's most powerful fleet would enjoy largely unhindered access to the Atlantic. The threat to Great Britain is similar to and more intense than the threat posed by German naval elements after the Nazi occupation of Norway in April of 1940. Professor Nils Orvik has drawn out the parallel between the Nazi "neutralization" of Norway and the current Soviet exercises along the same littoral. Known to NATO observers as exercises Sever and Okean, large Soviet naval forces with landing ships and naval infantry sail through the Danish straits along the Norwegian coast all the way to

²⁵Richard B. Foster, et. al., editors, Strategy for the West, (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974), p. 165.

the North, copying the German operation of 1940. While their exercise originates from the Baltic, a complementary one forms in Kola, where crack amphibious forces assault the local coast, implying tactics to be applied from Kirkenes to Narvik.²⁶

Another axis of attack might be by land movement, supported by air, through northern Finland and Sweden to Narvik. The object, again, would be to make the North Cape defense line untenable to NATO. Wolf Holsti, a Finnish military writer, envisions northern Norway as a huge aircraft carrier to launch Soviet air and naval operations far out into the Atlantic.²⁷

Control of the Baltic also has high priority in both offensive and defensive strategies of the Soviets in Europe.²⁸ Toward this end, Soviet possession of southern Sweden, B rnholm, and Denmark are of critical importance. This operation, too, is being well rehearsed in flagrant disregard of western protests.²⁹ The point is, the Soviet capability and intentions are manifest from both visible force levels and actual exercises.

²⁶Nils Orvik, "Scandinavian Security in Transition: The Two-dimensional Threat," ORBIS, Fall, 1972, p. 725.

²⁷Ibid. See also FBIS, 11 February 1976, p. P1.

²⁸Vigor, op. cit., p. 74.

²⁹Berlingske Tidende, 10 February 1976, p. 1, FBIS, Western Europe, 17 February 1976, p. P1. See also FBIS, 9 February 1976, p. P1.

The potential for the realization of Soviet strategic objectives has been described by Dr. R. J. Vincent in an Adelphi Paper for the International Institute of Strategic Studies as emanating from three "tactical threats": opportunism, catalysis and spill-over and accretion. In the first, the Soviet Union might make a forward move in northern Norway, where the Soviets have an enormous advantage in manpower and equipment both at sea and on land. If the attack came as a surprise and since the defense of Norway depends on allied reinforcement, the Soviet Union might gamble on the West thinking the better of a major confrontation and accepting the fact of Soviet expansion. In the second scenario, the Soviet Union might intervene in a local uprising (catalyst) -- for example in Spitzberg, jointly occupied with Norway in oil rich arctic waters -- and the "spillover" of Soviet military influence would naturally ensue. In the third situation, Norway might inevitably yield to the preponderance of Soviet military power in the Kola area, as well as to an economic authority acquired from oil fields in territorial waters. The accretion of naval influence alone could beget further concessions extending to a "natural defense line" in the Atlantic.

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³⁰R. J. Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe, Adelphi Paper 119, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 13-14. See also Mark Goldsmith, "Norwegian-Soviet War of Wives on Spitsbergen," The Christian Science Monitor, 8 April, 1976, p. 9.

In another Adelphi Paper, Mr. Egil Ulstein sees Soviet captivity within the Baltic and the Barents Seas as grating to the self-respect of a superpower with a super navy. For the Soviet Union, the logical course would be to push on from the North Cape to secure access to the Norwegian Sea between Iceland and Scotland, which could be done by the gradual build-up of a formidable presence in the outer access area. Analysts see this tendency as "already manifested in Soviet behavior."³¹ The major new elements in Soviet air and naval power are intensely political, in that they could force the adversary to concede that armed confrontation would automatically produce escalation to levels unacceptable in the circumstances, to other members of the alliance.³²

Premised upon the two verifiable facts of the increasing Soviet naval build-up and the pattern of Soviet naval exercises over the last ten years, the conclusion may be drawn that the Soviet Union has both the ambition and the resources necessary to push its forward defense well out into the Atlantic to the Iceland-Faroes line, thus acquiring a Mare Sovieticum. A permanent Soviet naval presence in this realm does not seem impossible. Recognizing the present need for land based air support to the Soviet navy, forward bases loom as an enticing prospect. As no European navy can any longer bring the Soviet Fleet to bay, the gauntlet has passed to the United States.³³

³¹Ulstein, op. cit., p. 15.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

IV. The Defense Posture of the Scandinavian States

A. Role in NATO

Dr. Johan J. Holst, formerly of SHAPE and Director of Research at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and Norway's new Minister of Defense has pointedly observed that despite their cultural homogeneity and political interdependence, "Scandinavianism has, however, never constituted sufficient reason and foundation for the security posture of the Scandinavian states."³⁴ While the spirit of Nordic cooperation has exclusively enveloped many aspects of government and society in Scandinavia, the individual states are on their own regarding matters of defense. Following the bitter experience of World War II³⁵ and alarmed by the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, Sweden, Denmark and Norway got together in the aftermath of the Czech Coup to discuss a Nordic Alliance. Sweden stipulated absolute non-alignment with major powers as a condition of their union. Norway, still persuaded of the importance of British naval protection and desirous of more aid and arms assistance than Sweden could afford, opted for NATO. Denmark had little choice but to follow suit.³⁶ Since then, the concept of the "Nordic balance" has

³⁴Foster, op. cit., p. 162.

³⁵Richard Petrow, The Bitter Years, (New York: William Morrow Company, 1974).

³⁶Laszlo Hadik and Wolfgang Klaiber, Acceptability to European Allies of Tactical Nuclear Defense Concepts, (Washington, D. C.: International Research Group, Ltd., 1973), p. 18; Defense Documentation Center, classification - Secret.

evolved, wherein Iceland, Norway and Denmark belong to NATO while Sweden and Finland provide a neutral buffer to the East.³⁷ Dr. Nils Orvik made this assessment: "In terms of strategy and empirical data, the theory of Nordic balance seems hardly tenable. As a political concept, however, it may look different."³⁸

As regards the roles of Finland and Sweden, the degree of neutrality varies. Finland is bound by a 1948 semi-mutual assistance Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Under the terms of this agreement, Finland is obligated to mutually resist attacks upon the Soviet Union "through Finland" but is committed only to "consult" with the Soviet Union concerning threats to Soviet security not transgressing Finnish territory. The treaty is an exception to the standard mutual assistance treaties executed by Stalin with Russia's allies in Eastern Europe.³⁹ Sweden, by contrast, is a true neutral, beholden to no one. Sweden's per capita outlay for defense is by far the highest in Europe, behind only the United States and the Soviets among theater forces.⁴⁰

³⁷For an excellent analysis of the "Nordic balance" see Colonel Albert Leo Romaneski, "Nordic Balance in the 1970's," U. S. Naval Institute.

³⁸Orvik, The Scandinavian Members of NATO, op. cit., p. 9.

³⁹Hadik, op. cit., p. 19.

⁴⁰"The Military Balance, 1975/76," Air Force Magazine, op. cit., p. 93.

Sweden is well armed. While remaining strictly neutral, she expressly reserves the right to ally herself with other forces in the event her neutrality is violated. Her motto is "non-alignment in peace in order to maintain neutrality in war."⁴¹

Among the three NATO allies (Denmark, Norway and Iceland), their loyalty is less than exemplary. In the midst of the present naval contest for the North Atlantic, Iceland's government has taken in Communist cabinet ministers and entertained public demands for the ouster of U.S. forces. Withdrawal from NATO is repeatedly proposed in Parliament. Denmark's Communist Party was elected to its Parliament in 1973 for the first time in over 20 years and promptly increased its seats in 1975. Norway, while not courting the communists in its government has been increasingly at pains to improve detente with her Soviet neighbor in the oil fields. Norway rejected membership in EEC by referendum in 1973, while Denmark's referendum approved their membership.⁴² Iceland makes no military contribution to NATO on its own, while Denmark and Norway each contribute a respectable share of their GNP. The most significant demonstration of commitment by their military, if not an overwhelming part of their populace and Parliament, was the recent purchase of the latest USAF fighter-interceptor, the F-16, by the

⁴¹Vincent, op. cit., p. 22.

⁴²Richard Staar, Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1976, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press), pp. 123-175.

consortium of Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands.⁴³

Neither Denmark nor Norway allows the permanent basing of NATO troops on their territory. They also exclude nuclear weapons.

In addition to the principal states of Denmark, Norway and Iceland, other strategic territories also come within the domain of NATO -- Greenland, Jan Mayen and the Faroes, for example. Beyond the European theater, these territories are perhaps the most crucial of all to the strategic defense of the Atlantic Community. Captain Christer Fredholm of the Royal Swedish Navy wrote for the U.S. Naval War College Review:

The strategic significance of Iceland today cannot be overemphasized. The confined waters in the Greenland-Iceland-Faroes-Scotland region might be likened to a lock, and whoever holds the key controls the North Atlantic. The key is Iceland. A change in the existing situation would result in an entirely new politico-military picture both in Europe and the north.⁴⁴

B. Force Disposition

NATO's position in the north is dependent upon two critical anchors of NATO: the northward deployments of Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) and AFNORTH's southern subsidiary, the Baltic Approaches Command (COMBALTAP). It should also be noted that in a deterrent context, the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), including the U.S. Second Fleet, has more than salutary effect in discouraging aggression against Northern NATO. AFNORTH has its

⁴³"The Military Balance," Air Force Magazine, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴⁴Fredholm, op. cit., p. 61.

headquarters at Kolsas, Norway and is responsible for the defense of Norway, Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein and the Baltic Approaches. The BALTAP sub-command has its headquarters at Karup, Denmark and alternates commanders between Danish and German naval officers.⁴⁵

The defenses of the "northern anchor" are positioned against the Tromso Line, which marks the southernmost contiguity of Finland and Norway, north of Narvik. The NATO Air Defense Ground Environment system (NADGE) extends from the North Cape of Norway to Southern Europe and is the vital nerve of northern European defense.⁴⁶ The Tromso Line itself is basically indefensible. It can be assumed that in case of war the Soviets would strike overland through northern Finland and Sweden, thereby by-passing the Tromso defenses. NATO exercise "Arctic Express" takes place biannually (as do the Soviet practice excursions into area waters) to rehearse the airlift that would be necessary to halt a Soviet overland attack. The primary and continuing NATO mission in the far north is air defense by the Norwegian Air Force. The mission objectives are to defend Norwegian forward airfields, reconnoiter Arctic/Barents Sea threats and to interdict the sea lanes to Murmansk in the event of hostilities.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Romaneski, op. cit., p. 36.

⁴⁶Moulton, op. cit., p. 91.

⁴⁷Geisenheyner, op. cit., p. 59.

The "southern anchor" is set at the western exit of the Baltic, or the "Baltic approaches." This defensive line, including the Danish straits and proximate islands, comprises only five per cent of the Baltic's total coastline. About 60 per cent is shared by Sweden and Finland while the remainder belongs to the USSR and her socialist sister states. Although NATO "controls" this strategic narrows, it has very little to counter this threat and, what is more important, to present a credible deterrent posture. As in the North Cape, the collective COMBALTAP forces are outnumbered by about 10 to one. Denmark contributes four infantry brigades with supporting armor and artillery, two frigates to the North Sea and 16 motor torpedo boats (MTB's) to the Baltic. The Danish Air Force has about 100 combat aircraft awaiting modern replacement. West Germany offers a fleet of 40 MTB's in the Baltic, 150 fighter and support aircraft and one armored division with supporting tactical air force for shore defense.⁴⁸ General Kurt Ramberg, Danish Chief of Staff in 1971, gave a sober assessment of Denmark's blocking position:

Denmark would not be able to defend against even the first wave of a conventional attack. Allied reinforcements, therefore, would not have time to come to Denmark's aid before the country was overrun by the enemy.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 60.

⁴⁹Ibid.

V. The Challenge to Nordic Security

A. Short of War

The expansion of Soviet control westward into Scandinavia by tactics short of war has been popularly described as "Finlandization."⁵⁰ A couple of scenarios would best illustrate the concept.

1. Assuming a reduced American resolve following withdrawal from Vietnam and the progress of detente in more conspicuous theaters, the USSR might assert its right to "unharrassed" movement of its naval forces in and out of its largest ports. Accordingly, the USSR demands that Norway cease its surveillance activities in the North Cape, as the U.S. insisted of Cuba. The Norwegians reject the demand, the Soviets issue an ultimatum and seize the Varanger Peninsula of the North Cape. Predictably, the Soviet attack meets little resistance and the Kremlin declares to the world that its "intervention" is only consistent with its security interests in Kola and that no further advances are intended.

The U.S., eager to display its "commitment to Europe," mobilizes NATO forces on the Central Front and reserves in the U.S. and dispatches the Second Fleet to the North Cape. The U.N. Security Council meets and typically establishes a neutral zone to "separate the belligerents" in the Finnmark area. The USSR complies with a resolution

⁵⁰Vincent, op. cit., p. 18. The Vincent article is an acknowledged riposte to debunking of Finlandization by George Kennan in "Europe's Problem's, Europe's Choices," Foreign Policy, Spring, 1974.

of the Security Council to withdraw its military but also persuades the U.N. to keep the area "neutral of both forces" (Soviet and NATO), thereby graciously restoring peace and securing its immediate objective -- the elimination of NATO forces and surveillance in that vicinity.⁵¹

2. More practicable, if at some future time the nuclear deterrent situation seemed to justify the risk, would be an operation designed to gain control of the Baltic Straits, or even a politico-military showdown over control of the strategically placed island of B rnholm -- previously under Soviet control, at the close of World War II. The main attack would come from the Baltic, while ancillary action would be mounted in the North Sea, on the western side of the Straits. Raids to disable the NADGE system, seize the peninsular air fields and establish missile-firing patrol boats in Norwegian fiords might ensue to isolate the area from NATO reinforcements. Prevented from reacting quickly and effectively, NATO might be presented with a fait accompli in preference to either nuclear escalation or the mounting of a prolonged conventional attack throughout the area. Indeed, judging from the Danish and Norwegian responses in two previous wars, they would more likely prefer peace and neutrality to a homeland war in defense of NATO.⁵²

The increasing inclination of Denmark, Norway and Iceland to "reassure" an anxious Soviet Union navy that Scandinavia harbors no

⁵¹Romaneski, op. cit., p. 40.

⁵²Moulton, op. cit., p. 91.

ill intent by eliminating "sources of provocation" could wed the Soviet Union to Scandinavia without even the use (distinguished from "show") of force.⁵³

B. In the Event of War

If, despite the declared policies of both sides, conventional war were to erupt in Europe, it would likely take place in two main theaters: a land/air war in Germany and a sea/air war in the Atlantic. Unless these were ruled out by some sort of tacit truce as has sometimes occurred in wars outside Europe, operations in the North Sea, though not in the far north, would be supportive to the main effort.

In a war of this sort, Russian control of the Baltic exists, achieved perhaps by a surprise attack at the outbreak, besides allowing submarines, if not surface ships to exchange between the Northern and Baltic Fleets, would make possible the attack on NATO military and commercial traffic in the North Sea by missile firing patrol boats and by older and smaller submarines not required in the Atlantic. If, however, the Pact had achieved effective air superiority, air attack on shipping, docks and communications and air mining of sea approaches would be likely to achieve the same results more quickly, probably closing the North Sea ports and stopping supplies to the forces of AFCENT.⁵⁴

In their assessment of the Soviet threat to Europe in 1974, Messrs. Vigor and Donnelly visualize an advance across the North German Plain to Schleswig-Holstein. From there, Soviet operations would have the additional support of a seaborne landing to meet the advancing armor.

⁵³Vincent, op. cit., p. 20.

⁵⁴Moulton, op. cit., p. 92.

"The Russians, of course, have paid considerable attention to the training of their seaborne infantry, and as Poland and East Germany have been developing forces of this nature, a fairly big seaborne landing by the Warsaw Pact forces can be expected"55

Today's military environment is a strange one. Wars can be won and lost without an actual engagement. Such is the case in Europe. British Prime Minister Edward Heath explained Scandinavia's situation in the House of Commons in 1971:

The Soviets may calculate that eventually the sheer disparity of military strength would leave Western Europe with no convincing strategy. Political pressure, shrewdly applied and backed by threat of greatly superior military force, could compel one of the more exposed members of the alliance to lapse into neutrality. Then a process of disintegration could begin which would lead to the ultimate price, an extension of the Soviet sphere of influence gradually into countries at present members of NATO, and if possible, to the Atlantic.⁵⁶

Preoccupation with Central Europe and neglect of NATO's flanks can be disastrous to all of Europe. The Baltic has already been abandoned to the Soviet realm while adjacent North Sea ports remain the economic lifeline of Europe. Beyond the Continent proper, the Scandinavian Peninsula alone insulates the North Atlantic Community from the strategic bulwark of the Soviet Union. And the Scandinavian Peninsula is practically devoid of NATO defenses. In the words of AFNORTH's

⁵⁵Vigor, op. cit., p. 74.

⁵⁶"The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank," op. cit.

former commander, "Nowhere is the imbalance of standing forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO greater than it is in Northern Europe."⁵⁷ When the move on the north is made, resistance is improbable and the Atlantic will devolve to the USSR.

⁵⁷ Moulton, op. cit., p. 92.

VI. CONCLUSION

Returning to the Grosser analysis of Soviet foreign policy set out in the Introduction to this paper, one can visualize the design of Soviet foreign policy in Scandinavia manifested by Soviet activity in that realm. Concerning the first aspect of Soviet foreign policy defined by Grosser, that policy which is "deliberately pursued by those in power in accordance with the objectives they have set," it is manifest that Marxist-Leninist goals still prevail, even though Marxist-Leninist means are being clouded by the developments of Eurocommunism. Evidence of this ideological state of affairs is seen in the deliberate and consistent policy statements of General Secretary Brezhnev, as chief spokesman for the Central Committee and its Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While Brezhnev has consistently reaffirmed the foreign policy goal of Marxist-Leninist communism in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, the revolutionary methods to be employed internationally in pursuit of supranational communism vary considerably from place to place and from time to time.¹

¹ Brezhnev addressing the 25th CPSU: "We Soviet Communists consider defense of proletarian internationalism the sacred duty of every Marxist-Leninist Communists of different countries follow each others' work with interest and understandable attention. Differences of opinion and approach to some question may arise among them from time to time. "

Immediately following the above quote, New Times (A Soviet Weekly of World Affairs) turns to an interview published in Il Messaggero with

Chapter Two of this paper applied the theoretical premises of communism -- as set out by Marx, Engels and Lenin -- to the social and political history of Scandinavia to illustrate the incongruity between Marxist theory and the form of non-Marxist socialism which has actually evolved in most of Scandinavia. Despite the historical dissimilarity of socialist revolution in Russia and socialist evolution in Scandinavia, the conclusion of Chapter Two leaves open the possibility of an eventual coincidence of Soviet and Scandinavian socialism. The latter development would represent a coincidence of socialist ends, irrespective of (revolutionary or evolutionary) means, and might be a logical extrapolation of the Soviet foreign policies respecting Finlandization and Eurocommunism.

Ideology aside, it is a fact of life in the international system that the Soviet Union must reckon with the institutions of international relations that prevail in today's world. That world is essentially a system of sovereign states that is becoming increasingly integrated into regional,

Italian Communist Party General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer to support the new Moscow foreign policy line of unity in diversity among fellow communists: "The Italian Communist Party is absolutely independent of the Soviet Union. There can be no question of any dependence or of directives of any kind. The Soviet Union has never made the slightest attempt to tell us what we should and should not do, not only as regards Italy, but also as regards our activity and participation in the international working-class movement."

Boris Vesin, "Proletarian Internationalism and Its Bourgeois Enemies," New Times, No. 24, (June, 1976), p. 5.

supranational and transnational entities that group affairs of state under ever widening umbrella organizations. In Europe today vestiges of the Metternich system remain within the embryo of a European Community, and the Soviet Union -- its own concept of a world community notwithstanding -- is constrained to cope with the existing "norms" of diplomacy to insure its own survival. In light of these circumstances, Grosser's second aspect of Soviet foreign policy is discernible, "policy that is in fact pursued, though not necessarily deliberately"

Chapters Three, Four and Five focused on the familiar instruments of foreign policy, which, apart from ideological declarations, express Soviet foreign policy in fact: international diplomacy, trade and armed force. These instruments are the currency of international relations in today's state-system and are essential to the survival of the Soviet Union within that system. The Soviets have capitalized on the use of each of these instruments to extend their influence in Scandinavia. In the case of diplomacy, the Soviet Union has steadily strengthened its treaty links between East and West from its post World War II rapprochement with Finland to its 1975 multinational accord concluding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the realm of trade, the Soviet Union has become the dominant suppliers of vital fuel-energy requirements to Finland and Iceland and has, with her COMECON partners steadily increased its share of the Nordic countries' world trade.

The most visible and the most ominous activity of the Soviets in Scandinavia is that of their military forces, which are far out of proportion

to any opposing forces and are still growing. This clarion manifestation of policy in fact should come as no surprise to the student of Soviet foreign relations:

This intimate link between the armed forces and foreign policy was characteristic of Lenin's outlook from the start, since Lenin, who greatly admired Clausewitz, drew no firm distinction between war and politics, and whose specific contribution to twentieth century foreign policy was its militarization.²

The third and final aspect of Soviet foreign policy delineated by Alfred Grosser concerns "the image of this policy to outside interlocutors."³ How the Scandinavian states and their allies respond to the increasing Soviet presence in that region depends directly upon the former's perception of Soviet foreign policy goals in that region. If Soviet intentions are perceived to be innocuous or benign, Soviet activity will doubtlessly be tolerated. It is obvious from the deliberate tone of Soviet foreign policy pronouncements -- the proposed abolition of alliances at Bucharest in 1966; the Peace Program of the 24th CPSU; the Declaration on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in 1975 -- that the methods of diplomacy, peace and cooperation are being assiduously cultivated. But it is equally obvious from the growing strength of Soviet armed forces in the waters and on the borders of Scandinavia pose an overwhelming threat to

²Leonard Shapiro, "Totalitarianism in Foreign Policy," in The Soviet Impact on World Politics, edited by Kurt L. London, (Hawthorn Books, Inc., New York, 1974), p. 9.

³See Alfred Grosser, Chapter One, p.

Scandinavian security. The purposes of such forces might still be explained by the classic post World War II assessment of Mr. X in "Sources of Soviet Conduct":

The main thing is that there should always be pressure, increasing, constant pressure toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.⁴

The "pressure" that is being applied by the Soviets on Scandinavia today is verbal diplomatic appeals for the renunciation of military alliances, while the Soviet Union remains the dominant military force on the continent, if not the world.

⁴Mr. X (George F. Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, no. 4 (July, 1947), p. 575.

APPENDIX A: Treaty Chronology
(Soviet Union and the Scandinavian States
From 1917 to 1970)

DENMARK

Sept. 21, 1918.	Trade and credit agreement	
Dec. 18, 1919.	Agreement concerning repatriation.	8
Apr. 23, 1923.	Preliminary agreement concerning political and economic relations, with protocol and declaration concerning claims.	38
June 18, 1924.	Note extending recognition <u>de jure</u> to the USSR.	43
June 18, 1924.	Exchange of notes constituting an agreement on commerce and navigation with declaration concerning claims.	4
Dec. 13, 1924 and June 23 and 29, 1925.	Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning reciprocal recognition of tonnage measurement certificates.	51
Dec. 23, 1927	Exchange of notes concerning reciprocal registration of trade-marks.	64.
Jan. 24, 1929.	Exchange of notes, extending the agreement of June 29, 1925, concerning reciprocal recognition of tonnage measurement certificates.	68
June 11, 1934.	Trade agreement.	95
June 17, 1935.	Trade agreement for 1935.	103
June 29, 1936.	Parcel post agreement.	112
July 7, 1936.	Trade agreement.	112

*Data compiled from Robert M. Skusser, Jan F. Triska, et al., A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957 (Stanford University Press, 1959); and Peter H. Rohn, ed., World Treaty Index, Vol. IV, op. cit.

July 22, 1936.	Agreement modifying the trade agreement of July 7, 1936.
Nov. 30, 1938.	Exchange of notes concerning payment for goods supplied to the USSR during 1937.
Sept. 18, 1940.	Trade and payments agreement.
May 21, 1941.	Trade protocol.
Apr. 18 and 23, 1944.	Exchange of notes concerning establishment of diplomatic relations.
May 10 and 16, 1945.	Exchange of notes concerning re-establishment of diplomatic relations.
Mar. 3, 1946.	Announcement of beginning of evacuation of Soviet military units from the Island of Bornholm.
July 8, 1946.	Commercial agreement.
July 8, 1946.	Trade protocol
Aug. 8, 1946	Agreement concerning establishment of telegraph communications with annex.
Aug. 17, 1946.	Treaty of commerce and navigation, with annex concerning the Soviet Trade Mission in Denmark.
Aug. 17, 1946.	Protocol concerning temporary principles of arbitration.
July 8, 1948.	Protocol modifying and extending the commercial agreement of July 8, 1946, and extending the arbitration protocol of August 17, 1946.
July 8, 1948.	Trade protocol.
July 17, 1953.	Trade protocol, with two annexes
Sept. 7, 1955.	Agreement concerning transformation of diplomatic missions into embassies.
Mar. 6, 1956.	Joint communique concerning political and other relations.

Mar. 6, 1956.	Agreement concerning saving human lives in the Baltic Sea.
Mar. 31, 1956.	Agreement concerning air communications between Moscow and Copenhagen, with two annexes and an exchange of notes.
May 14, 1956.	Trade protocol for the period 1956-1958.
June 14, 1956.	Agreement concerning communications between the rescue services of the USSR and Denmark for collaboration in saving human lives in the Baltic Sea.

DENMARK, four-way

Aur. 9, 1918.	Agreement concerning exchange of civilian and military personnel (RSFSR, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland).
May 30, 1959.	Treaty concerning finances and payments.
May 10, 1960.	Treaty concerning taxation.
July 20, 1960.	Treaty concerning consular agreement and citizenship.
Sept. 11, 1962.	Treaty concerning culture.
Feb. 27, 1964.	Treaty concerning specific claims or waivers.
July 17, 1970.	Treaty concerning research and scientific projects.

FINLAND, bilateral

July 29, 1918.	Agreement concerning liberation and exchange of citizens arrested for political reasons.
Jan. 15, 1919.	Agreement concerning conditions of trade.
Aug. 13, 1920.	Armistice agreement.
Oct. 14, 1920.	Peace treaty, with note, five declarations, and an annex (Treaty of Dorpat).
Aug. 23, 1921.	Agreement concerning establishment of border trading posts.

Sept. 7, 1921.	Temporary agreement concerning transfer of railroad rolling stock.
Sept. 7, 1921.	Temporary agreement concerning rafting timber in the Minalanioki and Tulemanioki Rivers.
Oct. 11, 1921.	Agreement concerning rafting timber in the Repola and Porosozero volosts.
Oct. 31, 1921.	Act regulating the functions of the Central Russian-Finnish Mixed Commission, established under Art. 37 of the peace treaty of October 14, 1920.
Dec. 14, 1921.	Temporary agreement concerning rail transportation of passengers, baggage and freight from Finland to Russia and vice versa, via the frontier stations of Rajajoki and Valeasaari (Beloostrov).
Mar. 21, 1922.	Agreement transferring the solution of border incidents to the Central Mixed Russo-Finnish Commission.
June 1, 1922.	Agreement concerning measures for ensuring security of the border, with protocol.
June 13, 1922.	Temporary agreement concerning establishment of telegraph communications.
June 22, 1922.	Temporary agreement concerning establishment of postal communications.
July 7, 1922.	Agreement concerning former government property.
Aug. 12, 1922.	Agreement concerning repatriation, with three declarations.
Aug. 12, 1922.	Agreement concerning the return of ships.
Sept. 20, 1922.	Agreement concerning fishing regulations in the Gulf of Finland.
Oct. 21, 1922.	Convention concerning fishing and seal hunting in territorial waters of the Arctic Ocean.

- Oct. 28, 1922. Agreement concerning maintenance of the main channel and fishing in the border water systems.
- Oct. 28, 1922. Convention concerning floating of timber in water courses running from the territory of Russia into the territory of Finland and vice versa.
- Oct. 28, 1922. Agreement concerning the conditions under which the RSFSR and its citizens shall be entitled to free transit through the district of Petsamo (Pechenga).
- Oct. 28, 1922. Convention concerning fishing and seal hunting on Lake Ladoga.
- Jan. 2 and 4, 1923. Exchange of notes concerning consular matters.
- Feb. 12, 14, and 21, 1923. Exchange of notes concerning exemption of certain urban property from stamp duty and all other charges on the occasion of its homologation or registration.
- June 5, 1923. Agreement concerning navigation by Finnish merchant and cargo vessels of the Neva between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland, with protocol.
- July 28, 1923. Agreement concerning maintenance of order in the parts of the Gulf of Finland situated outside territorial waters, the upkeep of maritime installations, and pilotage service in the Gulf.
- July 31, 1923. Protocol modifying the convention of October 21, 1922, concerning fishing and seal hunting.
- June 18, 1924. Convention concerning telephone communications, with final protocol.
- June 18, 1924. Convention concerning postal communications, with supplementary protocol.
- June 18, 1924. Convention concerning telegraph communications, with supplementary protocol and annex.
- June 18, 1924. Convention concerning direct transportation of passengers and freight by rail.
- June 18, 1924. Regulations concerning direct transportation of passengers and freight by rail.

June 18, 1924.	Agreement concerning reciprocal return of archives and documents of public institutions, with protocol and annex.
July 12, 1924.	Protocol concerning identification papers of citizens engaged in fishing and seal hunting on Lake Ladoga, with annex.
Feb. 20, 1925.	Agreement concerning change of postal money orders.
Mar. 29, 1927.	Agreement modifying Regulations of June 18, 1924, concerning direct transportation of passengers and freight by rail.
Sept. 2, 1927.	Exchange of notes concerning regulation for Finnish merchant and cargo vessels navigating the Neva.
Mar. 17, 1928.	Agreement concerning regulations for Finnish merchant and cargo vessels navigating the Neva.
Sept. 24, 1928.	Exchange of notes constituting an agreement concerning appointment of border commissioners on the Karelian Isthmus.
Nov. 17, 1928.	Exchange of notes modifying the Regulations of June 18, 1924, concerning direct transportation of passengers and freight.
Apr. 13, 1929.	Convention concerning customs supervision in the Gulf of Finland, with final protocol.
Apr. 13, 1929.	Protocol amending the agreement of July 28, 1923, concerning maintenance of order in the Gulf of Finland, in accordance with the convention of April 13, 1929, concerning customs supervision in the Gulf of Finland.
Oct. 7, 1929.	Protocol modifying the postal convention of June 18, 1924, with supplementary protocol.
Jan. 21, 1932.	Treaty concerning nonaggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes, with protocol of signature.
Apr. 22, 1932.	Convention concerning conciliation procedure.
June 17, 1932.	Agreement concerning navigation in the Gulf of Finland.

Nov. 30, 1932.	Exchange of notes concerning reciprocal recognition of trade-marks.
Jan. 5, 1933.	Convention revising the convention of June 18, 1924, concerning direct transportation of passengers and freight by rail.
July 4, 1933.	Convention concerning reindeer, with final protocol.
Oct. 15, 1933.	Convention modifying the convention of October 28, 1922, concerning floating of timber in border water courses, with final protocol.
Apr. 7, 1934.	Protocol extending the treaty of January 21, 1932, concerning nonaggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Feb. 11, 1936.	Protocol modifying the convention of June 18, 1924, concerning direct transportation of passengers and freight by rail.
Feb. 11, 1937.	Communique concerning negotiations.
Apr. 11, 1938.	Parcel post agreement.
Apr. 28, 1938.	Protocol concerning demarcation of the border, with maps and protocol of border marks.
Dec. 23, 1938.	Exchange of notes confirming documents and maps defining the state border.
Mar. 12, 1940.	Peace treaty, with map and protocol concerning an armistice.
Apr. 8, 1940.	Exchange of notes concerning procedure for exchange of prisoners of war.
Apr. 9, 1940.	Act of transfer of Petsamo to Finland.
Apr. 19, 1940.	Exchange of notes concerning establishment of temporary direct telephone and telegraph communications between Moscow and Helsinki.
Apr. 29, 1940.	Protocol concerning demarcation of the border.
June 28, 1940.	Commercial treaty, with annex concerning the Soviet Trade Mission in Finland.

June 28, 1940.	Agreement concerning payments.
Sept. 6, 1940.	Agreement concerning direct railroad freight traffic.
Oct. 11, 1940.	Agreement concerning demilitarization of the Aaland Islands.
Nov. 18, 1940.	Protocol concerning demarcation of the border, with maps and protocols of border marks.
May 10, 1941.	Exchange of notes validating the protocol of November 18, 1940, concerning demarcation of the border.
Aug. 25-Sept. 3, 1944. Cease-fire agreement.	
Sept. 19, 1944.	Armistice agreement, with annex and two maps.
Dec. 16, 1944.	Protocol concerning demarcation of the border in the Porkkala-Udd region, with annex, maps, and protocol of border marks.
Dec. 17, 1944.	Agreement concerning reparations deliveries by Finland.
Jan. 31, 1945.	Trade agreement.
Mar. 14, 1945.	Exchange of notes concerning entry into force of the border protocol of Dec. 16, 1944, describing the border in the region of Porkkala-Udd, with annexes.
May 8, 1945.	Trade agreement for 1945.
Aug. 5, 1945.	Communique by the Allied Control Commission for Finland concerning modification of the conditions of the armistice.
Aug. 6, 1945.	Exchange of declarations concerning re-establishment of diplomatic relations.
Aug. 11, 1945.	Supplementary trade agreement.
Oct. 26, 1945.	Protocol concerning the boundary in the Pechenga (Petsamo) area, with annexes and maps.

Dec. 31, 1945.	Agreement concerning extension of the period of reparations payments and reduction of annual installments, with protocol.
Feb. 19, 1946.	Exchange of notes confirming the protocol of October 26, 1945, concerning the boundary in the Pechenga (Petsamo) area.
Apr. 24, 1946.	Joint communique concerning negotiations.
Apr. 30, 1946.	Trade agreement for 1946.
Apr. 30, 1946.	Agreement concerning lease to the Soviet combine Pechenga-Nikel' of a concession for a power station on the Patso-Yoki, with protocol.
Aug. 19, 1946.	Agreement concerning telegraph and telephone communications.
Aug. 19, 1946.	Agreement concerning postal exchange.
Dec. 5, 1946.	Trade and payments agreement.
Dec. 5, 1946.	Trade protocol for 1947, with annex.
Feb. 3, 1947.	Treaty concerning transfer to the USSR of part of the state territory of Finland in the region of the Janiskoski hydroelectric station and the Niskakoski control dam, with annex and map.
Feb. 3, 1947.	Agreement concerning use of the USSR of former German funds in Finland transferred to the USSR, with annex and two protocols.
Feb. 3, 1947.	Protocol concerning establishment of a Soviet-Finnish joint-stock company for production of artificial fibers.
Feb. 3, 1947.	Protocol concerning work of the Soviet combine Pechenga-Nikel' in Finland.
Feb. 10, 1947.	Treaty of peace, with six annexes.
Apr. 24, 1947.	Agreement concerning regulation of Lake Inari by means of the regulating dam at Niskakoski, with four annexes.

Apr. 24, 1947.	Rules for regulating the water level on Lake Inari in connection with operation of the Niskakoski dam.
May 24, 1947.	Agreement granting Finland the right of railroad transit for freight and passengers through the area of the Soviet naval base at Porkkala-Udd.
Oct. 14, 1947.	Agreement concerning direct rail transportation of passengers and freight between Helsinki and Leningrad.
Nov. 16, 1947.	Joint communique concerning negotiations.
Dec. 1, 1947.	Treaty of commerce, with annex concerning the Soviet Trade Mission in Finland.
Dec. 1, 1947.	Trade protocol for 1948.
Dec. 7, 1947.	Protocol concerning demarcation of the border in the area of the Janiskoski hydroelectric station and the Niskakoski control dam, with eight appendices.
Dec. 19, 1947.	Agreement concerning direct rail communications, with annex.
Mar. 13 and 16, 1948.	Exchange of notes concerning renewal of prewar treaties.
Apr. 6, 1948.	Treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance.
June 3, 1948.	Decision to reduce reparations payments.
June 19, 1948.	Convention concerning procedure for settling border disputes and incidents, with related documents.
Dec. 9, 1948.	Treaty concerning the regime on the state border, with final protocol.
Dec. 17, 1948.	Trade agreement for 1949.
June 1950.	Agreement defining trade contingents for three-way trade between the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Finland.
June 13, 1950.	Trade agreement for the period 1951-1955.
June 13, 1950.	Trade protocol for 1950.

May 29 and July 18, 1950. Exchange of notes concerning entry into force of the border protocol of Dec. 7, 1947.

Dec. 2, 1950. Trade protocol for 1951.

Dec. 21, 1951. Trade protocol for 1952.

Sept. 21, 1952. Trade agreement.

Sept. 23, 1952. Agreement concerning supplementary trade during 1952-1955.

Jan. 1, 1953. Changes in the agreement of Dec. 19, 1947, concerning direct railroad communications.

Feb. 23, 1953. Trade protocol for 1953.

June 1, and Aug. 26, 1953. Exchange of notes modifying the agreement of August 19, 1946, concerning postal exchange.

Nov. 25, 1953. Trade protocol for 1954.

Feb. 6, 1954. Agreement concerning a loan to Finland.

Apr. 29, 1954. Protocol concerning execution of the agreement of April 24, 1947, concerning regulation of Lake Inari.

Apr. 29, 1954. Protocol modifying the rules of April 24, 1947, for regulating the water level on Lake Inari.

July 17, 1954. Joint communique concerning negotiations.

July 17, 1954. Trade agreement for the period 1956-60.

Dec. 1, 1954. Communique concerning a visit to Finland of A. I. Mikoyan, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Jan. 24, 1955. Trade protocol for 1955.

Jan. 24, 1955. Agreement concerning a loan to Finland.

June 17, 1955. Supplementary protocol to the agreement of August 19, 1946, concerning telegraph and telephone communications.

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June 17, 1955.	Supplementary protocol to the agreement of August 19, 1946, concerning postal exchange.
Aug. 16, 1955.	Agreement concerning scientific and technical collaboration.
Sept. 15, 1955.	Agreement concerning renunciation by the USSR of rights to the use of the territory of Porkkala-Udd as a naval base and the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from the territory.
Sept. 19, 1955.	Protocol concerning extension of the treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance of April 6, 1948.
Sept. 20, 1955.	Joint communique concerning the visit to Moscow of J. K. Paasikivi, President of Finland.
Oct. 19, 1955.	Agreement concerning air communications.
Dec. 2, 1955.	Trade protocol for 1956.
Dec. 10, 1955.	Agreement concerning technical and commercial service on air communications between Moscow and Helsinki. an
Jan. 26, 1956.	Final protocol concerning transfer to Finland of the naval base and installations at Porkkala-Udd.
Mar. 3, 1956.	Communique concerning the first meeting of the USSR-Finland commission for scientific and technical collaboration.
May 25, 1956.	Protocol concerning transfer to the USSR of a hydro-electric station on the Rajakoski waterfall.
Sept. 14, 1956.	Agreement concerning trackage rights on Soviet railroads of freight trains of the Finnish railroads, with annex.
Oct. 18, 1956.	Communique concerning the second meeting of the Soviet-Finnish commission for scientific and technical collaboration.
Nov. 28, 1956.	Trade protocol for 1957 with annexes.

- Dec. 7, 1956. Agreement concerning collaboration between rescue service in the Baltic Sea.
- Feb. 2, 1957. Joint communique concerning political and economic relations.
- June 4, 1957. Communique concerning the third meeting of the Soviet-Finnish commission for scientific and technical collaboration.
- June 12, 1957. Joint communique concerning the visit of a Soviet governmental delegation to Finland.
- June 12, 1957 (approximate date). Supplementary trade protocol for 1957.
- Dec. 4, 1957. Trade protocol for 1958.

FINLAND, three-way

- Sept. 19, 1921. Agreement concerning telegraph communications (RSFSR, Finland, Norway).
- Aug. 19, 1925. Agreement defining areas subject to control under the convention of August 19, 1925, concerning suppression of the contraband traffic in alcoholic products (USSR, Estonia, Finland).
- Apr. 22, 1926. Protocol defining state borders under the agreement of August 19, 1925, supplementary to the convention of the same date concerning suppression of the contraband traffic in alcoholic products, with final protocol (USSR, Estonia, Finland).
- Oct. 26, 1945. Protocol defining the junction point of the borders of the USSR, Finland, and Norway (USSR, Norway, Finland).
- Dec. 3, 1947. Documents concerning the frontier mark erected at Muotkavaara (Krikfjellet) (USSR, Norway, Finland).
- June 29, 1949. Trade and payments agreement (USSR, Finland, Czechoslovakia).
- June 29, 1949. Trade and payments agreement (USSR, Finland, Poland).

1950.	Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland, Czechoslovakia).
1951.	Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland, Czechoslovakia).
Apr. 14, 1951.	Trade agreement (USSR, Finland, Poland).
Dec. 17, 1951.	Trade protocol (USSR, Finland, Poland).
1952.	Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland, Czechoslovakia).
Sept. 21, 1952.	Trade and payments agreement, with two annexes (USSR, Finland, Chinese People's Republic).
1953.	Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland, Czechoslovakia).
Feb. 7, 1953.	Protocol concerning maintenance of the border mark erected at Muotkavaara (Krokfjeller) (USSR, Finland, Norway).
1954.	Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland, Czechoslovakia).
1955.	Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland, Czechoslovakia).
Mar. 31, 1955.	Trade agreement (USSR, Finland, Poland).
1956.	Trade and payments protocol (USSR, Finland, Czechoslovakia).
Feb. 24, 1956.	Protocol concerning regulation of the water regime of the Pasvik-El'v river and Lake Inari, with regulations (USSR, Finland, Norway).
FINLAND, unverified	
July 1940.	Agreement concerning military use of Finnish railroads.

FINNISH DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, bilateral

Dec. 1, 1939.	Exchange of notes concerning recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations.
Dec. 2, 1939.	Treaty of mutual assistance and friendship.
Sept. 14, 1956.	Agreement concerning land transportation.
Dec. 7, 1956.	Agreement concerning humanitarian matters.
June 26, 1958.	Agreement concerning commodity trade.
Feb. 21, 1959.	Agreement concerning the conservation of specific resources.
Apr. 29, 1959.	Agreement concerning specific claims or waivers.
Oct. 22, 1959.	Agreement concerning general trade.
Dec. 22, 1959.	Agreement concerning loans and credits.
May 27, 1960.	Agreement concerning culture.
June 23, 1960.	Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
Nov. 24, 1960.	Agreement concerning customs duties.
Feb. 3, 1961.	Agreement concerning specific property.
Apr. 6, 1961.	Agreement concerning technical assistance.
Sept. 27, 1962.	Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
Apr. 24, 1964.	Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
May 20, 1965.	Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
Jan. 4, 1965.	Agreement concerning the conservation of specific resources.
Jan. 24, 1966.	Agreement concerning consular relations and citizenship.
May 5, 1967.	Agreement concerning conservation of specific resources.

Mar. 7, 1968.	Agreement concerning general transportation.
Oct. 18, 1968.	Agreement concerning land transportation.
May 14, 1969.	Agreement concerning atomic energy assistance.
May 30, 1969.	Agreement concerning education.
June 13, 1969.	Agreement concerning conservation of specific resources.

ICELAND

June 22 and 24, 1926.	Exchange of notes concerning recognition of the USSR <u>de jure</u> and establishment of diplomatic relations.
May 25, 1927.	Exchange of notes concerning the regime of most-favored-nation in trade relations.
July 27, Sept. 21 and Oct. 4, 1943.	Exchange of telegrams concerning establishment of diplomatic relations.
Aug. 1, 1953.	Trade and payments agreement, with two annexes.
Jan. 30 and Feb. 5, 1954.	Exchange of notes modifying the trade and payments agreement of August 1, 1953.
June 19, 1954.	Trade protocol.
Sept. 23, 1955.	Trade protocol for 1956.
Sept. 23, 1955.	Exchange of notes concerning an increase in the trade balance limit.
Dec. 3, 1955.	Agreement concerning transformation of diplomatic missions into embassies.
Sept. 27, 1956.	Trade protocol for 1957-1959.
Mar. 13, 1958.	Treaty concerning consular agreement and citizenship.
July 16, 1958.	Agreement concerning conservation of specific resources.

Aug. 18, 1958.	Agreement concerning loans and credits.
Mar. 14, 1960.	Agreement concerning consular agreement and citizenship.
May 17, 1960.	Agreement concerning finances and payments.
Apr. 25, 1961.	Agreement concerning general health, education, culture, welfare, labor.
Dec. 19, 1962.	Agreement concerning commodity trade.

NORWAY

Sept. 2, 1921.	Temporary agreement concerning political and economic relations.
Nov. 15, 1922.	Agreement concerning conditions of a loan offered by Norway to the RSFSR.
Feb. 15 and Mar. 10, 1924.	Exchange of notes concerning recognition of the USSR <u>de jure</u> .
Dec. 15, 1925.	Treaty of commerce and navigation, with final protocol.
Apr. 9, 1926.	Declaration concerning reciprocal recognition of tonnage measurement certificates.
June 9 and Oct. 26, 1927, and Jan. 16, 1928.	Exchanges of notes concerning mutual notification in the case of nations of either country being arrested in the other.
Feb. 24, 1928.	Convention concerning reciprocal protection of industrial property rights, with final protocol.
Mar. 12, 1932.	Trade agreement.
May 29, 1933.	Trade agreement for 1933.
May 19, 1934.	Trade agreement.
Apr. 10, 1941.	Trade and payments agreement.
Aug. 5, 1941.	Exchange of notes concerning re-establishment of diplomatic relations.

Aug. 1, 1942.	Exchange of notes concerning reorganization of diplomatic missions into embassies.
May 16, 1944.	Agreement concerning civil administration and jurisdiction in Norwegian territory after its liberation by Allied expeditionary forces.
1945.	Agreement concerning establishment of a mixed Soviet-Norwegian commission to investigate living and working conditions of Soviet citizens in German captivity in Norway.
Dec. 27, 1946.	Trade and payments agreement.
Dec. 27, 1946.	Trade protocol for 1947.
Feb. 11, 1947.	Agreement concerning establishment of telegraph and telephone communications.
Feb. 11, 1947.	Parcel post agreement, with final protocol.
Dec. 18, 1947.	Final protocol of the mixed Soviet-Norwegian border commission, with related documents, constituting an agreement for demarcation of the state border.
Dec. 22, 1947.	Informal agreement concerning trade in 1948.
Jan. 6, 1948.	Trade protocol for 1948.
Apr. 28, 1949.	Communique and protocol concerning work of a mixed Soviet-Norwegian commission to investigate living and working conditions of Soviet citizens in German captivity in Norway.
Jan. 10, 1949.	Trade protocol for 1949.
May 23, 1949.	Exchange of notes concerning approval and entry into force of the border protocol of December 18, 1947.
Dec. 29, 1949.	Treaty concerning the regime on the state border and procedure for settling border disputes and incidents, with related documents.

- July 2, 1953 (approximate date). Informal agreement concerning care of the graves of Soviet citizens killed in Norway during the war.
- Aug. 26 and Sept. 7, 1953. Exchange of notes modifying the parcel post agreement of February 11, 1947.
- Jan. 25, 1954. Trade protocol for 1954.
- May 23, 1955. Trade protocol for 1955.
- Nov. 15, 1955. Joint communique concerning diplomatic negotiations.
- Nov. 15, 1955. Trade protocol for the period 1956-1958.
- Nov. 15, 1955. Supplementary trade protocol for 1956.
- Mar. 31, 1956. Agreement concerning air communications, with two annexes and an exchange of notes.
- Oct. 12, 1956. Agreement concerning cultural collaboration.
- Oct. 19, 1956. Agreement concerning collaboration in rescuing persons in distress and in searching for missing persons in the Barents Sea, with the exchange of notes.
- Feb. 5, 1957. Supplementary trade protocol for 1957.
- Feb. 15, 1957. Agreement concerning the sea boundary in the Varanger Fjord.
- June 7, 1957. (approximate date). Protocol concerning joint exploitation of the hydroelectric resources of the border river Pasvik-El'v (Paatso-Joki).
- Aug. 1, 1957. Protocol concerning demarcation of the maritime boundary.
- Nov. 22, 1957. Agreement concerning measures for regulating seal-hunting and for protection of seal reserves in the North-eastern Atlantic Ocean, with annex and exchange of notes.
- Nov. 29, 1957. Final documents concerning demarcation of the border in the Varanger Fjord.

- Dec. 18, 1957. Agreement concerning exploitation of the hydro-electric resources of the Pasvik-El'v river.
- NORWAY, three-way
- Sept. 19, 1921. Agreement concerning telegraph communications (RSFSR, Norway, Finland).
- Oct. 26, 1945. Protocol defining the junction point of the borders of the USSR, Finland, and Norway (USSR, Norway, Finland).
- Dec. 3, 1947. Documents concerning the frontier mark erected at Muotkavaara (Krokfjellet) (USSR, Norway, Finland).
- Feb. 7, 1953. Protocol concerning maintenance of the border mark erected at Muotkavaara (Krokfjeller) (USSR, Norway, Finland).
- Feb. 24, 1956. Protocol concerning regulation of the water regime of the Pasvik-El'v river and Lake Inari, with regulations (USSR, Norway, Finland).
- Oct. 20, 1958. Agreement concerning culture.
- Sept. 30, 1959. Agreement concerning claims and debts.
- Dec. 9, 1959. Agreement concerning specific claims or waivers.
- May 12, 1961. Agreement concerning consular agreements and citizenship.
- Feb. 22, 1963. Agreement concerning conservation of specific resources.
- Apr. 16, 1962. Agreement concerning conservation of specific resources.
- Dec. 24, 1963. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
- Aug. 8, 1964. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.
- Jan. 29, 1965. Agreement concerning finances and payments.
- May 6, 1965. Agreement concerning consular agreements and citizenship.

Dec. 18, 1967. Agreement concerning boundaries of territory.

July 9, 1968. Agreement of administrative cooperation.

NORWAY, multi-lateral treaties

Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, with annex
Signed Feb. 9, 1920, in Paris.

Soviet adherence by decree of Feb. 27, 1935. Entered into force for the USSR May 7, 1935.

SWEDEN

June 1, 1918. Trade agreement.

Oct. 28, 1918. Trade agreement.

Oct. 31, 1918. Agreement supplementing the trade agreement of October 28, 1918.

Mar. 15, 1924. Commercial agreement.

Mar. 15, 1924. Declaration concerning claims.

Mar. 15 and 18, 1924. Exchange of notes concerning recognition of the USSR de jure.

Sept. 12, 1924. Agreement concerning exchange of parcel post and insured letters.

July 21, 1926. Exchange of notes concerning reciprocal protection of trade-marks.

Feb. 2, 1927. Exchange of notes constituting an agreement on rights and immunities of consuls.

Oct. 9, 1927. Convention concerning the legal status of the Soviet Trade Mission in Sweden, with final protocol.

Apr. 1940. Agreement concerning regular air communications during the summer of 1940.

Sept. 1940. Agreement concerning repatriation of persons of Swedish origin from Estonia.

Sept. 7, 1940.	Trade and payments agreement.
Sept. 7, 1940.	Agreement concerning an arbitration court.
Sept. 7, 1940.	Trade agreement for 1940-1941.
Sept. 7, 1940.	Credit agreement, with protocol.
May 30, 1941.	Agreement concerning settlement of property claims relating to the Baltic States.
Nov. 4, 1941.	Protocol concerning regulation of questions concerning trade under wartime conditions.
Oct. 7, 1949.	Protocol modifying and extending the trade and payments agreement of September 7, 1940, with two lists.
Oct. 7, 1946.	Credit agreement with annex, list, and protocol.
Oct. 7, 1946.	Exchange of notes concerning an increase in trade.
Oct. 7, 1946.	Exchange of notes concerning prices for goods purchased in Sweden by the USSR.
Oct. 7, 1946	Informal agreement concerning settlement of certain property claims arising out of the war.
Oct. 25, 1946.	Agreement concerning establishment of regular air communications.
Oct. 25, 1946.	Protocol concerning flights using air facilities in Finland.
Nov. 5, 1946.	Parcel post agreement.
Dec. 10, 1946.	Exchange of notes concerning entry into force of the trade protocol of Oct. 7, 1946.
Jan. 30, 1947.	Agreement concerning general conditions for delivery of goods to the USSR, with annex.
Dec. 31, 1947.	Trade protocol for 1948.
Apr. 2, 1949.	Trade protocol for 1949.

- Apr. 9, 1953. Trade protocol for 1953.
- June 29 and Aug. 26, 1953. Exchange of notes modifying the parcel post agreement of November 5, 1946.
- Jan. 23, 1954. Protocol modifying the agreement of October 25, 1946, concerning establishment of regular air communications.
- Feb. 2, 1954. Trade protocol for 1954.
- Sept. 29, 1954. Agreement concerning cooperation for rescue in the Baltic Sea.
- Nov. 24 and Dec. 4, 1954. Exchange of notes modifying the parcel post agreement of November 5, 1946.
- Apr. 22, 1955. Trade protocol for 1955.
- Dec. 9, 1955. Trade protocol for 1956.
- Mar. 31, 1956. Agreement concerning air communications, with two annexes and two exchanges of notes.
- Apr. 3, 1956. Joint communique concerning political negotiations.
- Dec. 21, 1957. Trade protocol for 1958.
- SWEDEN, four-way
- Aug. 9, 1918. Agreement concerning exchange of civilian and military personnel (RSFSR, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland).
- SWEDEN, unratified
- Mar. 1, 1922. Temporary commercial treaty.
- Mar. 16, 1934. Agreement concerning a loan by Sweden of one hundred million Swedish crowns.
- Mar. 27, 1958. Agreement concerning facilities and property.
- Mar. 28, 1958. Agreement concerning privileges and immunities.
- Feb. 2, 1962. Agreement concerning general trade.
- Nov. 30, 1967. Agreement concerning consular agreement and citizenship.

APPENDIX B: Finno-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance*

*Reproduced from U.N. Treaty Series, 1950, pp. 156-160.

TRANSLATION — TRADUCTION

No. 742. TREATY¹ OF FRIENDSHIP, CO-OPERATION AND
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE REPUBLIC
OF FINLAND. SIGNED AT MOSCOW, ON 6 APRIL 1948

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the President of the Republic of Finland,

With a view to the further development of friendly relations between the USSR and Finland,

Being convinced that the strengthening of good-neighbourly relations and co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Finland is in accordance with the vital interests of both countries,

Considering Finland's endeavours not to be involved in clashes between the interests of the great Powers, and

Being inflexibly resolved to co-operate in the interests of maintaining international peace and security in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Have decided for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Vyacheslav Mihailovich MOLOTOV, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR;

The President of the Republic of Finland: Mauno PEKKALA, Prime Minister of the Republic of Finland,

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1

Should either Finland, or the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland, become the object of military aggression on the part of Germany or any Power allied with Germany, Finland will carry out its duty as a sovereign State and

¹ Came into force on 31 May 1948, by the exchange of the instruments of ratification at Helsinki, in accordance with article 8.

will fight to repel aggression. In so doing, Finland will direct all the forces at its disposal towards defending the integrity of its territory on land, sea and air, acting within the limits of its boundaries, in accordance with its obligations under the present Treaty, with the help, if necessary, of the Soviet Union or together with the Soviet Union.

In the above-mentioned cases the Soviet Union will extend to Finland any necessary assistance, this to be supplied as mutually agreed between the Parties.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties will consult together in case there is found to be a threat of the military aggression referred to in Article 1.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties affirm their intention to participate, in the sincerest fashion, in all action for the maintenance of international peace and security in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties confirm the undertaking contained in article 3 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Paris on 10 February 1947¹ not to enter into any alliance or take part in any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.

Article 5

The High Contracting Parties affirm their resolve to act in a spirit of co-operation and friendship for the further development and strengthening of the economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and Finland.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties agree to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for their national sovereignty and independence and of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other State.

Article 7

The present Treaty will be implemented in conformity with the principles of the United Nations.

¹ See page 203 of this volume.

Article 8

The present Treaty will be subject to ratification and will remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force. The Treaty will come into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which will take place at Helsinki as soon as possible.

If neither of the High Contracting Parties gives notice one year before the expiration of the said ten-year period that it wishes to denounce the Treaty, it will remain in force for a further five years, until such time as either High Contracting Party gives notice in writing one year before the expiration of the current five-year period of its intention to terminate the Treaty.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and attached their seals thereto.

DONE at Moscow on 6 April 1948, in two copies, each in the Russian and Finnish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

By authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:	By authorization of the President of the Republic of Finland:
(Signed) V. MOLOTOV	(Signed) MAUNO PEKKALA
[SEAL]	[SEAL]

APPENDIX C: A Survey of Government Interaction Between the USSR and the Scandinavian States from 1 January 1966 to 31 December 1975.

Summary

Significant quantitative patterns emerge from a survey of interaction between the Kremlin and the respective Scandinavian governments since 1966:

1. A marked variance in amount of interaction between the USSR and the respective Scandinavian states, which in turn suggests:
 - a. Soviet relations with some Scandinavian states is more active than with others.
 - b. The relations of the respective Scandinavian states with the Soviet Union may be ranked in order of interaction.
 - c. The degree of interaction reflects
 - (1) Issues or conflicts that occur more frequently between the USSR and some Scandinavian states than others.
 - (2) An allocation of government resources, bureaucratic attention and leadership concern commensurate with the level of interaction with other states.
 - (3) The focus of foreign policy and related national, governmental or Party interests and objectives.
2. The number of reported interactions since 1970 is equal to the number of reported interactions from 1966 to 1970, suggesting no overall shift in Soviet-Scandinavian relations in this decade.

3. The number of reported interactions between the USSR and Norway increased significantly this decade over the previous five-year period.

4. Interaction with Finland has decreased significantly in the last five years.

5. Relations with Finland over the entire reporting period have reflected predominant accord.

6. Relations with Sweden over the entire reporting period have reflected predominant discord.

Operational Definitions

"Approval" or "accord": Interaction observed by government officials or an official (government) news agency to be in consonance with national policy.

"Disapproval" or "discord": Interaction observed by government officials or an official news agency to be in conflict with national policy.

"Heads of State": President, prime minister or foreign minister.

Data source: Summaries of inter-governmental actions reported in the N. Y. Times Index and filed in the WEIS data bank for computer print-out. "World Event Interaction Study Report," Textscan, September 1976, designed by University of Southern California, School of Politics and International Relations, (Monterey, California: U. S. Naval Postgraduate School Computer Center, 1976).

**APPENDIX D: Indicators of Comparative Economic Strength
(Tables 27-28)**

The following tables are provided through the courtesy of Luci Korner with the permission of the U. S. Department of State, (Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Reference INR Report No. 619, 2 Nov 76)

TABLE 27
Table I. Indicators of Comparative East-West Economic Strength, 1975

Item	Unit	European OECD	US	Canada	Japan	Australia and New Zealand	Yugoslavia	Total West	USSR	Other Eastern Europe ^{a/}	People's Republic of China	Cuba	Total Communist countries listed ^{b/}	Rest of world
Population (mid-1975)	Millions	382	214	23	111	17	21	768	255	109	935	9.3	1,308	2,004
GNP, total ^{c/}	Billion dollars	1,745	1,516	158	491	95	35	4,040	787	321	237	9	1,354	889
Per capita GNP ^{c/}	Dollars	4,568	7,099	6,935	4,425	5,724	1,649	5,266	3,091	2,959	253	968	1,035	443
Foreign trade														
Imports (c.i.t.)	Billion dollars	389.9	d/96.9	d/34.0	57.9	d/13.2	7.7	599.6	d/37.0	d/52.3	7.4	3.8	100.5	198.5
Exports (f.o.b.)	Billion dollars	361.5	107.7	32.3	55.8	14.1	4.1	575.5	33.3	44.9	6.9	3.4	88.5	212.7
Trade balance	Billion dollars	-28.4	+10.8	-1.7	-2.1	+0.9	-3.6	-24.1	-3.7	-7.4	-0.5	-0.4	-12.0	+14.2
Exports as percentage of GNP	Percentages	20.7	7.1	20.4	11.4	14.8	11.7	14.1	4.2	14.0	2.9	37.8	6.5	23.9
Production ^{e/}														
Coal	Million MT	321	581	23	18	73	18	1,034	566	378	427	none	1,371	187
Crude steel	Million MT	152	106	13	102	8	3	384	141	51	26	0.2	218	39
Electric power	Billion KWH	1,410	2,000	278	476	94	40	4,298	1,038	342	121	6.5	1,508	562
Crude petroleum	Million MT	27	413	70	1	20	4	535	491	20	78	0.1	589	1,513
Primary aluminum	Thousand MT	3,067	3,519	913	1,016	333	168	9,016	2,450	486	320(1974)	none	3,256	454
Motor vehicles, total	Thousands	10,846	1/8,985	1,424	6,948	9,436	150	28,789	1,964	849	145	none	2,958	1,298
Passenger cars	Thousands	9,548	1/6,713	1,045	4,572	9,351	130	22,359	1,201	624	n.a.	none	1,825	836
Commercial vehicles	Thousands	1,298	1/2,272	379	2,376	9/85	20	6,430	763	225	145	none	1,133	462

NOTES

1. Data shown are latest available at time of publication but are subject to revisions.
2. Some data represent new estimates and therefore are not comparable with data published in the 1975 edition of the "Indicators."
3. All figures are rounded, but computations for per capita data and percentages are based on unrounded data.

Footnotes

- a. Includes Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.

- b. There are no reliable data available for other Asian Communist areas. Their share in the total for Communist countries is insignificant.
- c. For the Western countries, data are not adjusted for the purchasing power equivalents of the dollar, which are lower in many countries outside the U.S. currencies were converted into dollars at average 1975 trade conversion factors, as published by OECD. GNP values for Communist countries and for the "Rest of the World" are based on Department of State estimates.
- d. Imports f.o.b. except for New Zealand and Hungary which are c.i.f.
- e. Hard coal and lignite in terms of hard-coal equivalents.
- f. Factory sales.
- g. Including assembly.

TABLE 28
Table 2. Indicators of Economic Strength of Western Europe, the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, 1975

Item		Population mid-1975 (millions)	Gross National Product ^{a/} b/		Defense Expenditures ^{b/} c/		Foreign Trade ^{b/}		
Country or Area	Total (billion dollars)		Per capita (dollars)	Total (billion dollars)	As percentage of GNP	Imports (c.i.f.)	Exports (f.o.b.) (Billion dollars)	Balance	Exports as percentage of GNP
Belgium	9.80	63.4	6,474	1.9	3.0	30.7	28.8	-1.9	43.9
Luxembourg	0.36	2.2	5,992	insig.	1.0	10.3	8.7	-1.6	24.2
Denmark	5.06	36.0	7,106	0.9	2.5	54.2	52.2	-2.0	15.5
France	52.91	337.9	6,366	13.2	3.9	75.6	91.4	+15.8	21.6
Federal Republic of Germany	61.83	423.0	6,842	15.5	3.7	3.8	3.2	-0.6	39.8
Ireland	3.13	8.1	2,575	0.1	1.6	38.4	34.8	-3.6	20.2
Italy	55.81	171.6	3,074	4.5	2.6	35.1	34.4	-0.7	42.9
Netherlands	13.65	80.3	5,886	2.9	3.6	53.3	43.8	-9.5	19.1
UK	55.96	228.8	4,089	11.3	4.9	301.4	297.3	-4.1	22.0
Total EC	258.51	1,351.3	5,227	50.3	3.7	53	23	-3.0	10.0
Greece	9.05	22.8	2,525	1.4	6.0	0.5	0.3	-0.2	25.3
Iceland	0.22	1.2	5,541	none	none	7.2	7.2	-2.5	25.8
Norway	4.01	27.8	6,944	0.9	3.2	3.8	1.9	-1.9	13.1
Portugal	8.76	14.8	1,690	1.0	7.0	4.6	1.4	-3.2	3.9
Turkey	39.18	36.4	929	1.4	4.0	321.5	307.2	-14.3	21.3
Total European NATO ^{d/}	316.60	1,446.2	4,568	54.9	3.8	94	75	-1.9	19.8
Austria	7.52	38.0	5,051	0.4	1.2	76	55	-21	20.9
Finland	4.71	26.4	5,800	0.4	1.4	16.3	7.7	-8.6	7.6
Spain	35.47	101.1	2,851	2.8	2.8	18.0	17.4	-0.6	25.1
Sweden	8.20	69.3	8,450	2.3	3.4	13.3	13.0	-0.3	23.1
Switzerland	6.40	56.0	8,754	1.1	1.9	389.9	361.5	-28.4	20.7
Total European OECD	382.03	1,745.1	4,568	62.0	3.6	7.7	4.1	-3.6	11.7
Yugoslavia	21.35	35.2	1,649	n.a.	n.a.	397.6	365.6	-32.0	20.5
Total	403.38	1,780.3	4,114	62.0	3.6	e/96.9	107.7	+10.8	7.1
US	213.61	1,516.3	7,099	89.0	5.9	e/34.0	32.3	-1.7	20.4
Canada	22.33	158.3	6,935	3.1	1.9	452.4	447.2	-5.2	14.3
Total NATO ^{d/}	553.04	3,120.8	5,643	147.0	4.7	55.8	55.8	-2.1	11.4
Japan	110.95	491.0	4,425	9/4.3	0.9	e/10.0	1.9	+1.9	14.3
Australia	13.50	83.3	6,168	9/2.5	3.0	3.2	2.2	-1.0	18.7
New Zealand	3.09	11.7	3,785	9/0.2	2.0	599.6	575.5	-24.1	14.1
Total	767.36	4,040.9	5,266	161.1	4.0				

TABLE 28 (continued)
Table 2. Indicators of Economic Strength of Western Europe, the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand,
1975 - Continued

Country or Area	Item	General index 1970 = 100	Coal ^{1/} (million MT)	Crude Steel (million MT)	Electric power (billion kWh)	Crude petroleum (million MT)	Primary aluminum (thousand MT)	Motor Vehicles (thousands)	
								Passenger cars	Commercial vehicles
Belgium		108	7.5	11.6	41.0	none	none	none	none
Luxembourg		93	4.6	0.6	1.5	none	none	none	none
Denmark		n.a.	none	0.6	17.1	0.2	none	none	none
France		112	25.5	21.5	177.5	1.0	382.8	2,952.0	326.0
Federal Republic of Germany		105	131.2	40.4	301.8	5.7	678.0	2,904.0	288.0
Ireland		115	integ.	0.1	7.5	none	none	none	none
Italy		109	0.6	21.8	149.3	1.0	194.4	1,344.0	108.2
Netherlands		115	4.8	54.3	54.3	1.4	260.4	50.3	10.8
UK		103	128.7	20.1	272.2	1.1	308.4	1,272.0	384.0
Total EC		106	293.5	125.5	1,022.2	10.4	1,824.0	8,522.3	1,128.0
Greece		151	5.9	0.9	14.6	none	135.6	none	none
Iceland		n.a.	none	none	2.3	none	61.7	none	none
Norway		128	0.4	0.9	77.6	9.3	590.4	none	none
Portugal		132	0.2	0.4	10.5	none	none	none	none
Turkey		n.a.	6.9	1.5	15.6	3.1	integ.	none	none
Total European NATO ^{2/}		109	306.9	129.1	1,135.3	22.8	2,611.7	8,522.3	1,128.0
Austria		118	1.7	4.5	35.2	2.0	88.8	0.2	6.5
Finland		122	none	1.6	28.8	none	none	none	none
Sweden		140	12.3	11.1	82.4	1.7	210.0	709.2	112.8
Switzerland		115	none	5.2	79.2	none	77.4	1/50.4	1/50.4
Switzerland		97	none	0.5	41.8	none	79.2	none	none
Total European OECD		110	320.9	152.1	1,410.2	26.5	3,087.1	9,548.1	1,287.7
Yugoslavia		147	18.1	2.9	39.9	3.7	168.0	129.6	20.4
Total		111	339.0	155.0	1,450.1	30.2	3,235.1	9,677.7	1,318.1
US		107	580.7	105.8	1,999.7	412.5	3,519.0	1/6,713.0	1/2,272.0
Canada		120	22.9	13.0	278.0	89.9	912.6	1,045.2	379.2
Total NATO ^{3/}		108	910.5	247.9	3,413.0	505.2	7,043.3	16,280.5	3,779.2
Japan		110	18.1	102.3	476.0	0.6	1,016.4	4,572.0	2,376.0
Australia		110	71.1	8.1	74.1	19.3	223.2	1/351.1	1/84.8
New Zealand		n.a.	1.8	0.2	19.7	0.2	109.8	none	none
Total		109	1,033.6	384.4	4,297.6	532.7	9,016.1	22,359.0	6,430.1

NOTES
1. Data shown are latest available at time of publication but are subject to revisions.
2. Some data represent new estimates and therefore are not comparable with data published in the 1975 edition of the "Indicators."
3. All figures are rounded, but computation for per capita data and percentages are based on unrounded data.

FOOTNOTES
a. Data are not adjusted for the purchasing power equivalents of the dollar, which are lower in many countries outside the US.
b. Currencies are converted into dollars at average 1975 trade conversion factors, as published by OECD. See table 3.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE ACCORDING TO NATO DEFINITIONS FOR NATO COUNTRIES. GENERALLY, BUDGET DATA ARE USED FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. TOTALS DO NOT INCLUDE YUGOSLAVIA.

d. Total of countries listed above, except Ireland.
e. F.o.b.
f. European NATO plus the US and Canada.
g. Fiscal years. For Japan and New Zealand ending Mar. 31, 1976; for Australia ending June 30, 1976.
h. Totals are based on OECD and UN weights. Totals only for countries for which information was available.
i. Hard coal and lignite in terms of hard-coal equivalents.
j. Including assembly.
k. Factory sales.

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1